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ABSTRACT
SOVIET AND MARXIST THEORIES OF ACCUMULATION
by
Nicholas N. Kozlov 
University of New Hampshire, May, 1988
The theoretical conceptions of capitalist economy held 
by socialists are surprisingly neglected in efforts to ex­
plain socialist political practice. Most explanations of 
politics, including those offered by Marxists themselves, 
emphasize personal, ideological, etc., factors. By providing 
a 'theoretical economic history' of the mainstream Marxist 
labor movement in the years roughly 1860-1930, this study 
contributes to an inductive justification for the claim that 
the theory of capitalism implicitly or explicitly held by 
Marxist politicians is a considerably more important deter­
minant of their political conclusions than is generally 
admitted.
After a relatively concise treatment of the First and 
pre-war Second Internationals, in which the general methodo­
logical approach will be revealed and some more or less 
minor errors of interpretation by various analysts will be 
corrected, attention will shift to the Third International 
in the years prior to the advent of fascism in Germany. The 
usefulness of theoretical economic history will be most 
forcefully evident here, as it will be demonstrated that the
iii
politics of the Third International, contrary to most ac­
counts, are not primarily rooted in factional struggles 
within the Russian party, the general economic/political 
problems of socialist construction in Soviet Russia, Sta­
lin’s personality, etc. Rather, it will be shown that the 
key transformations of the Third International's political 
orientation derived from the prevailing theory of capital­
ism in communist circles.
iv
INTRODUCTION
The elaboration of an adequate economic theory of cap­
italism has been a central feature of the Marxist project 
(the work of Karl Marx and his followers) ever since Marx
himself together with Frederick Engels decided "to settle
1
accounts" with their philosophically grounded outlook. From 
the outset, the concern with economic theory has involved 
more than the mere satisfaction of intellectual curiosity 
about the nature and dynamics of capitalist economy. In good 
measure, Marxists have traditionally desired a scientific 
theory of capitalism as the pragmatic prerequisite for elab­
orating a concrete strategy and tactics for the advance to 
socialism, i^.e., to root their conception of this advance in 
something other than the propagandistic notion of socialism
as an ethical ideal. This has been true of Marxists with
2
quite diverse orientations. As such, most Marxists would 
probably not object to assigning an important role to the 
development of economic theory as an explanation of the 
progress of Marxist political practice.
This study will be a 'theoretical economic history' of 
the mainstream Marxist labor movement in the years roughly 
1860-1930, i , encompassing the First and (pre-war) Second 
socialist Internationals and the Third International (or 
Communist International or Comintern) in the period up to 
the advent of fascism in Germany. The terra 'theoretical 
economic history* designates a method in which the principal
objects of analysis are the competing theoretical concep­
tions of capitalist economy holding sway over political 
agents. The critical analysis of these theoretical concep­
tions then becomes the primary instrument for the organiza­
tion and comprehension of historical events as such, includ­
ing the ’choices’ made by individuals. The general useful­
ness or sensibility of this approach will not be defended a
priori--superb accounts of realist methodology are elsewhere
3
available. Rather, this study seeks to provide some induc­
tive support for the writing of theoretical economic history 
(at least for the specific example under consideration) by 
demonstrating how this approach can clarify and rectify
ambiguities and errors produced by the ’standard'
4
histories.
The principal claim advanced herein is that the theo­
retical conception of the capitalist economy held by social­
ists at any particular moment is a considerably more signif­
icant determinant of their political conclusions than is 
generally admitted, and that therefore these theoretical 
conceptions should be accorded prominent status in any ef­
fort to explain socialist political thinking. The usefulness 
of this approach will become most forcefully apparent in the 
contrast between the First and Second Internationals on the 
one hand, and the Third International on the other.
* * *
Among the political issues confronted by the First and 
Second Internationals was the problem of working class in­
2
ternationalism, .e^  , the problem of whether and to what 
extent workers in different countries would be able to 
overcome nationalist strivings and stand in solidarity as a 
class against the bourgeoisie. The outbreak of World War I 
put an end to any illusions that proletarian international­
ism was a given, as masses of workers, without apparent 
reluctance, went forth to slaughter one another in the name 
of the fatherland.
Let the notion of proletarian internationalism at this 
point refer to the more or less well-defined claim that to 
be a proletarian (propertyless wage-worker) implies some 
form of solidarity or commonality of interests with other 
workers that transcends national boundaries. Such a notion 
of working class internationalism can plainly be seen to 
antedate (and of course overstep the bounds of) the emer­
gence of a specifically Marxist section of the working class 
5
movement. Nonetheless, it does not seem unreasonable to 
venture that the most unambiguous claims about the basis for 
proletarian internationalism stem from the thinking of Karl 
Marx and Frederick Engels. Since the time of the writing of 
the Manifesto of the Communist Party, the slogan "The work­
ing men have no country" has come to be either vilified or
6
revered, depending on political perspective.
Even a cursory survey of the literature in the Marxist 
tradition, however, shows that it would be difficult to 
ascribe a specific content to the term 'internationalism', 
since its practical meaning has ranged from the very strong 
claim that proletarians cannot be persuaded to participate
in imperialist wars to the much weaker notion that workers
in one capitalist nation do not materially benefit (suffer)
from the greater (lesser) exploitation of workers in another
7
capitalist nation or colony.
The first two chapters of this study will serve to show 
that (by and large) the political leadership of the Second 
International failed to appreciate a crucial feature of 
Marx’s theory of capitalism, viz., that any effort to for­
mulate a general (in the sense of universal and non­
contradictory) material-economic basis either for the neces­
sity of proletarian internationalism or its necesary ab­
sence, even in the weaker sense of the term, is misplaced.
An understanding of the prospects for working class interna­
tionalism must be the result of analysis rather than an 
assumption, or a concept present throughout the analysis in 
an untransformed ste.te from start to finish, or a ’fact' 
given by history. Consequently, internationalism should be 
viewed as a political program to be realized, rather than an 
objective economically determined ’condition’ in which the 
proletariat either does or does not find itself. The corol­
lary suggests that historically observable lapses in inter­
national working class solidarity are not to be explained 
solely by reference to the political and ideological levels 
of the social structure. Rather, uneven and contradictory 
determinations affecting working class relations can, and 
indeed must, also be conceived at the economic level itself. 
This is most emphatically not a denial of the significance
4
of politics and ideology for a complete analysis. The point 
is that uneven and contradictory tendencies should be ex­
pected to operate not only between levels, but within levels 
as well.
The bulk of this study will be devoted to the Third 
International, insofar as this will be where the approach 
adopted herein yields the most striking and controversial 
results. The great historical advance of the Third Interna­
tional consisted in the practical recovery of the insight 
(into the contradictory and complex economic determinations 
of politics) only gradually arrived at by Marx over the 
course of his theoretical and political activity. IVith the 
founding of the Comintern in 1919, there was a radical 
displacement of the conditions in which the internationalism 
controversy had up until then developed. The strict organi­
zational imperatives of the Third International (more on 
these later) purposely rendered membership by uncommitted 
internationalists for all intents and purposes impossible. 
But recognition of the non-deterministic nature of politics 
masked a significant shortcoming. Political disagreements 
within the Comintern, and disputes between the Comintern and 
reformist working class organizations, were implicitly ex­
plained by or ascribed to ideological factors. In other 
words, the theory-dependence of political conclusions was 
not clearly and unambiguously recognized.'
This practical failure has, not surprisingly, been 
reproduced in the historical accounts of the Third Interna­
tional. Many if not most Marxist and mainstream explanations
of the crucial 'left turn' (supposedly around mid-1928) in
the political orientation of the Comintern maintain that the
left turn in Soviet -domestic policies v/as merely transmitted
to the Comintern's international policy and/or that the left
turn stemmed from the triumph of Joseph V. Stalin's faction
in the struggle within the Russian Communist Party (bolshe-
8
vik), the RCP(b). The third chapter of this study will 
rectify such conceptions by showing that the origins of the 
left turn considerably predate Stalin's ascent to power and 
surprisingly must be ascribed to the theory of 'capitalist 
stabilization' associated with Nikolai I. Bukharin. The few 
Marxist writers who appear to take seriously economic theory 
as a significant explanation of political conclusions will 
be subjected to critical scrutiny, from which it will be 
seen that their references to the importance of economic 
theory in Comintern thinking either miss the mark or are 
more gestural than analytical.
f3
Notes to Introduction
1. This break with a philosophical conception of history 
took place, by Marx's own account, in 1845 with the writing 
of The German Ideology. Karl Marx, A Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy (New York: International Pub­
lishers, 197Q), 22.
2. See for example the Manifesto of the Connunist Party, 
written jointly by Marx and Engels, the entire third section 
of which is a critique of non-scientific socialist thinking. 
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works vol. 6 (New 
York: International Publishers, 1976), 507-517. See also 
Frederick Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (New 
York: International Publishers, 1975); Lucio Colletti, 
"Marxism: Science or Revolution?" in his From Rousseau to 
Lenin (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974); Roy Medvedev, 
Leninism and Western Socialism (London: Verso, 1981).
3. A readable survey is in A.F. Chalmers, What Is This Thing 
Called Science? (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of 
Queensland Press, 1979), chapters 10-12. Also David-Hillel 
Ruben, Marxism and Materialism: A Study in the Marxist 
Theory of Knowledge (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1979); 
Gregor McLennan, Marxism and the Methodologies of History 
(London: Verso, 1981).
4. Rather than providing a general survey of the literature 
at this time, each chapter will discuss those writings 
specific to the subject matter of the chapter.
5. For a brief survey of pre-Marxian socialism, consult the 
early chapters of G.D.H. Cole, A History of Socialist 
Thought vol. 1 (London: MacMillan^ 19677. Note that many 
staunchly conservative— and in truth nationalist— North 
American trade unions continue to carry the word ’interna­
tional* in their titles.
6. Marx and Engels, Collected Works vol. 6, 502.
7. The ’strong* claim was prevalent in the pre-1914 Second 
International, a federation of Marxist and progressive po­
litical parties and trade unions founded in 1889. The 'weak* 
claim forms the basis of * modern’ internationalist thinking, 
well represented by the work of Charles Bettelheim. See his 
debate with Arghiri Emmanuel in the appendixes to the lat­
ter’ s Unequal Exchange (New York: Monthly Review Press,
1972). See also Arghiri Emmanuel, "The Delusions of Interna­
tionalism," Monthly Review 22, 2 (June 1970); Michael 
Kidron, Capitalism and Theory (London: Pluto Press, 1974) 
claims a privileged, even exclusive, role for the Western 
working class in the socialist revolution.
8. Consider for example Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political
Biography (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 403.
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CHAPTER I
KARL MARX AND FREDERICK ENGELS
A. Descriptive Assessments of the Accumulation Process and
Capitalist Development
The founders of scientific socialism, Karl Marx and 
Frederick Engels, were of course supremely concerned to 
analyze the conditions of the working class movement, na­
tionally as well as internationally. At first sight, it
1
might appear that both Marx and Engels considered that the 
process of capital accumulation would simply negate all 
national differences in the forces and relations of produc­
tion and in the objective conditions of existence of the 
working classes.
It is easy to identify numerous instances where Marx 
and Engels emphasized the homogenizing effects of the de­
velopment and expansion of the capitalist mode of produc- 
2
tion. In the late 1840s Marx observed the progressive
aspects of free trade (as against protectionism), Insofar as
3
its generalization would speed the social revolution; like­
wise, Engels wrote of the "levelled social development" in
the bourgeois countries and the implications of this for the
4
international character of the coming revolution.
In The German Ideology, written jointly in 1846, Marx 
and Engels conceived the process of development in highly 
general terms. The concept of a mode of production as an 
historically delimited and specific category is entirely
3
absent. Instead, a series of chapters subsumes analyses of 
feudal society, the manufactory period and industrial capi­
talism proper under a (rather Smithian) discussion of devel­
opment per se as the progressive extension of the division 
of labor. Thus the guild system emerges as a deepening of 
the town-country contradiction (itself a product of "the 
transition from barbarism to civilization"), manufacture is 
an example of the "further division of labor," and indus­
trial capitalism represents the "most extensive division of 
5
labor."
The 'final phase’ of the divsion of labor, industrial 
capitalism, compelled each nation "that wished to retain its 
historical role" to adopt large scale machine production. A 
world market arose, increasing the interdependence of na­
tions. The transformation of capital into industrial capital 
facilitated rapid circulation and centralization. Finally, 
industrial capitalism
made natural science subservient to capital and took from 
the division of labor the last semblance of its natural 
character.... It completed the victory of the town over 
the country.[6]
Under these conditions the revolution would be
carried through by the class which no longer counts as a 
class in society... and is in itself the expression of the 
dissolution of all classes, nationalities, etc., within 
present society.[7]
While the bourgeoisies of the respective industrial coun­
tries were pitted against each other in struggle, "large 
scale industry created a class which in all nations has the
8
same interest and for which nationality is already dead..." 
Engels delivered a speech in 1847 (at a commemoration
9
of the Polish uprising of 1830) which stressed how the 
development of the capitalist node of production had fos­
tered the "elimination of opposed interests which previously 
divided the different sections of workers." Owing to the 
application of machinery to production, "the condition of
the workers of all countries is the s a m e t h e i r  interests 
9
are the same."
The perception that capitalist development engendered a 
levelling tendency seemed to apply more or less equally to 
conditions within a single capitalist country, between capi­
talist countries, and even between capitalist countries and 
their non-capitalist colonies, the effect of coloni­
alism, in Marx's and Engels' views, was to tear asunder 
traditional societies and implant a West European type of 
capitalist development. Thus in the Manifesto of the Com­
munist Party they wrote:
The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revo­
lutionary part. The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the 
upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, 
idyllic relations....
The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolu­
tionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the 
relations of production, and with them the whole rela­
tions of society....
The need of a constantly expanding market for its 
products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of 
the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, 
establish connections everywhere.
The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy 
artillery with which [the bourgeoisie] batters down all 
Chinese walls.... It compels all nations, on pain of 
extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production.... 
In one word, it creates a world after its own image. [10]
In the same work, Marx and Engels indicated the expected
effects of the extension of the capitalist mode of
10
production:
[W]ith the development of industry... [t]he various 
interests and conditions of life within the ranks of the 
proletariat are more and more equalized, in proportion as 
machinery obliterates all distinctions of labor....[11]
National differences and antagonisms between people are 
more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the 
bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, 
to uniformity in the mode of production and in the condi­
tions of life corresponding thereto.[12]
At the same time as the Manifesto was being written 
(winter of 1847-1843), Marx produced a working paper on 
"Wages," which remained unpublished until 1924. In a section 
devoted to the effects of the development of the productive 
forces on wages, Marx noted the relatively worsening posi­
tion of the working class compared with the bourgeoisie, the 
increasingly "one-sided” character of work and the growing 
tendency to reduce all labor to simple labor, and the ever
greater dependence of the workers’ condition on the state of
13
the world market. In another section, entitled the "Pos­
itive Aspect of Wage Labor," Marx wrote:
If one says 'positive aspect of wage labor' one says 
'positive aspect of capital', of large scale industry, of 
free competition, of the world market, and I do not need 
to explain to you in detail how without these production 
relations neither the means of production— the material 
means for the emancipation of the proletariat and the 
foundation of a new society— would have been created, nor 
would the proletariat itself have taken to the unifica­
tion and development through which it is really capable 
of revolutionizing the old society and itself. Equaliza­
tion of wages.[14] *
A few years later, in a New York Daily Tribune article 
about British colonial rule in India, Marx argued that 
"England has to fulfill a double mission in India: one 
destructive, the other regenerating— the annihilation of old 
Asiatic society and the laying of the material foundations
1 1
15
of Western society in Asia." In the introduction of a 
colonial railroad network, Marx saw the embryo of an inevi­
table process of development:
You cannot maintain a net of railways over an immense 
country without introducing all those industrial proces­
ses necessary to meet the immediate and current wants of 
railway locomotion, and out of which there must grow the 
application of machinery to those branches of industry 
not immediately connected with railways. The railway- 
system will therefore become, in India, truly the fore­
runner of modern industry.[16]
This was not an incidental point. Marx specifically referred
to this article in a letter to Engels, and noted that its
significance consisted precisely in the description of the
revolutionizing character of the British colonial 
17
penetration.
In another (but contemporaneous) article on the same 
subject, Marx layed stress on the effects of the development 
of the capitalist mode of production in India's transforma­
tion; special emphasis was accorded not to the role of 
military conquest and plunder, but to the specifically 'eco­
nomic' consequences of capitalist commodity production. Thus 
India's primitive indigenous
forms of social organism have been to the greater part 
dissolved, and are disappearing, not so much through the 
brutal Interference of the British tax-gatherer and the 
British soldier, as to the working of English steam and 
English free trade.... English interference having placed 
the spinner in Lancashire and the weaver in Bengal, or 
sweeping away both Hindoo spinner and weaver, dissolved 
these small semi-barbarian, semi-civilized communities by 
blowing up their economic basis, and thus produced the 
greatest, and to speak the truth, the only social 
revolution ever heard of in Asia.[18]
12
B. The Theoretical Arguments 
The salience of these merely descriptive assessments of 
capitalist penetration into underdeveloped or non-capitalist 
areas would of course be inadequate without grasping the 
theoretical connections, mentioned earlier, between an un­
derstanding of the development of the capitalist mode of 
production and the tendencies intrinsic to the process of 
capital accumulation. Marx worked through the bulk of the
theoretical arguments which later appeared as Capital during
19
the years (approximately) 1856-1866. The homogenizing ef­
fects of capitalist development, characterized until then in 
a descriptive and/or highly general fashion, came to be 
linked with a theory of the capitalist mode of production.
In Part Two of Capital vol. 1, having established the
general formula for capital (M-C-M1) and shown that "its
20
determining purpose is...exchange-value," Marx arrives at
21
the concept of capital as value which valorizes itself. On 
this theoretical basis, both the mainspring and the neces­
sary outcome of capitalist production become apparent, viz.,
the incessant drive to produce the maximum amount of surplus
22
value possible.
But this is only the beginning. While the production of
surplus value indeed emerges as the driving motive whenever
exchange-value has become the "determining purpose," it is
still the case that
this Inherent tendency of capitalist production does not 
become adequately realized— it does not become indispen­
sable, and that also means technologically indispen- 
sable--untll the specific mode of capitalist production




The truly revolutionary role of bourgeois society only
becomes manifest with the transition from the production of
absolute to relative surplus value, the transition from
the formal to the real subsumption of labor to capital. The
transformation (revolutionizing) of the "actual mode of
labor" and the onset of "a complete (and constantly re-
24
peated) revolution...in the mode of production" is not an
accomplished fact until the pre-eminence of relative surplus
value and the real subsumption of labor assert themselves,
in other words, until the development of modern machine
industry and the rational application of science to indus- 
25
try. In short, capitalist production per se is not revolu­
tionary, just as the proletariat is not inherently imbued 
with a revolutionary consciousness. Rather, both are revolu­
tionised by the very development of the bourgeois mode of 
production.
In the rather long chapter on machinery, Marx details
the interconnections between these developments and the
Introduction of machinery to various branches of production
(especially the production of machines by means of ma- 
26 27
chines), the prolongation of the working day, and the
intensification of labor (especially when the lengthening of
the working day comes to be restricted by labor legisla- 
28 29
tion). Capital, "by Its nature a leveller," moves into
those spheres of industry where labor is only formally
subsumed:
Thus spinning machines led to power-looms In weaving;
machinery in cotton spinning to machinery in the woollen, 
linen and silk etc. industries. The increased use of 
machinery in the mines, cotton mills etc. made the intro­
duction of large-scale production in machine tools inevi­
table. [30]
Formally, the process must follow the same general
31
pattern, whether in England or in India. In the preface to 
the first edition of Capital (1867) Marx wrote: "The country
that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less
32
developed, the image of its own future." On the basis of 
capitalist production, the means of production and produc­
tive forces of labor are thus continually revolutionized,
33
creating the "material basis" of the future society. At
the same time, the destruction of pre-capitalist forms, and
the subjugation of all spheres of production, "generalizes
34
the direct struggle against" capital. Hence in the chapter
on "The Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation" Marx
concludes that alongside the centralization of capital,
the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world 
market, and, with this, the growth of the international 
character of the capitalist regime... there grows also the 
revolt of the working class, a class constantly increas­
ing in numbers, and trained, united and organized by the 
very mechanism of the capitalist process of produc­
tion . [35]
Consequently, the extension and development of capi­
talist relations of production engender the material condi­
tions which create a commonality of interests among the 
proletariat, nationally as well as internationally. Insofar 
as capital "by its nature" tends to annul divergency in 
levels of development of the productive forces through the 
constant revolutionizing of technique and the assimilation 
of backward sectors, it follows that proletarians everywhere
must be increasingly subject to similar (i,.e.> maximum) 
conditions of exploitation.
* * *
But the discussion has now reached a crucial juncture.
The equalizing and homogenizing aspect of capitalist devel­
opment assumes a highly visible position in the theoretical 
work of Marx and Engels, a visibility which is reinforced by 
the descriptive accounts already discussed (particularly the 
works of the early period). The prominence of this thesis in 
Marx's theoretical work at times obscures his parallel and 
equally important theoretical demonstration of capitalism's 
simultaneous propensity to negate equality and to differen­
tiate the conditions of production. That this facet of the 
theory often remains unappreciated is suggested by the as­
sessment of Maurice Dobb, who wrote that while "[i]t is 
probably true that there were always important qualifica­
tions to be made" to the view that capitalist development 
"exercised a 'levelling' influence on the different parts of 
the world," the need to account for these qualifications was
not fully recognized when Marx and Engels wrote, and only
became apparent when the phenomena of colonialism and under-
36
development began to be investigated. The point is that 
while Dobb correctly stresses the need to make "qualifica­
tions" regarding the "levelling" effects of capitalist de­
velopment, he erroneously maintains that this need was not 
"fully recognized" in Marx's (and Engels') time. In fact, 
the theory of the reproduction of inequality is an Integral
16
aspect of the analysis found in Capital, and the essential 
elements of the theory are identifiable even prior to the 
publication of Marx’s magnum opus.
The theory of crisis in Capital vol. 3 is naturally 
Marx's most complete explanation of the uneveness of capi­
talist development. There are, however, two additional ways 
in which Marx formulates the tendency of capital accumula­
tion to impose and reproduce inequality, and these become 
apparent at an even higher level of theoretical abstraction 
than the theory of crisis. The first, and more trivial, 
concerns the notion that capitalist development produces a 
general worsening of the proletariat’s position relative to 
the bourgeoisie. A formulation of the relative impoverish­
ment thesis is provided by Marx in Wage Labor and Capital 
(April 1849):
Let us assume the most favorable case: when productive 
capital grows, the demand for labor grows; consequently, 
the price of labor, wages, goes up....
The rapid growth of productive capital brings about an 
equally rapid growth of wealth, luxury, social wants, 
social enjoyments. Thus, although the enjoyments of the 
worker have risen, the social satisfaction that they give 
has fallen in comparison with the increased enjoyments of 
the capitalist....[37]
and somewhat more clearly in Capital vol. 1:
[A]11 methods for the production of surplus value are 
at the same time methods of accumulation, and every 
extension of accumulation becomes, conversely, a means 
for the development of those methods. It follows there­
fore that in proportion as capital accumulates, the sit­
uation of the worker, be his payment high or low, must 
grow worse.[38]
The second sense in which the accumulation process 
produces and reproduces inequality is theoretically more 
significant. A hint of this perspective is already present
17
in 1847 in The Poverty of Philosophy, where Marx writes of 
'competition' and 'monopoly' not as the idealized forms in 
which they appear to bourgeois (and petty bourgeois) eco­
nomic theory, but in terms of a movement in which one begets
39
the other only to be in turn superseded. Thus the dynamic
of capitalism, which finds expression in competition, does
not produce a regular procession of forms culminating in
perfect monopoly, but rather engenders a continual motion
where 'competition' gives rise to 'monopoly' which must then
have recourse to 'competition' in order to maintain itself.
At about the sane time as he was writing the critique
of Proudhon, Marx described capital accumulation and its
effects on the cost of production of commodities in terms
which demonstrate that the "total movement of this disorder 
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is its order," A.-®.* » that the differentiation of produc­
tion, just as much as its homogenization, is a condition of 
capitalism.
In these early texts, the idea which Marx seeks to
express is as yet inadequately developed theoretically, and
only makes an appearance in the form of polemic against
Proudhon’s metaphysical conception of ’monopoly' as negation
of 'competition', or in a series of popular lectures to
41
workers presented at a time (1847) when Marx had not yet 
even worked out the distinction between labor and labor 
power. By the time of "The Chapter on Capital" from the 
Grundrisse notebooks (late 1857 and early 1858), Marx had 
begun to move in the direction of a theoretical elaboration
I S
of capitalist competition and its relationship to capital 
accumulation and the effects of equalization and differen­
tiation. He writes there that
Finally: proportionate production (this is already in 
Ricardo, et c.) only when it is capital's tendency to 
distribute itself in correct proportions, but equally its 
necessary tendency— since it strives limitlessly for 
surplus labor, surplus productivity, surplus consumption 
etc.— to drive beyond the proportion. (In competition 
this inner tendency of capital appears as a compul­
sion ....)[42]
The final (paranthetical) sentence above presents com­
petition separately from the "necessary tendency" of capital 
"to drive beyond the proportion." This is among the first 
clear indications of a significant theoretical result of 
Marxian economics, viz., the conceptualization of competi­
tion not as a ’law’ of capitalist production, but as a
"mechanism by which the essence of capitalist social rela-
43
tions is transformed into their appearance." In the same 
chapter, capital's need to maintain an ongoing revolution­
izing of the "actual mode of labor" is established by Marx 
on the basis of the capital relation itself, rather than as 
a derivative of the external compulsion of competition.
It is easy to develop the introduction of machinery out 
of competition and out of the law of the reduction of 
production costs which is triggered by competition. We 
are concerned here with developing it out of the relation 
of capital to living labor, without reference to other 
capitals.[44]
As Marx puts it elsewhere in the same text,
Competition merely expresses as real, posits as an 
external necessity, that which lies within the nature of 
capital; competition is nothing more than the way in 
which the many capitals force the inherent determinants 
of capital upon one another and upon themselves.[45]
Already in the Grundrisse notebooks Marx thus distin-
19
guishes, as may be seen from the passages quoted above, 
between the laws of motion of capital and their expression 
in competition. Sometime later, in Capital vol. 1, Marx ex­
pressly argues that competition is not a law of capital- 
46
ism, that it merely causes "the immanent laws of capi­
talist production [to] confront the individual capitalist as
47
a coercive force external to him," and that "a scientific
analysis of competition is possible only if we can grasp the
48
inner nature of capital." It follows that a study of the
latter must precede the former, and the discussion in vol. 1
consequently proceeds at the level of "capital in general,"
which abstracts from the action of "many capitals" on one
49
another through competition.
Throughout Parts Four and Five of vol. 1 ("The Produc­
tion of Relative Surplus Value" and "The Production of 
Absolute and Relative Surplus Value"), proceeding from the 
already established concept of capital as self-expanding 
value, Marx details the manner in which co-operation, the 
division of labor and finally the application of machinery 
to industry each lead to the cheapening of commodities by
way of reducing the socially necessary time required for
50
their (re)production. The process does not consist of
optimizing an incremental 'choice of technique* algorithm,
as conceived by both neo-classical and neo-Ricardian 
51
analyses. Rather, Marx shows how a localized innovation in 
technique results in the differentiation of production con­
ditions; how the extension of the new method implies a
20
restructuring of values; and how all the while the process 
52
begins anew. In those regions where it first becomes
established, large scale capitalist industry "acquires an
elasticity, a capacity for sudden expansion by leaps and 
53
bounds...." The other regions, those in which the penetra­
tion of capitalist production had been less swift or com­
plete, will "suffer not only from the development of capi­
talist production, but also from the incompleteness of that 
54
development." The uneven development of capitalism thus 
has its basis in the uneven develpment of capitals.
In its more fully developed form, the capitalist mode 
of production extends the production of surplus value prin­
cipally through the ever increasing mechanization of produc­
tion. It follows that the accumulation of capital is accom­
panied by a tendency for the expulsion of living labor from 
the production process and the other effects detailed in the 
chapter. As already pointed out, these results are obtained 
by Marx on the basis of the abstraction "capital in gen­
eral," i_.e^  , from a consideration of capitalist social rela­
tions and the labor process alone. Competition, which in­
volves the mutual interaction of "many capitals" in their
55
struggle over the dividing up of surplus value, is theo-
56
retically absent as a concept. Marx thus states that "it 
is not our intention here to consider the way in which the 
immanent laws of capitalist production manifest themselves 
in the external movement of the individual capitals," even 
though he intends to provide examples and illustrations "for 
the understanding of the production of relative surplus
value, and merely on the basis of the results already a- 
57
chieved."
Competition therefore does not ’cause* the simultaneous 
tendency toward differentiation and equalization, any more 
than it ’causes* the accumulation of capital to proceed or 
the rate of profit to fall. The "immanent laws" of capi­
talism are theoretically derived from capital's nature as 
self-expanding value, a quality of capital in general. Com­
petition is merely the vehicle by which these laws manifest 
themselves on the 'surface* of bourgeois society and make
themselves felt to the individual capitalists as an exter-
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nally imposed compulsion (in an "inverted" form). It fol­
lows that the simultaneous tendency toward differentiation 
and equalization is, for Marx, an intrinsic feature of the 
process of capital accumulation, and does not flow from or 
depend on the ’assumption* of competition.
This unevenness immanent to the accumulation of capital 
naturally produces its effects on the 'surface', in the 
forms in which capital actually appears, and "in the action 
of different capitals on one another, .i.e.. , in competition,
and in the everyday consciousness of the agents of produc-
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tion themselves." Marx's investigation descends to this 
lower level of abstraction, the consideration of the con­
crete forms of capital's movement, in Capital vol. 3. After 
establishing the concept of profit in Part One, Marx devotes
Parts Two, Three and Four to a concrete examination of the
60
"constant equalization of ever-renewed inequalities." It
is not necessary here to delve into a discussion of these
specific relations, as this has already been ably and thor-
61
oughly accomplished by others. For present purposes, it 
should suffice to have established that Marx’s theory en­
visions a necessarily uneven development (equalization- 
differentiation) immanent to the accumulation process.
23
C. Implications for the Working Class Movement
Marx's general theory of the capitalist mode of produc­
tion posits unevenness as an inherent feature of capitalist 
development, flowing from the nature of capital. In order to 
obtain this result, it has consequently been sufficient to
consider the most abstract level of analysis as found in 
62
Capital. Implicitly, the result itself suggests a poten­
tial pitfall which night be encountered in efforts to meta­
morphose certain abstract ramifications into specific out­
comes, , to give them concrete expression as 'predic-
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tions’. In particular, since the Marxist theory of the 
capitalist mode of production rejects any notion of capital­
ist development as a symmetrical process, it is not possible 
to deduce from the theory anything like a one-to-one cor­
respondence between the extent of capitalist development and
the stage of evolution of the working class struggle in its
64
concrete forms.
The uneven and contradictory nature of the accumulation 
process is therefore concretely manifested in, among other 
things, ambivalent tendencies in working class responses to 
the rule of capital. This is clearly evident from a textual 
survey of the works in which Marx and Engels undertake 
analyses at lower levels of abstraction, those which deal 
with the specific historical situation. They produced numer­
ous examples of this type of research, both in the form of 
systematic investigations and irregular commentary. Only
those which pertain explicitly to the prospects for interna-
65
tionalism, however, will be considered below.
For the "two man party," as Marx and Engels were cal­
led, concrete analysis generally meant the investigation or 
propagandization of issues directly connected to the politi­
cal struggles in which they were involved.
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Prior to about 1850, Marx and Engels frequently ex­
pressed themselves in writings and speeches characterized by
a high degree of generality and a predominantly descriptive
67
(rather than theoretical) approach. Thus in an 1845 arti­
cle on the anniversary of the proclamation of the First 
French Republic (1792), Engels declared that the "great mass 
of proletarians are, by their very nature, free from na­
tional prejudices" and that workers "in all countries have
68
one and the same interest." The implications of the dis­
cussion found in The German Ideology are virtually identi­
cal, as may be seen from the relevant passages cited in 
subheading A of this chapter.
Similarly, speaking in 1847 at a commemoration of the 
1830 Polish uprising, Engels made note of the "elimination
of opposed interests" between workers, a consequence of the
69
widespread application of machinery to production. On the
same occasion, Marx talked in equally general terms, but
drew some rather different conclusions:
For the peoples to be able to truly unite, they must 
have common interests. And in order that their interests 
may become common, the existing property relations must 
be done away with, for these property relations involve 
the exploitation of some nations by others: the abolition 
of existing property relations is the concern only of the 
working class.[70]
For Engels, therefore, it seemed that (capitalist) machine
25
production and its generalization would be sufficient to 
serve as the basis for establishing a commonality of inter­
ests among the proletariat, whereas J!arx appeared to suggest 
that such a commonality could only arise as a consequence of 
the revolution. With regard to the oppression of Poland, the 
subject of their talks, both Marx and Engels insisted that 
"Poland must be liberated not in Poland but in England,"
.i.e. , the victory of the English workers was seen as a 
condition for the end of the oppression of the Polish peo­
ple. The reason for this was simply that "England is the
[country] where the contradiction between the proletariat
71
and the bourgeoisie is most highly developed."
The Manifesto of the Communist Party, drafted in 1848
by both Marx and Engels, contains numerous passages which
closely correspond to the quotations above. Where Engels had
earlier spoken of the "elimination of opposed interests,"
the Manifesto proclaims that "differences and antagonisms
72
between the people are more and more vanishing."
While it is hardly necessary to underscore the politi­
cal nature of the Manifesto, it is equally clear that the
authors of the pamphlet considered it to be based on a
73
scientific theory of history. And the philosophy of histo­
ry which implicitly resides between the lines of the Mani­
festo brings to the fore the levelling and equalizing tend­
encies of the process of accumulation, while suppressing the 
effects of the unevenness of capitalist development. Al­
though the latter aspect of the theory was not entirely
74
unknown to Marx at the time, it had not as yet been com­
25
pletely or explicitly worked out, hence the reason for its 
theoretical absence in the P.Ianif esto.
A theoretical silence produces its effects just as '.yell 
as a theoretical concept which is explicitly present. In 
this case, the result for Marx and Engels is that interna­
tionalism frequently appears as an objective ’condition’ in 
which the proletariat finds itself. There is, of course, the
simple attendant political conclusion: ’’The working men have 
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no country.” Among Marx’s writings it is perhaps in the
Manifesto that this approach finds its highest expression.
But even here, the reduction of internationalism to an
objective condition is not complete, because according to
the Manifesto, one of the distinguishing features of the
communists viz-a-viz other working class parties is that the
communists "point out and bring to the fore the common
interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all 
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nationality." In this passage, internationalism has ceased 
to be a condition; it is rather a political program to be 
forged , i^£. , the common interests must be brought ’’to the 
front.”
After the Manifesto such a tension or ambivalence in 
Marx's work is less and less evident. As the discussion in 
the first two subheadings of this chapter sought to show, 
Marx had become increasingly rigorous and consistent in 
distinguishing levels of abstraction in theoretical analysis 
and their relation to one another. In particular, the tend­
encies to metamorphose abstractions, the teleological formu­
27
lations, and the conflation of levels of abstraction which 
at times had crept into his (and Engels’) work were by 1850 
being systematically rejected. So in March 1850, for exam­
ple, the notion of international working class solidarity as
77
a political program is fairly unambiguously expressed,
with political implications which are notably similar to
those found in passages from the Critique of the Gotha
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Programme, written 25 years later.
It is not valid to argue, by way of a ’defense’ of the 
Manifesto, that since the pamphlet was produced as a ’mere­
ly’ political text the conclusions therein were necessarily
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dictated by political exigency. The fallacy of such rea­
soning becomes apparent if the Manifesto is compared to the 
numerous other ’merely* political works penned and spoken by 
Marx during his tenure on the General Council of the Inter­
national Working Men’s Association (1864-1876), later fre-
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quently referred to as the First Internatonal. Marx's 
presentations to the International ranged from the highly 
general (£.g., the "Inaugural Address") to the rather spe­
cific (e.g., the reports on the Franco-Prussian War, on the 
question of amnesty for Irish political prisoners, etc.). In 
each instance, however, the viability of international work­
ing class solidarity was neither premised as a general 
condition, nor deduced from the abstract theory.
While the bulk of Marx's "Inaugural Address" was a 
description of the proletariat's dismal economic condition
and a historical "review of the adventures of the working
81
classes since 1845," the speech closed with an exhortation
23
to the workers on the need to "conquer political power." To
be sure, the basis for the realization of this objective,
according to Marx, will be found in solidarity which crosses
national boundaries. But the prospects for solidarity are no
longer sought in abstract formulae ("the elimination of
opposed interests"); instead, it is recognized that positive
results can only be achieved through the "fight" for a
02
concrete "policy."
That the recognized potential existed for real contra­
dictions to emerge within the working class, and even within 
the International itself, may be amply illustrated by refer­
ence to the Association's history and Marx's activities. 
Members of the General Council, Marx included, successfully
struggled to prevent efforts at introducing apologetic reso-
83
lutions regarding the Polish Insurrection of 1863. Some­
what later, when German strikebreakers were imported to stem 
the tailor's strikes in England (Spring 1866), the General 
Council acted to keep the tailors informed and arranged for
agitation among the Germans; Marx wrote circulars to both
84
the English and German workers.
When the First International commenced discussion of
the Irish question in November 1869, Marx opened the debate
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condemning the English government's Irish policy. Over the
objections of some English chauvinists on the Council, a
strong resolution of solidarity with the Irish people was 
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passed. At this time, Marx argued that the English prole­
tariat was incapable of effecting the revolution. As long as
29
the English workers, by virtue of their "hostility" to the 
Irish, supported English landlordism in Ireland, the posi­
tion of the ruling classes in England was impregnable. It is 
notable that Marx did not see the hostility of the English 
workers as principally rooted in ethnic or religious consid­
erations, false consciousness, or political immaturity. 
Rather, there was an ’objective’ contradiction at play,
i^ .e^  , the English workers were the concrete beneficiaries of
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the oppression of the Irish.
The political conclusion is striking, particularly in 
contrast with the earlier proclamations on Poland: because 
"Ireland is the bulwark of English landlordism" the decisive 
blow against the latter can only be accomplished in the 
former. In Ireland "the operation is a hundred times more 
easy" due to the "concentrated" nature of the struggle 
(against landlordism), its simultaneously national charac­
ter, and because of the greater revolutionary ardor of the 
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Irish people.
One of the most significant events which took place 
during the period of the First International’s existence was 
the short-lived proclamation of the Paris Commune. The Asso­
ciation collected money and found employment for refugees
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after the defeat of the Commune in late May 1871. At the
behest of the International, Marx produced The Civil War in
France (May 1871), an analysis of the victory and defeat of
the Commune, which served as an Address of the General 
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Council. Marx had also earlier written two other Addresses 
for the International on the Franco-Prussian War and the
80
establishment of the Third French Republic. These documents
called on all sections of the International to support first
the Republic and then the Commune. Internationalist synna-
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thies were indeed displayed in England, the U.S.A., and
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in Germany (despite repression there). Nevertheless, Marx
ascribed the defeat of the Commune to an insufficiently
94
vigorous reaction by the (European) working class.
The breakup of the First International (effectively by 
1872 and officially in 1876) brought a temporary hiatus to 
the concerted efforts at establishing an international work­
ing class movement. The split between Marxists and the 
anarchist followers of Mikhail Bakunin at the Fifth General 
Congress (the Hague, 1872) closed the period of the Interna­
tional’s useful political life. Perhaps the best analysis of 
this turn of events, and its consequences and prospects, is 
provided by Engels, in two letters. One to August Bebel:
After the Commune [the International] had a colossal 
success. The bruised and shattered bourgeoisie ascribed 
omnipotence to it. The great mass of the membership 
believed things would stay like that for all eternity. We 
knew very well that the bubble must burst. All riff-raff 
attached themselves to it.... The bubble burst at the 
Hague.... And if we had come out In a conciliatory way at 
the Hague, if we had hushed up the breaking out of the 
split— what would have been the result? The sectarians, 
especially the Bakuninists, would have had another year 
in which to perpetrate, in the name of the International, 
still greater stupidities and infamies; the workers of 
the most developed countries would have turned away in 
disgust;.... Then the International would indeed have 
gone to pieces--gone to pieces through ’unity’! Instead 
of this we have now got rid of the rotten 
elements....[95]
And another to Friedrich Sorge:
In order to produce a new International after the 
fashion of the old, an alliance of all proletarian par­
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ties of all countries, a general suppression of the labor 
movement, like that which prevailed from 1849-64, would 
be necessary. For this the proletarian world has now 
become too big, too extensive.[98]
* * *
Despite the encouraging expressions of international 
solidarity which at times had characterized the working 
class movement, such results had been by no means general or 
automatically forthcoming, either prior to the Internation­
al's convocation or even during the years of its greatest 
influence.
In 1852, long before the founding of the Association,
Engels wrote to Marx about the situation in France. With
Louis Bonaparte's coup d' etat,
the temporary prosperity, and prospects of the glory of 
an empire, the [French] workers seem to have become 
completely bourgeois after all. It will take a severe 
chastisement by crises if they are to become good for 
anything again soon.[97]
Throughout the tenure of the First International, cer­
tain English trade union leaders had frequently adopted
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openly national chauvinist positions. Writing to Ludwig 
Kugelmann in 1868, Marx noted that the Irish question repre­
sented an opportunity for "intriguers" within the labor
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movement "for joining up with the bourgeois liberals." Six
years later, again in a letter to Kugelmann, Marx wrote that
the English labor movement was making progress only among
the rural workers, and that the industrial proletarians
needed "to get rid of their present leaders" before any
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progress was possible.
These pessimistic assessments were not, however, con-
32
fined only to the leaders of the labor movement. To a cer­
tain extent, Marx felt that the English working class as a 
whole had acquiesced to the domination of the bourgeoisie. 
Several times in the 1860s, in correspondence with Engels, 
Marx wrote of the "sheepish attitude" and "apparent bour­
geois infection" afflicting the English workers. In this 
exchange of letters, Engels wrote that "the revolutionary 
energy of the English proletariat has to all extents and 
purposes completely evaporated and the English proletarian
is in complete agreement with the rule of the bour- 
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geoisie."
Such a political and ideological capitulation was con­
ditioned by a particular economic situation. Already in 
1845, Engels had written of England's industrial monopoly in 
The Condition of the Working Class in England. At that time, 
he expected that such a monopoly would accelerate the devel­
opment of a proletariat with increasingly revolutionary 
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attitudes. By 1858, however, the industrial monopoly 
seemed to be producing different effects, and Engels wrote 
to Marx that
the English proletariat is actually becoming more and 
more bourgeois, so that this most bourgeois of all coun­
tries is apparently aiming at the possession of a bour­
geois aristocracy and a bourgeois proletariat alongside 
the bourgeoisie. For a nation which exploits the whole 
world this is of course to a certain extent justifi­
able .[103]
Engels' connection of England's industrial monopoly to the 
co-optation of the English working class is frequently ex­
pressed. In a letter to Marx In 1881: "The British working 
man just will not budge, he must be shaken up by events, by
33
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the loss of the industrial monopoly." In a letter to Karl
Kautsky in 18S2:
You ask me what the English workers think about colo­
nial policy. Well, exactly the same as they think about 
politics in general: the sane as the bourgeois think. 
There is no worker’s party here, there are only Conserva­
tives and Liberal-Radicals, and the workers are cheerful­
ly consuming their share of England's monopoly of the 
world market and the colonies.[105]
And in a letter to August Bebel in 1883:
Do not on any account whatever let yourself be deluded 
that there is a real proletarian movement going on 
here....
Participation in the domination of the world market was 
and is the basis of the political nullity of the English 
workers. The tail of the bourgeoisie in the exploitation 
of this monopoly but nevertheless sharing in its advan­
tages, politically they are naturally the tail of the 
'great Liberal Party', which for its part pays them small 
attentions, recognizes trade unions and strikes as legit­
imate factors...and has given the mass of the better 
placed workers the vote.[106]
Note that the emergence of England’s "monopoly of the 
world market" was nothing more than the uneven development 
of capitalism, .i.e.., the concrete expression of the uneven 
development of capitals, which Marx had already theorized. 
Once large scale capitalist industry (especially the produc­
tion of machines by means of machinery) becomes established 
in a particular region, according to Marx, it acquires a
dynamic "elasticity"— the expansion of production becomes
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"indispensable." The immediate effect of this is to ruin 
less highly developed industries in other regions, and to 
establish a
new and International division of labor... suited to the 
requirements of the main industrial countries, and [to 
convert] one part of the globe into a chiefly agricultur­
al field of production for supplying the other part, 
which remains a pre-eminently industrial field.[108]
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England's industrial monopoly was the material basis of 
the "bourgeois proletariat" in Great Britain- While the 
uneven development of capitalism made these results possi­
ble, it also created the conditions which would subsequently 
undermine them. Engels recognized this, and in 1835 (after 
Marx's death) in an article for The Commonwealth (newspaper) 
which was later re-printed as part of the 1892 "Preface" of 
The Condition of the Working Class in England, he tended to
distinguish between "a small, privileged, 'protected' minor- 
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ity" and the "great bulk" of the working class. The 
fruits of England's industrial monopoly "were very unequally 
parcelled out," although "even the great mass had, at least, 
a temporary share now and then." Most significantly, how­
ever, Engels argued that as a consequence of the "breakdown" 
of England's "monopoly of the world market," the English 
proletariat would in general lose its "privileged posi­
tion. ... And that is the reason why there will be Socialism
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again inEngland."
Immediately after repeating the phrases cited above,
Engels continued to write in the 1892 "Preface:"
Needless to say that there is indeed 'Socialism again 
in England', and plenty of it— Socialism of all shades: 
Socialism conscious an unconscious, Socialism prosaic and 
poetic, Socialism of the working-class and of the middle 
class, for, verily, that abomination of abominations, 
Socialism, has not only become respectable, but has ac­
tually donned evening dress and lounges lazily on drawing 
room causeuses.[111]
Engels counterposes this rather ironic appraisal to a genu­
inely positive development, viz., "the revival of the East 
End." Paraphrasing the aged Engels' remarks would not do
justice to their stylish quality and the heartfelt hopeful­
ness they seek to convey, so the rather long passage will 
simply be quoted in full. Writing of London's East End, 
Engels stated:
That immense haunt of misery is no longer the stagnant 
pool it was six years ago. It has shaken off its torpid 
despair, has returned to life, and has become the home of 
what is called the 'New Unionism’, that is to say, of the 
organization of the great mass of 'unskilled' workers. 
This organization may to a great extent adopt the form of 
the old Unions of 'skilled' workers but it essentially 
different in character. The old Unions preserve the tra­
ditions of the time when they were founded, and look upon 
the wages system as a once-for-all established, final 
fact, which they at best can modify in the interest of 
their members. The new Unions were founded at a time when 
the faith in the eternity of the wages system was severe­
ly shaken; their founders and promoters were Socialists 
either consciously or by feeling; the masses, whose adhe­
sion gave them strength, were rough, neglected, looked 
down upon by the working-class aristocracy; but they had 
this immense advantage, that their minds were virgin 
soil, entirely free from the inherited 'respectable' 
bourgeois prejudices which hampered the brains of the 
better situated 'old' Unionists. And thus we see now 
these new Unions taking the lead of the working-class 
movement generally, and more and more taking in tow the 
rich and proud 'old* Unions.
Undoubtedly, the East Enders have commited colossal 
blunders; so have their predecessors, and so do the 
doctrinaire Socialists who pooh-pooh them. A large class, 
like a great nation, never learns better or quicker than 
by undergoing the consequences of its own mistakes. And 
for all the faults committed in past, present and future, 
the revival of the East End of London remains one of the 
greatest and most fruitful facts of this fin de siecle, 
and glad and proud I am to have lived to see it.[112J
It would not be unreasonable to suggest that Engels' 
hopes were not realized. From the 1890s until the First 
World War, international socialism was embodied in the poli­
tics and economics of the Second International. Some have 
argued, both then and subsequently, that the "drawing room 
socialism" berated by Engels had crept unnoticed into the
world view shared by certain tendencies constituting the 
Second International. Others maintain that Engels himself 
was partly responsible for that transformation of terrain. 
These issues will be more fully explored in the next 
chapter.
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Notes to Chapter I
1. I generally accept the view that a sharp rupture is 
evident in Marx's thinking around 1845, such as has been 
identified particularly by Louis Althusser in For Marx (Lon­
don: New Left Books, 1977), 31-33, but also by others. This 
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INTERNATIONALISM, A PLETHORA OF 'ISMS’,
THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL AND ITS COLLAPSE
A. Introduction 
Six years after Marx's death and six years before 
Engels', the founding of the Second International took place 
on the hundredth anniversary of the storming of the Bas­
tille. Concurrently with the reformist Possibilist Congress, 
and only a few Paris blocks away, the avowedly socialist 
Second International first convened on 14. July 1889.
Edouard Vaillant and Wilhelm Liebknecht, the leading French 
and German representatives to the International, were elect­
ed joint presidents. Their handshake came to symbolize the 
international solidarity of the proletariat against the 
bourgeoisie.
Delegates from France included Vaillant, a Blanquist 
and a member of the Paris Commune; the Marxists Jules 
Guesde, Charles Longuet, and Paul Lafargue; and Sebastian 
Faure, a representative of the Anarchists. Coming from the 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic 
Party of Germany— the SPD) were Liebknecht, Eduard Bern­
stein, and Klara Zetkin. Another SPD representative was 
Georg Heinrich von Vollmar, Bavarian ex-officer, a champion 
of reformism, and soon to become Bernstein's supporter in 
the 'revisionist' current. Also from Germany, although not a 
member of the SPD, was the trade union leader Karl Legien.
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Another major group came from England, representing both 
trades unions and political parties. Finally, there were 
smaller delegations from Belgium, Austria, Italy, the Scan­
dinavian countries, Russia, Poland, the Balkans, Switzer-
1
land, the U.S.A. and Argentina. All told, some 400 persons
2
were in attendance.
The SPD itself arose from the merger of the various
German socialist parties at the socialist unity congress at 
3
Gotha in 1875. While this unification brought together the 
followers of Marx and Ferdinand Lassalle, the former in­
sisted that too many programmatic concessions had been made 
to the latter--see Marx's Critique of the Gotha Programme. 
But by the time of the Erfurt congress of the SPD (1891) the 
bickering Lassalleans, lacking leadership, lost considerable 
influence, and the Erfurt Programme reflected a substantial­
ly Marxist perspective. The accumulation of capital was seen 
as leading to the concentration and centralization of capi­
tal, creation of a reserve army of the unemployed, and 
recurrent crises. There was no theory of crisis offered, 
implicitly or explicitly, other than the statement that the 
crisis was "founded in the essence of the capitalistic 
method of production." The document also maintained that 
"[t]he interests of the working class are the same in all 
lands with capitalistic methods of production." Owing to the 
development and extension of the world market,
the state of workers in any one country becomes constant­
ly more dependent upon the state of workers in other 
countries.... Conscious of this, the Social Democratic 
Party of Germany feels and declares Itself one with the
47
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class conscious workers of all other lands.
Finally, the ultimate goal of the SPD, a classless society,
was clearly posed in the so-called maximum programme; and a
list of immediate demands comprised the minimum programme.
In France, the unification of the disparate socialist
groupings into a single party was not accomplished until 
5
1905, when the unity congress held in Paris provided for
the merger of four relatively large organizations and some
6
seven small ones into the SFIO. At this time, three funda­
mental principles of unity were established: recognition of 
internationalism as an imperative, work directed at devel­
oping the organization with the aim of capturing state
power, and an affirmation of the eventual goal, .i.e.*, abol-
7
ishing private ownership of the means of production.
For British socialists, unification Into a single or­
ganization was not forthcoming, and the four principal au­
tonomous groups— the Labour Party (LP), a federation of 
trades unions; the Independent Labour Party (ILP), an indi-
8
vidual membership party; the British Socialist Party (BSP); 
and the Fabian Society— maintained separate organizations 
throughout the tenure of the International, although af­
filiations and overlap existed among some of them (e.g., the
9
LP and the ILP). Furthermore, a purely federal Labour
Representation Committee (established in 1900) accepted
10
representatives from most labor organizations. Originally,
the official British sections of the International were the




So while mediations by the International Socialist 
12
Bureau (ISB) succeeded in unifying French socialism, simi­
lar efforts met with failure in the case of England. Also 
unsuccessful were the attempts to unify the Russian Social 
Democratic Party, split into the Bolshevik and Menshevik 
factions since 1903. Throughout the period of their dissen­
sion, both factions of the Russian Social Democracy main-
13
tained delegations to the International.
Plainly put, substantial contradictions characterized 
the relations within and between the different national 
sections of the Second International. The object herein 
cannot be to detail the specificity of those relations in 
their full intricacy. Instead, after a review of the perti­
nent resolutions, documents and stated positions of the 
Second International, both as a whole and as a conglomera­
tion of conflicting tendencies, the discussion will shift to 
an examination of the theoretical underpinnings of the prin­
cipal Marxist groupings. The major emphasis will consist in 
setting out the diverse conceptions of capitalist develop­
ment and the accumulation of capital, and linking these to 
the implications regarding the prospects for international­
ism which emerge from the various analyses.
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B. The Second International Before the War: 
Resolutions, Statements, Tendencies
Judged on the immediate content of its official pro­
nouncements, it would be necessary to conclude that the 
Second International considered the international solidarity 
of the working class as a given fact--the proletariat's 
commitment to this principle was seen as unshakable. Between 
1889 and 1914 congresses of the International met nine 
times. Far-reaching issues were argued and discussed, in­
cluding the colonial question, the wrangle around Bern­
stein's 'revision' of Marxism, strategies for extension of 
the franchise, the relative merits of parliamentary activity 
as against mass action (the general strike and insurrection 
variants both had adherents), and the question of war.
At the founding congress Vaillant introduced a resolu­
tion condemning standing armies and urging their replacement
14
by people's militias. Although the document implied that
standing armies may provoke Avar, the ultimate cause of war
was seen to reside in the capitalist mode of production, and
the resolution stated that war could finally be abolished
15
only with the victory of socialism. While the question of 
what to do should war threaten to break out was by and large 
passed over, there were already indications of future points 
of debate: should bourgeois militarism be opposed through 
parliamentary activity or mass action?
A similar anti-war resolution was passed at the Brus­
sels congress (1891), where the discussion of appropriate 
responses to the eventuality of conflagration came to the
fore. The Dutch delegation, led by Donela Nieuwenhuis, sub­
mitted the idea that social democrats should threaten to 
initiate a general strike whenever capitalist belligerence 
led to the brink of open conflict. Although the ensuing 
debate was lively, the notion of a general strike was re­
jected as an "anarchist" deviation, and the congress con­
fined itself to a strategy of refusing to vote for war
16
credits and manpower. Opposition to the general strike
weapon was especially voiced by the German delegation, which
feared (probably correctly) that vigorous anti-militarist
activity would invoke repression from the German monarchy.
The SPD was particularly anxious to expand its parliamentary
activity, since the recent lapse of the German Anti-
Socialist Law in 1890 was immediately followed by a major
17
electoral success for the Social Democrats.
In an optimistic moment at the London congress (1896), 
the International established a tribunal intended to arbi­
trate disputes between nations, but this not surprisingly
18
came to nothing. The International Socialist Bureau was 
established somewhat later, in 1900. Headquartered in Brus­
sels, the ISB's function would be "to initiate and organize 
co-ordinated protest movements and anti-militarist agitation
in all countries on all occasions of international impor- 
19
tance." Unfortunately, the ISB's success in this respect
proved to be illusory, and some critics have charged that
the Bureau was never more than a "letterbox" for 
20
socialism.
After the turn of the century, the issue of war or
51
peace ceased to be primarily theoretical. Crisis upon crisis 
in rapid succession made the threat of a general war seem 
immediate: the Spanish-American War, intervention in the 
Boxer Rebellion, the Boer War, the Russo-Japanese War, the 
French and German conflicts in the Middle East and North 
Africa, the Russian and Austrian conflict in the Balkans. By 
the time of the important Stuttgart congress (1907), the two 
major perspectives— mass strike vs. parliamentary activity-- 
had crystallized within the International. It should be 
emphasized that while broad groupings in the SPD advocated 
parliamentarism and a French majority favored mass action, 
both positions could be found in each of the parties, along 
with an embryonic ’revolutionary left* whose importance was 
yet to be revealed, and a ’right’ wing or ’social imperial­
ist' faction which endorsed the "civilizing mission" of
colonialism and supported ’purely defensive’ arms build- 
21
ups. Indeed, almost all of the delegations at Stuttgart 
found themselves split over these issues. Thus the ultra­
left French anarchist Gustav Herve launched a virulent at­
tack on the "bourgeoisified" SPD, submitting a resolution
calling for "anti-patriotism" and a military strike in case 
22
of war. A more moderate proposal by Vaillant and the 
French pacifist-socialist Jean Jaures called for the preven­
tion of war by all means ranging from parliamentary activity
23
to the mass strike. Finally, a minority within the French 
delegation led by Guesde called only for the "most effec­
tive" tactics for the prevention of war— this came to noth-
52
24
ing more than a ratification of the status quo.
Within the SPD, a majority sided with August Bebel 
(head of the SPD's parliamentary group), who proposed a 
resolution similar to the one offered by Guesde, > one
which did not commit any of the sections to specific ac­
tions, and allowed a maximum latitude of individual re- 
25
sponse. The notorious reformist von Vollmar vehemently 
responded to Herve's speech with, in Lenin’s characteriza­
tion, "the extraordinary conceit of a man infatuated with
26
stereotyped parliamentarism." And Rosa Luxemburg, although 
officially a representative of the All-Russia Social Demo­
cratic Party, found support in the left wing of the SPD by
insisting on mass action not only as a tactic for ending
27
war, but a means of overthrowing capitalism as well.
In the ensuing debate, Jaures emphasized the optimism 
of the militant left in the power of activism, and denied 
the "necessity" of war under capitalism (although he never 
doubted capitalism’s tendency to generate conflict). Bebel, 
on the other hand, contended that war under capitalism was 
unavoidable, that any effort to initiate mass action as a 
response to war would be futile in view of government re­
pression, and that therefore the principal task for social­
ists was to push for socialism (which for the SPD of course
28
meant parliamentary activity). It is symptomatic of the
politics of the International and its subsequent development
that Jaures the internationalist found himself defending
bourgeois democracy ■ > France) against the "pseudo-
29
Parliament" of the German monarchy. Bebel could then re­
53
spond: "Bourgeois monarchy, bourgeois republic, both are
class states.... The monarchy is not so bad, nor the repub-
30
lie so good as you suggest."
Eventually, a sub-committee including Bebel, von Vol-
lmar, Jaures, Guesde, Luxemburg and Viktor Adler (Social
Democratic Party of Austria) was charged with producing a
document to which all could agree--the result, in the words
of historian James Joll, was "a long and involved resolution
which contained something for everybody while commiting
31
nobody to anything." An amendment submitted by Luxemburg, 
Lenin and Julius Martov seemed unobtrusive enough since, 
according to another astute observation by Joll, "no one 
except its sponsors took it seriously." But in this amend­
ment, consisting of only a single sentence, it was already 
possible to discern (in retrospect, at least) the bases for 
the coming split in international socialism:
Should war ever break out in spite of all of this, it 
is [the Social Democrats'] duty to intercede for its 
speedy end, and to strive with all their power to make 
use of the violent economic and political crisis brought 
about by the war to rouse the people, and thereby to 
hasten the abolition of class rule.[32]
The resolution passed unanimously amid great enthusiasm.
Also at the Stuttgart congress, a significant discus­
sion developed around the question of colonialism, an issue 
obviously linked to the relationship of the various sections 
of the International to 'their* respective governments.
Prior to Stuttgart, all congresses of the International had 
unequivocally condemned all aspects and manifestations of 
colonial rule in their resolutions, but in 1907 the commit­
54
tee charged with drafting a document on colonialism produced 
a paper which began:
The Congress confirms that the usefulness or the neces­
sity of colonies in general— but especially for the work­
ing class— is greatly exaggerated. But it does not repu­
diate in principle and for all time every form of colo­
nialism, which under a socialist system could perform a 
civilizing mission.[33]
The latter sentence was inserted at the behest of the com­
mittee najority, led by Eduard David of Germany and H. van 
Kol of Holland, and resulted in three days of heated debate: 
one day in the committee and two at the plenum. Bernstein, 
David, van Kol and Ramsay MacDonald spoke in favor of the 
motion as offered. A minority of the committee, outraged at 
the wording of the resolution, offered an alternative, one 
similar to those passed at earlier congresses and which 
condemned all colonialism. Kautsky, Georg Ledebour and Harry 
Quelch spoke for the minority version. Ultimately, the cong­
ress as a whole defeated the majority resolution, but only
34
by a small margin— 127 to 108.
At the Copenhagen congress (1910), Vaillant's mass 
action proposals were endorsed by Keir Hardie, recently 
elected MP of the British ILP, a combative but non-
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revolutionary individual membership socialist party. The 
ILP's political stance propelled Hardie toward the militant 
camp, which included Jaures and Vaillant. Their joint reso­
lution, which stated that parliamentary activity alone would 
be ineffective unless supported by a mass strike, was adopt­
ed by the draft committee. The congress as a whole, however, 
failed to approve it, and chose instead to submit the motion
55
to the ISB for consideration at the next congress— scheduled
36
to be held in Vienna in August 1914. By then, of course, 
there was little to discuss. The majority of the SPD de­
clined to support the general strike notion on the grounds 
that if successful, such a strike would ensure, in the event
of war, that the most highly 'organized* and 'class con-
37
scious* proletariat would be defeated. Later, at a July
1914 congress of the SFIO, Guesde opposed the general strike
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group on precisely the same grounds.
Meanwhile, the prospects for war mounted: the Morocco
crisis and the Balkan wars raised great alarm. The ISB,
under direction of its secretary Camille Huysmans, scheduled
an extraordinary congress to meet in Basle during November
1912. Joll describes the mystical quality of the session,
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held in a cathedral. There was an abundance of rhetoric
and self-congratulatory pronouncements. The resolutions from
Stuttgart and Copenhagen were re-affirmed without, again,
any specification of concrete measures. That fall there were
large anti-war demonstrations all over Europe, and the Bal-
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kan crisis passed without a general conflagration. The 
easing of tensions caused a wave of optimism to engulf the 
voluntarist militant group— they became convinced of the 
International's strength and capacity to prevent war.
The so-called orthodox Marxist faction (hereafter also 
referred to as the 'center*, in anticipation of post-1914 
political alignments) was encouraged by the defusing of the 
crisis, but continued to believe that Social Democracy did
56
not possess sufficient strength, in any nation, to prevent 
fighting in case of mobilization of the war machine. Adler
thus remarked: "It unfortunately does not depend on us
41
Social Democrats whether there is a war or not." Faced 
with this realization, and circumscribed by its committment 
to parliamentarism, the center grouping was forced toward 
pacifist sentiments (more on this in subheading D below). 
This drift was expressed in hopes of attracting bourgeois 
anti-war groups to a common front. To an extent, the easing 
of tensions contributed to the spawning of illusions among
this tendency as well, with the political consequence that
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they above all began to fear 'rocking the boat'.
Only among the revolutionary left, notably Lenin and 
Leon Trotsky, was there a refusal to see anything but a 
temporary detente in the passing of the crisis. Furthermore, 
the revolutionary wing harbored no illusions about the In­
ternational's potency, and were thus in agreement with the 
center regarding the ineffectuality of 'opposing1 the out­
break of war. Trotsky wrote:
Once mobilization is declared, the Social Democracy 
finds itself face to face with the concentrated power of 
the government, which is supported by a powerful military 
apparatus.143]
Lenin had also noted, and quite early on, the futility of 
the naive expectations of the militants (_i.e. , Hardie, Vail- 
lant, Jaures and the rather incoherent Herve) and the com­
plete chauvinism of the right (i,.£. , von Vollmar, David and 
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Bernstein). It yet remained for Lenin to appreciate Luxem­
burg’s perspicacity in her recognition of the imperative of
57
breaking with the center (i_.e,. , Kautsky and Hugo Haase, the 
latter taking over leadership of the SPD' s parliamentary 
group following the death of Bebel).
* * *
The course of events between the incident at Sarajevo
(28. June, 1914) and Austria's ultimatum to Serbia (23.
July) must have seemed to move with inordinate speed for
most members of the International. Faster yet must have been
the days between 23. July and the German declaration of war
on Russia on 1. August.
Prior to the German declaration, a hasty meeting of the
ISB was called in Brussels (28-29. July) with the hope of
avoiding a European war. Some of the delegates, such as
Adler, had already given up hope and were crushed and im- 
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mobilized. Others, such as Jaures, felt compelled to 
praise the "peaceful policy" of the French government, al­
though he did issue grave warnings (of revolution) in case
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war did break out. Haase and even Luxemburg felt that
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Kaiser Wilhelm II was too afraid to risk war. Keir Hardie
insisted that England could not be drawn into war. No one at
the conference thought to ask what should be done in case
48
war did actually break out.
On 28. July, Austria declared war on Serbia. At the ISB
meeting, there was still a feeling that the conflict might
remain isolated. Haase had meanwhile returned to Berlin from
the ISB meeting, and on 30. July met with the Reichstag
Group and the SPD executive. At this time, a majority of the
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SPD leadership was still resolutely against Avar. Haase and
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Ledebour spoke, urging a vote to reject war credits in the 
50
Reichstag. A personal blow to the International cane on 
31. July, when a young French 'patriot' assasinated Jaures.
On 1. August, the German government declared war on 
Russia. Owing to press censorship, the SPD Reichstag Group 
had only a limited awareness of passing events. Specifical­
ly, they did not know that on the previous day Germany had 
demanded a declaration of neutrality from France. Further­
more, the government 'revealed' (untrue) information that
Russian troops had crossed the German frontier and that the
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French had bombed Karlsruhe and Nuremberg. Under these
conditions, the Reichstag Group reversed itself, and decided
(78 to 14) to vote in favor of war credits. The 14 opposed
submitted to party discipline, so the vote in the Reichstag
52
on 4. August was unanimous.
In France, the parliament also met on 4. August, and 
the vote for war credits was also unanimous. The French 
socialist deputies found it easy to rationalize their ac­
tions, citing the German declaration of war on France the
day before and the movement of German troops into Belgium, a
53
neutral nation, the previous night. The European war had
truly begun, and within a matter of days England and Rus- 
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sia were also involved.
* * *
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, it seems possible 
to identify four broad tendencies within the International—  
the right, the 'orthodox* center, the militant (albeit gen­
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erally non-Marxist) left, and the revolutionary left. A re­
markable transformation in these political positions was 
effected by the eruption of war.
Needless to say, the right quickly moved to a perspec­
tive almost indistinguishable from that of the bourgeois 
parties. Certain elements within the center, although ini­
tially ambivalent with regard to the voting of war credits, 
soon succumbed when faced with the overwhelming support for 
the war within the various parliaments. And although there 
had been anti-war rallies as late as 2. August, the militant 
left found that once war had been declared, anti-war mass 
action was notable only for its absence. Some members of the 
militant tendency (£.g.» Guesde, Marcel Sembat) subsequently
even came to accept positions on wartime cabinets. (Herve,
55
incidentally, became a French patriot).
Fundamentally, there was a mingling of the center and 
militant left groups, followed by the uneven crystalliza­
tion, over the first years of the war, of two relatively 
distinct positions. On the one hand, a ‘pro-war’ or ’defense 
of the fatherland* group emerged, including such personages 
as Vaillant, Guesde, Sembat and Georgi Plekhanov. On the 
other hand, a ’pacifist* wing appeared which, while opposed 
to the war, acquiesced to voting for war credits while 
waiting for a ’solution' to be found. This group found
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Haase, Kautsky and (later) Bernstein among its members.
Finally, the revolutionary left, remaining largely 
intact, undertook an immediate campaign to explain the col­
lapse of the International, and sought to formulate a viable
60
but principled position on the imperialist war. Within this 
perspective, a range of reponses to the war became promi­
nent, from Luxemburg's slogan of "struggle against capital­
ist class rule" to Lenin's tactic of "revolutionary 
defeatism."
The following subheadings of this chapter seek to exam­
ine the underlying theoretical premises and conceptions of 
the accumulation process held by these principal factions, 
and to reveal the links to movements in the political and 
ideological spheres. The results should serve to help ex­
plain the diverse positions, sketched out above, on the 
prospects for proletarian internationalism in a concrete 
historical setting.
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C. Eduard Bernstein and the 'Revision* of Marxism
The first 'ism* to be defined by the clash of theoreti­
cal and political standpoints operating within the framework 
of the International was the 'revisionism* (beginning in the 
late 1890s) associated with Eduard Bernstein. Even before 
Bernstein launched his critique, the political content of 
revisionism was expressly present within the SPD. In 1891, 
von Vollmar (in a speech to the Erfurt congress) spoke of
the primacy of immediate objectives and the need to pursue
57
"the path of calm, legal, parliamentary activity...." Von 
Vollmar, however, was no theoretician. In fact, by distin­
guishing between the reformists and the revisionists within 
the SPD, Gary Steenson draws attention to the explicitly
anti-theoretical attitude of the reformists (e.g., von Vol- 
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Imar). Thus Bernstein's novelt3^, which he himself recog­
nized, was the effort to ratify theoretically the already
existing practical program of the SPD (i_.e^, reformist par-
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liamentary activity), with which he agreed.
Somewhat paradoxically, one of Bernstein's principal 
antagonists in the subsequent debate surrounding the revi­
sion of Marxism came to be Karl Kautsky, 'High Priest' of 
orthodoxy in the SPD's center faction— paradoxically because 
Kautsky and Bernstein had collaborated in 1891, less than a 
decade earlier, to draft the Erfurt Programme of the SPD.
In 1896, a year after Engels' death, Bernstein began to 
publish a series of articles in the SPD theoretical organ 
Die Neue Zeit. These were subsequently collected, somewhat 
refined and published (in 1899) as a book: Die Voraus-
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setzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufhaben der Sozialdemo-
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kratie, appearing in English translation under the title 
Evolutionary Socialism.
The assault which Bernstein engineered proceeded along
many fronts. Addressing himself to the SPD, Bernstein argued
for a political strategy of expanding legal, parliamentary
and above all evolutionary methods of struggle. ,f[l]n my
judgement a greater security for success lies in a steady
advance than in the possibilities offered by a catastrophic 
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crash.'’ Bernstein furthermore contended that in urging
this approach he was doing no more than acting on the advice
given by Engels in an 1895 preface (written shortly before
his death) to Marx's The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to
1850. Citing Engels, Bernstein wrote that
the time of political surprises, of the 'revolutions of 
small conscious minorities at the head of unconscious 
masses' was today at an end, that a collision on a large 
scale with the military would be the means of checking 
the steady growth of social democracy.... [T]he next task 
of the party should be 'to work for an uninterrupted 
increase of its votes' or to carry on a slow propaganda 
of parliamentary activity.[62]
Before continuing, note that Ernest Mandel has effec­
tively put to rest the legend which makes Engels the progen­
itor of Bernstein's theses, a misconception which still 
enjoys widespread currency. In actuality, Engels' manuscript 
was not printed in full, and the excised passages lend the 
text an entirely different meaning from that suggested by 
Bernstein. As Engels himself wrote to Paul Lafargue:
'Liebknecht [the editor] played a dirty trick on me. He 
took from my introduction to Marx's articles on France 
between 1848 and 1850 everything he could use to support
6 3
a peaceful tactic at any price.... But I recommend such a 
tactic only for Germany today, and even here with strong 
reservations *.[63]
On the opening page of Evolutionary Socialism, Bern­
stein makes clear that the principal thrust of his critique 
will be to subject Marxist theory to empirical test, since 
"what is not capable of such proof is no longer science...." 
Moreover, he contends:
In all sciences a distinction can be drawn between a 
pure science and an applied science. The first consists 
of priciples and of a knowledge, which are derived from 
the whole series of corresponding experiences and there­
fore looked upon as universally valid.... From the appli­
cation of these principles to single phenomena or to 
particular cases of practical experience, is formed an 
applied science....[64]
Now, according to Bernstein, the division of Marxism into 
its "pure" and "applied" aspects "has not hitherto been 
attempted." At first glance, Marx's analysis of the capi­
talist mode of production may appear to be "applied" Marx­
ism, since it deals with a historically specific and de­
limited form of social organization. But in truth, says 
Bernstein, the theory of capitalism "is a thouroughly essen­
tial application" of "pure" Marxism, and consequently "the 
general or chief propositions of [the] deductions regarding
modern society must be ascribed to the pure doctrine of 
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Marxism." Thus the empirical critique, by bringing into 
question the validity of certain derived propositions, at 
the sane time (and somewhat contrary to Bernstein's original 
account of the relation between "pure" and "applied" sci­
ence) can be made to refute the "pure" theory as well.
Having framed the issue in this manner, Bernstein pro-
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ceeds to examine the "nost important element in the founda­
tion of Marxism,... the materialist interpretation of histo­
ry." For Bernstein:
To be a materialist means first of all to trace back 
all phenomena to the necessary movements of matter.... 
Mechanical facts determine, in the last resort, all oc­
curences, even those which appear to be caused by ideas. 
It is, finally, always the movement of matter which 
determines the form of ideas and the directions of the 
will; and thus these also are inevitable. The materialist 
is thus a Calvinist without God.[66]
But beyond this passage, Bernstein never again refers 
to the "movement of matter" as having any privileged status 
in Marxism (or, for that matter, in any other non-Marxist 
materialist philosophy). Instead, his concern moves as unob­
trusively as possible to an effort aimed at revealing the 
existence of a necessary link between a (any) materialist 
eplstemology (but Marx’s in particular) and a belief in 
historical necessity or determinism ("the inevitableness of 
all historical events"). And by quoting from Marx’s 1859 
"Preface,” Bernstein concludes that for Marx the economic 
(taking now the place of the "movement of matter") is "the
determining factor" by which "the inevitable is accomplished
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in human history."
Marx, in Bernstein's view took a "dogmatic" stand by
erecting such a sharp distinction between "consciousness"
and "existence... that we are nearly driven to conclude that
men were regarded solely as living agents of historical
powers whose work they carry out positively against their
68
knowledge and will." This conception of the historical 
process is not ascribed to Engels, who (we are told) in the
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period after Marx's death adopted a much more "qualified"
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position. Invoking two letters written by Engels,
Bernstein quotes passages therein which emphasize the effec-
tivity of non-economic factors, and maintains that these
formulations convey a rather different meaning than the ones
produced by Marx himself. In the end, the entire matter
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reduces, for Bernstein, to "a question of proportion."
Thus while Bernstein does not deny the significance of the 
economic, it becomes necessary, in his opinion, to consider 
the economic as merely one factor among many— this "eclecti­
cism" is then simply the "rebellion of sober reason" against 
dogma, and points the way to a rational reconstruction of
scientific socialism which avoids the deterministic formula-
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tions intrinsic to Marxian materialism.
After all this, however, Bernstein surprisingly an­
nounced that he still preferred to retain the notion of the 
"Economic Interpretation of History," provided that his 
qualifications were adopted. He also inexplicably continued 
to refer to it as the "Marxist conception of history," 
although Marx had specifically been held responsible for its
"deterministic" formulations, i . , those which were sub-
72
sequently "corrected" by Engels.
Foremost among Bernstein's objections to the "dogma" is 
the vision of necessary "collapse" which he imputes to the 
Marxist theory of capital accumulation. In Bernstein’s read­
ing of Marx, the collapse of capitalist society is conceived 
as the necessary and inevitable outcome of the accumulation 
process. The "coercive lav/s of competition" and "the growing
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wealth of capital in society1' act to bring down the rate of 
profit: "competition...presses constantly on the market 
price of commodities," forcing capitalists to cheapen pro­
duction costs. The principal means by which costs are low­
ered is mechanization, which entails a rising organic compo­
sition of capital and a concommitant falling rate of 
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profit.
This interpretation of Marx's law of the tendency of
the rate of profit to fall is no doubt muddled by ascribing
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the fall to the "coercive laws" of competition. But even 
more striking is the fact that these references, which are 
no more than passing comments from an introductory chapter, 
are actually the sole passages in Evolutionary Socialism 
where Bernstein even considers Marx's crisis theory to be 
bound up with profitability at all. The discussion is inter­
rupted at this point by Bernstein's recapitulation of the 
Marxian theory of value.
The first page of the chapter on value theory in Evolu­
tionary Socialism is also virtually the last where Bernstein 
renders an accurate account. He begins with the reasonable 
claim that the theory of surplus value, for Marx, is the 
"pivot" on which the workings of the capitalist mode of 
production are understood. But Bernstein then complains that 
Marx, having equated value with the socially necessary labor 
time required for (re)production, finds that such a concept 
of value entails all manner of abstraction. In particular, 
it is necessary to (i) "leave aside” use-value, (ii) reduce
C>7
complex to simple labor, (iii) allow for differential pro­
ductivities, (iv) allow for the deviation of prices of
prodiiction from values and (v) deduct ground rent from the
75
"total value"[?]. After all of these allowances, Bernstein
claims that value becomes no more than a "pure abstract
concept." Marx, like Smith, is then forced to regard value
under capitalist production as the sum [!] of profits, wages 
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and rent.
For Bernstein, the "fundamental" debate in Marxism 
prior to the publication of vol. 3 of Capital, a debate in 
which Bernstein proudly notes he participated, revolved 
around the question of whether "socially necessary labor 
time" referred to the "amount produced" or to "the manner of 
the production." According to Bernstein, the resolution of 
this momentous issue was made largely irrelevant with the 
publication of vol. 3, since there it is discovered that 
commodities do not even exchange at values, but at prices of 
production. Following this disclosure, "[w]hat takes the 
first place is the value of the total production of socie­
ty. . .— that is, not the individual, but the total social
77
surplus value."
From this, Bernstein infers that the amount of the 
total surplus value realized depends on the relation between 
total production and total demand, and according to this 
perspective the individual value (sic) of a commodity is 
"determined by the labor time which was necessary to produce 
it under normal conditions of production to that amount 
which the market...can take in each case." Since there can
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be no measure of social need, "value as conceived above is a
purely abstract entity," not unlike the (subjective) value
of the marginal utility theoreticians--and of equally lim-
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ited applicability. And if all of this is true, it re­
quires no great feat of deduction to conclude that the 
theory of surplus value (the "pivot" of Marx's system) 
collapses as ■well. But fortunately, all is not lost because 
"practical experience" shows first, that supply and demand 
tend to equalize themselves (obviating the need for a theory 
of value!); and second, that some people consume without
working (obviating the need for a "deductive proof" of the
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theory of surplus labor!). It must be said in Bernstein's 
defense that his recourse to the empirical is a testament to 
consistency.
A full critique of Bernstein's appraisal of the Marxian 
theory of value is not necessary for present purposes, but a 
few summary points can be readily made and briefly elab­
orated. First, Bernstein's complaint that the theory "is 
above all misleading in this that it always appears again
and again as the measure of the actual exploitation of the 
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worker" will re-emerge as an element of his observation 
that the position of the working class under capitalism is 
steadily improving (i..e_., the basis of his argument against 
the "class struggle"). Second, and highly important, his 
treatment of the labor theory of value allowed Bernstein to 
detach the subsequent discussion of crisis from any founda­
tion in value theory, thus expelling any notion of crisis as
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intrinsic to capitalism. Indeed, as already noted, the ac­
tual discussion of crisis in Evolutionary Socialism does not 
even indirectly refer to profitability. Rather, the section 
on crisis dwells on two topics: the role of the credit
system and disproportions stemming from the anarchy of 
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production.
According to Bernstein, "the enormous extension of the 
world market” reduces the possibility of crisis by virtue of 
enhancing flexibility (in transport, finance, etc.) and 
therefore increasing the likelihood that the adjustment of 
disturbances will be accomplished locally, without precipi­
tating a massive crisis in all parts of the system. In 
particular, "the elasticity of the modern credit system and 
the rise of industrial Kartels" has facilitated the smooth 
operation of the capitalist market to the extent that "gen­
eral commercial crises similar to the earlier ones are to be
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regarded as improbable."
True, says Bernstein, the credit system in the early 
days of capitalism served on occasion to fuel speculation 
and hence instability. But he argues that in addition to 
this "destructive" role, Marx himself had assigned a "cre­
ative" content to speculation insofar as it aids in the
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development and extension of capitalist production. And
once established, the maturing of a particular branch of
production coincides with a diminution of "the speculative
momentum.... The conditions and movements of the market are
then more exactly foreseen and are taken into consideration
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with greater certainty." Bernstein concedes that credit
70
may nevertheless act as a "hothouse forcing... overproduc­
tion." But here too, in his opinion, a countervailing in­
fluence has emerged in the form of cartels and trusts, which 
are able to regulate production with ever greater precision.
To deny this is to deny the superiority of organization 
over anarchic competition. But we do so if we deny on 
principle that Kartels can work as a modifying influence 
on the nature and frequency of crises.[85]
The conclusion is self-evident. Marx may have more or 
less correctly identified the source of economic crises at 
the time in which he wrote Capital, but social development 
had so altered economic conditions that it was certainly no 
longer possible in 1900 to argue that capitalism was threat­
ened by "collapse." Moreover, even the recurrent fluctua­
tions seemed to diminish over time. Naturally, external 
factors— war, general crop failures, etc.— could still in­
duce a crisis, but "there is no urgent reason for concluding
that such a crisis will come to pass for purely economic 
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reasons."
For Bernstein, Marx’s errors were not confined to the 
crisis theory. "The Marxist doctrine of class war" rests, 
according to Bernstein, on the argument that capitalist 
development entails the concentration and centralization of 
capital in the hands of an ever smaller, wealthier bourgeoi­
sie and the impoverishment and degradation of an ever larg­
er, increasingly destitute proletariat. To this interpreta­
tion Bernstein counterposes his own contention that
conditions have not developed to such an acute opposition 
of things and classes.... The enormous increase in social 
wealth is not accompanied by a decreasing number of large
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capitalists but by an increasing number of capitalists of 
all degrees.[87]
Indeed, the economic 'facts’ demonstrate that rather than
generating a concentration of wealth, capitalist development
disperses it (as evidenced by the growing number of share- 
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holders). The principal characteristic of the capitalist
mode of production, for Bernstein, consists in the rapid
increase in the productivity of labor, leading to
the production of masses of commodities. Where are these 
riches?... If the 'capitalist magnates' had ten times as 
large stomachs as popular satire attributes to them..., 
their consumption would only be a feather in the scale 
against the mass of yearly national product....[89]
Bernstein concludes that the "riches" must obviously be
accruing to the middle and working classes. Thus once again,
in the best modern tradition, the 'facts' contradict the
'theory', and Bernstein provides a falsification of Marx.
Since in Bernstein's schema "class is a social stratum
which is largely formed by similarity of living condi- 
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tions," and observation shows a wide spectrum of "living
conditions" (even within the ranks of the propertyless), it
follows that the "middle classes" not only are not de-
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dining, they are even increasing. At the same time, these
differences in "living conditions" create such tensions
within the working class that, according to Bernstein, it
becomes impossible to even speak of the proletariat as
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anything except a "purely mental construct."
In an important essay, Lucio Colletti criticizes Bern­
stein's reduction of value to a mental generalization as an
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egregious misreading of Marx’s theory. While Colletti
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links Bernstein’s mistake to the (vulgar) understanding of -
exploitation as a violation of the law of equivalent ex-
94
change (similar to Proudhon’s "theft"), grasping this 
connection only uncovers the tip of the iceberg.
When Bernstein severs value theory from the theory of 
capital accumulation and crisis, a twofold result directly 
obtains. First, it becomes possible to think of crisis as a 
problem of disproportions or periodic outbreaks of specula­
tive fever, both of which can be gradually eliminated
through regulation and the perfection of the credit sys- 
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tern. This implies an enhanced appreciation of the pros­
pects for reform, which of course leads to a reliance on the 
(bourgeois) parliament and efforts to 'perfect' the parlia­
ment. The conception of the 'interests' of the 'nation as a
whole' is thus smuggled onto the arena, with clear implica-
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tions for working class organizations. Second, once value
theory is abandoned, accumulation takes on the aspect of a
process whose aim is the production of "riches" in the form
of "masses of commodities" which appear merely as use- 
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values. Consumption, rather than the expansion of value, 
has become the object of capitalist production; all that is 
left for socialism is to effect a more or less equal distri­
bution of these "riches."
It is in Bernstein’s discussion of the nature of civil 
society that the implications of his theory of capitalist 
development are combined and their links with the theory 
most fully revealed. Bernstein openly states that acceptance 
of his arguments regarding the crisis theory leads directly
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to the view that social democracy must proceed by "evolu­
tion," an imperative if the socialist movement was "to avoid
the steady growth of social democracy by lawful means being
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interrupted by a political revolution." There is an in­
ference here: since for the SPD "lawful means" signified 
parliamentary methods, fealty to parliamentary methods also 
implied fealty to the parliament, i..e. , the emergence of a 
state of affairs in which the supposed interests of the 
working class come to be linked and identified with the 
continued maintenance and development of the parliament, 
rather than its revolutionary supersession.
A similar theme is evident when Bernstein speaks of 
"[d]emocracy [as] the suppression of class government," and 
when he maintains that the "right to vote in a democracy 
makes its members virtually partners in the community, and
this virtual partnership must in the end lead to real part- 
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nershlp." Plainly, this line of reasoning leads somewhat 
beyond the mere renunciation of violent methods as a means 
of obtaining political power for the working class. Rather, 
it rejects any notion whatsoever of the state as guarantor 
or reproducer of particular social relations by conceiving 
the modern representative state as a perfectly class neutral 
or non-class institution.
To be sure, Marx had also made mention of the progres­
sive aspects of capitalism (and its ideology, bourgeois 
liberalism) viz-a-viz archaic forms of social organization. 
But Marx had nowhere argued that even the most democratic
7 4
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bourgeois government was anything but a class state.
Bernstein consequently places himself far afield from Marx's 
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theses when he argued that ”[t]here is actually no really
liberal thought which does not also belong to the elements
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of the ideas of socialism," and that for the full reali­
zation of socialism the "liberal organizations of modern so­
ciety. ..do not need to be destroyed, but only to be further 
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developed." It is not a major leap frciu here to the con­
tention that with the development of liberalism the worker 
"moves from being a proletarian to a citizen..,[and becomes]
a fellow owner of the common property of the nation." Ob-
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viously, such a worker increasingly "has a fatherland."
Whereas for Bernstein it thus comes to pass that West­
ern workers can and should establish an identity of in­
terests with the fatherland, the same cannot be said of the 
inhabitants of the colonies, since
only a conditional right of savages to the land occupied 
by them can be recognized. The higher civilization ulti­
mately can claim a higher right. Not the conquest, but 
the cultivation, of the land gives the historical legal 
title to its use.[105]
And here Bernstein claims he is only following Marx [!],
citing the following passage from Capital vol. 3:
Even a whole society, a nation, nay, all contempora­
neous societies taken together are not proprietors of the 
earth. They are only its tenants, its usufructuaries, and 
have to leave it improved as boni patres familias to the 
following generation.
In addition to such non sequiturs, much of Bernstein's
writing is infused with homages to Germany's "honourable
share in the civilizing work of the world" and considera-
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tions of Germany's "future rights." Here again, Bern-
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stein's sympathetic biographer concocts an apologia. Con­
ceding that Bernstein "supported" colonialism, Gay immedi­
ately warns that it would be a "grave misconception” to 
ignore the fact that this support was "qualified." In par­
ticular, Gay argues that Bernstein's favorable attitude to 
colonialism was confined to the British variety, insofar as
this supposedly enlightened form was capable of "bringing
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advancement to backward nations."
Bernstein was not alone in the SPD in voicing support
of colonialism, and it must be said that others provided
much less "qualified" endorsements. Ludwig Quessel, for
instance, was unhappy with Germany's 'meager' endowment of
colonies, and thought it only fair that Portugal should cede
its colonies to Germany, since Portugal had shown Itself to
be manifestly incapable of performing the "civilizing mis- 
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sion." In a similar vein, Gerhard Hildebrand saw that
"our [Europe'S--N.K.] well being, our civilization, is based
upon the payment of tribute by foreign peoples." Should
these "peoples" in the colonial areas begin on a course of
independent economic development, Europe might find itself
without adequate food supplies and markets for export.
Clearly, the colonies had to be maintained in a state of
dependence. Hildebrand justifies himself:
A mass of humanity consisting of 290-300 millions, 
crowded into the narrow space of the Western half of 
Europe, which is blessed with a superior civilization, 
must claim the right to colonize the backward, sparsely 
populated lands such as Africa, where the people have 
proved themselves incapable of progress.[ 109]
Alongside Bernstein's revisionism, and clearly linked
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to it via the implicit or explicit abandonment of interna­
tionalist principles, a second 'ism’ had thus made its 
appearance within the Second International: social imperial­
ism, _i .e^ . , socialism in words and imperialism in deeds. 
Concretely, social imperialism manifested itself (as already 
discussed in subheading B above) in the struggle around the 
issue of colonialism. The manner in which the anti­
revisionist Marxists now came to develop theoretical expla­
nations of revisionism, social imperialism and the connec­
tions between them is discussed in subheadings D and E 
below.
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D. Karl Kautsky, Georgi Plekhanov, 
and the Orthodox* Critique of Revisionism
The response to Bernstein and the revisionist tide was 
swift. From the ’center* camp, Georgi Plekhanov immediately 
launched a vituperative critique of Bernstein’s philosoph­
ical theses, while Karl Kautsky (the ’High Priest’ of doc­
trinal purity within the SPD) somewhat belatedly went on the 
attack against the economic theory of revisionism as well as 
its philosophical grounding.
When Bernstein began publishing his articles in Die 
Neue Zeit toward the end of 1896, Plekhanov was one of the 
first to react. Kautsky delayed, however, and continued to 
publish Bernstein’s work without comment. Some have vaguely 
sought to explain Kautsky's hesitation as "symptomatic’’ of
the general absence of an "articulate opposition" to revi-
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sionism within the SPD. What this implies, of course, is 
that Bernstein’s critique of Marxism was devastating. Proba­
bly closer to the mark are those explanations which empha­
size Kautsky’s friendship with Bernstein, and more impor­
tantly, the tactical considerations of SPD leaders over
provoking a split with the revisionists, who had powerful
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allies in the SPD affiliated trade unions. In their 
personal correspondence, Kautsky and August Bebel rather 
quickly concurred that Bernstein was beyond the pale. Viktor 
Adler, however, counseled that a break would be inopportune 
because Bernstein might prove more troublesome outside the 
constraints imposed by party discipline. By March 1899 even 
Adler had become fed up with Bernstein’s contentions, and
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Kautsky proceeded to work out a critique of revisionism.
* * *
Plekhanov’s earliest (Marxist) theoretical writings, 
however, appeared in 1883, long before the revisionist con­
troversy. In that year, he published Socialism and the 
Political Struggle, followed a year later by Our Differ­
ences .
The former was a critique of the theoretical and polit­
ical positions of the Russian populist Narodnaya Volya group 
from a Marxist perspective. In the pamphlet, Plekhanov de­
nied that Marx had argued "that Russia must go through 
exactly the same phases of historical and economic develop­
ment as the West," and insofar as Capital was concerned with 
"the history of West European relations," these were "used 
by Marx only as the basis of the history of capitalist 
production." The principal aim of Socialism and the Politi­
cal Struggle was to show that class conflict is the motivat­
ing force of history, and that in modern industrial society,
and increasingly in Russia, the proletariat would be the
113
class which asumes the key historical role. The Narodnaya 
Volya group erred, said Plekhanov, in regarding workers as 
merely an auxiliary force in the revolution, and in empha­
sizing the recruitment of intellectuals and members of "the
114
officer corps."
Having said all this, Plekhanov immediately grew cau­
tious in his assessment of the prospects for socialist 
revolution in Russia.
The socialist organization of production implies such a
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character of economic relations as will make that organi­
zation the logical conclusion of the entire previous 
development of the country.... In other words, socialist 
organization, like any other, requires the appropriate 
basis. But that basis does not exist in Russia.[115]
The most that could be hoped for in the Russia of the 1880s
was "to achieve free political institutions...and to create
elements for the setting up of the future worker’s socialist 
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party...."
For Plekhanov, the appropriate political strategy was 
consequently to support the bourgeoisie (quoting the Mani­
festo) " ’whenever it acts in a revolutionary way, against
117
the absolute monarchy’ Narodnaya Volya was mistaken in 
believing that an immediate transition to socialism was 
possible on the basis of the village commune, argued. 
Plekhanov, and therefore the appropriate if paradoxical 
strategy to achieve socialism was to ’support' the develop­
ment of capitalism.
Many of these same themes were further developed in Our
Differences. Moreover, Plekhanov also sought to show that 
capitalism was already implanted and developing in Russia, 
citing statistics on industrial concerns, numbers of work­
ers, the expansion of the market and the dissolution of the
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village commune. The laws of motion of capitalism were at
work with the irresistible and blind harshness of laws of 
nature. But to discover this or that law of nature or of 
social development means, firstly, to be able to avoid 
clashing with it and, consequently, to avoid expending 
one's efforts in vain, and, secondly, to be able to 
regulate its application in such a manner as to draw 
profit from it.[119]
There was an historical "peculiarity" of Russian capi­
talism, according to Plekhanov, and it consisted in the fact
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that because of a prior capitalist development in Europe,
and the lessons which were drawn from it, "the socialist
movement in [Russia] began when capitalism was only in the 
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embryo." Plekhanov's political conclusion is the same as
previously: Russian socialists should "put aside all
thoughts of siezing power, leaving that to our worker's
socialist party of the future." Rather, efforts should be
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directed towards the creation of such a party. The "char­
acter of the impending revolution" will be bourgeois, con­
cluded Plekhanov, but socialists can take comfort in knowing
that because of Russia's "peculiarity," the capitalist phase
122
there will be shorter than in the West.
The debates with the populists occupied Plekhanov dur­
ing the 1880s, but shortly after the end of the decade he 
began to take note of the unwelcome trends within the SPD.
As noted earlier, revisionism as a political practice was 
already firmly established in German social-deraocracy at 
least since the Erfurt congress (1891) of the party, thus 
well before Bernstein's formulation of the theoretical bases 
of revisionism. At the congress, von Vollmar had exhorted 
party members to seek an accomodation with the ruling clas­
ses and to confine the SPD's activity to the parliamentary 
arena. At the time, Plekhanov expressed pleasure at the
rejection of von Vollmar's position by the congress, but
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also noted that the danger was not thereby eliminated.
During the spring and summer of 1898, Plekhanov toured 
Italy and Switzerland, delivering a series of critical lec­
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tures on Bernstein's philosophical arguments. These lectures
ultimately served as the basis for several anti-revisionist
1 24
articles which Plekhanov published in Die Neue Zeit.
For Plekhanov, the critique of revisionism was in large 
part a continuation of his polemics against the "theory of 
factors" put forward in Russia by the "subjectivists" and 
liberal populists such as Nikolai Kareyev and Nikolai K. 
Mikhailovsky. Proponents of the "theory of factors" inter­
preted Marx's "materialist conception of history" to mean 
that only the economic "factor" played any active role; 
their critique then consisted in seeking to establish that 
numerous other "factors" (law, ideology, etc.) possessed an
independent effectivity, which found expression in the cora-
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plex interaction of factors. Plekhanov had no objection to
the observation that social phenomena are characterized by
the articulation of a myriad of factors--the problem came
when the observer of events
embark[s] on philosophising.... In that case I [the 
observer-turned-philosopher] shall not be satisfied with 
the external nexus between events, but shall wish to 
uncover their inner causes, so that those factors— human 
passions, public law, and the economy--which I previously 
set off and brought forward, guided almost exclusively by 
my artistic instinct, will now acquire a vast new signif­
icance for me. I shall see them just as those inner 
causes, those 'hidden forces', to whose influence the 
events can be ascribed. I shall create a theory of 
factors.[126]
The "theory of factors" was flawed, according to Ple­
khanov, in that it "split up social man's activities" and 
was consequently unable to take the "synthetic view on 
social life." Plekhanov maintained that the "theory of fac­
tors" stood in the same relationship to social science as
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did the early notions of separate physical forces to the 
science of physics. In the same way as modern physics devel­
oped a unified concept of energy, so too did modern social
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science (i_.£., "dialectical materialism") adopt the "syn­
thetic view on social life." Granted, the "synthetic view" 
was not unique to Marxism— it could be found in Hegel as 
well. The advance of Marxism over Hegelianism consisted in 
the former’s "eliminat[ion of] teleology from social sci­
ence ." Marxism
has shown that men make their history, not so as to march 
along a predestined road of progress or because they must 
obey the laws of some kind of abstract evolution. They 
make it in a striving to satisfy their needs....
The ways of satisfying social man’s needs, and, in 
considerable measure, those needs themselves are deter­
mined by...the condition of his productive forces.... To 
the idealists of all shades and varieties, economic rela­
tions have been a function of human nature; the dialecti­
cal materialists consider those relations a function of 
the social productive forces.[128]
In rejecting what he termed "eclecticism," Plekhanov insist­
ed "that men are creating, not several and separated histo­
ries... but a single history of their own social rela- 
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tions...."
The imagery of a unified or "synthetic" social ontology 
permeated Plekhanov’s work. Just prior to the publication of 
the anti-Bernstein article quoted from above, Plekhanov 
produced The Development of the Monlst View of History 
(1895), wherein he defined materialism as the view which 
"explain[s] psychic phenomena by these or those qualities of 
matter, by this or that organization of the human or, in 
more general terms, of the animal body." Moreover, "the most
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consistent and profound thinkers were always inclined to 
monism," i,.£. , an unwavering commitment to either material­
ism or idealism. The eclectics simply did not understand 
"the worthlessness of [their] dualist outlook on the world" 
because they (the eclectics) could never
reply satisfactorily to the inevitable question: how 
could these two separate substances [i.*©., spirit and 
matter], which have nothing in common between them, in­
fluence each other?[l30]
And finally, Plekhanov (following Kautsky) asked how
Bernstein could conceive of the possibility of scientific
explanation at all without accepting determinism, i.e.,
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causality. Bernstein could respond, of course, by claiming 
that he only objected to the explanation of "all occurences" 
by the billiard ball-like "movement of matter." By contrast 
to what he deemed "purely" materialist explanations, Bern­
stein claimed he only wished to leave room for spiritual, 
moral, etc. principles. Plekhanov’s monism was no less dog­
matic than Calvinism.
But both Bernstein and Plekhanov muddled the issues. As 
already seen above, Bernstein had objected to the determin­
ism of billiard ball explanations of social (as opposed to 
natural) processes, and claimed that Marx explained the
"inevitableness of all historical events" by the "material
132
productive forces and the conditions of production."
Bernstein himself did not seek to provide the (seemingly 
necessary) explanation of why a theory of history rooted in 
the development of the productive forces necessarily implied 
the "inevitableness" of any particular event in the sense
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that the "movement of matter" might. Plekhanov, meanwhile, 
never elaborated his conception of history beyond general 
statements about the unified social history which "men are 
creating," and which is rooted in the development of the 
productive forces. Plekhanov thus certainly left himself 
open to charges of crudity, given his "definition" of mate­
rialism, when he referred to his theory of history as 
materialist.
On the other hand, Plekhanov's sketchy outline does not 
necessarily allow Bernstein's deduced criticism of ironclad 
determinism. Much depends on the content ascribed to "socio­
economic relations" and the "productive forces." If it can 
be shown that the forces-relations couplet is conceived as
"an antecedent sphere, prior to any human mediation" (in the
133
words of Lucio Colletti), and the 'economic factor* is 
seen in purely technical terms, then Bernstein might have a 
possible avenue along which to press his criticism. If, 
however, Plekhanpv's "definition" of materialism is inter­
preted to mean only that the existence of matter is a neces­
sary condition for thought, but that ideas, thoughts, etc., 
are not reducible to the "movement of matter," then Bern­
stein would be far wide of the mark.
So in the absence of further elaborations of the re­
spective positions, which were not forthcoming, the dispute 
necessarily arrives at an impasse. Plekhanov continued the 
attack by heaping scorn on Bernstein, accusing him of igno­
rance in philosophical matters. Bernstein, on the other
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hand, could admit to being a philosophical "layman," and
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yet remain smugly secure in the knowledge that the SPD’s 
concrete activities suggested a world-view in keeping with 
his revision of Marxism.
Since Plekhanov did no more than take a few passing
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snipes at Bernstein's use of statistics, the task of 
providing the refutation of Bernstein's economics fell to
Karl Kautsky, the chief theoretician of the SPD.
* * *
With Kautsky too, it is necessary to examine the theo­
retical writings which preceded the revisionism debates, 
both in order to better understand his critique of Bernstein 
(and its obscurities) as well as to grasp the general char­
acter of his approach.
In 1887, Kautsky wrote The Economic Doctrines of Karl 
Marx, intended as a straightforward and unoriginal synopsis 
and popularization of Capital and Marx's other major econom­
ic writings. The first two parts of the book consist of a 
rather rambling and far-ranging recapitulation of roughly 
the first eighteen chapters of Marx's magnum opus. In the 
third part, Kautsky begins with "Wages," corresponding to 
Part Six of Capital vol. 1, but then quickly moves ahead, 
dealing with reproduction, accumulation, primitive accumula­
tion and crisis theory in the last fifty pages (out of two 
hundred and fifty in all).
This last part of the book is also the least satisfac­
tory, being both vague and inconsistent. Economic crises are 
explained as a consequence of the struggle for markets
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causing "a period of feverish production," followed by stag­
nation. Although the crisis is characterized as one of 
"overproduction," there is no indication given as to the 
specific source or cause of the demand gap. The prolonged 
crisis beginning in the 1870s was due to the gradual diminu­
tion of non-capitalist regions of the world. So "instead of 
a cycle of 10 years,... since 1873 we had chronic business
stagnation and permanent depression..." due to the shrinkage 
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of markets.
The Class Struggle, Kautsky's commentary on the SPD's
Erfurt Programme, was first published in 1892. Here Kautsky
developed themes from the past, and introduced his own
conceptions of the historical development of capitalism.
Marx's theory of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall
made an appearance early in the book, although no special
significance was assigned to it other than as an explanation
of the "narrowing" of the capitalist class, i_.e,. , the de-
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cline in the profit rate squeezed out smaller capitals.
Crises were once again explained in terms of an "over­
production," this time linked to the anarchy of capitalist 
commodity production. Due to the unplanned nature of capi­
talist production, Kautsky claimed, once an upswing began 
individual capitals would increase production and, unaware 
of the consequences of their actions, continue to raise 
output beyond the point at which demand was saturated. As 
before, no explanation of the origin or the nature of the 
demand gap was forthcoming.
Ultimately, according to Kautsky, this state of affairs
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was caused by the fact that capitalist production was for 
exchange rather than for use. He provided a rather puzzling 
illustrative example of simple commodity circulation, show­
ing how the process could break down if one of the producers 
sold but chose not to buy. Conceding that the example was 
perhaps oversimplified, Kautsky nevertheless claimed that it 
grasped the essential contradiction of capitalism, viz.,
that production for use "is crowded ever more to the 
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rear."
At this point, Kautsky began to distinguish periodic
crises as just decribed from "chronic" overproduction, which
he saw as rooted in the constant pressure to expand markets
coming up against the continual decline in the number of
non-capitalist areas around the world. The problem became
aggravated by the proletarianization of pre-capitalist pro-
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ducers, which "lowers [their] purchasing power." Capital­
ism thus digs its own grave by depriving itself of con- 
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sumers, and periods of prosperity become shorter while
crises become longer. Adopting a highly modern-sounding turn
of phrase, Kautsky argued that the "capitalist system begins
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to suffocate in its own surplus...."
Although the theory of "chronic" overproduction would
142
allow Kautsky to explain imperialism, both in this work
and subsequently, as the quest to annex non-capitalist
agrarian areas for both markets and sources of raw mate- 
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rials, the theory of periodic crises left itself open to 
Bernstein’s criticisms. The latter had argued, it will be
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recalled, that cartels facilitate planning and that any 
overproduction under capitalism could be (and in actuality 
was) overcome by increasing consumption, especially working 
class consumption. Kautsky’s crisis theory was to remain in 
this very loosely formulated and incomplete state, for he 
never returned to a comprehensive treatment of the subject.
Perhaps the most noteworthy sections of The Class 
Struggle deal with Kautsky's general view of the process of 
social development under capitalism. It is here that one 
encounters Kautsky’s efforts to reconcile a denial of crude 
determinism (and by implication, fatalism) on the one hand, 
with a strong desire to affirm the lawfulness of social 
processes (and the inevitability of socialism). On the same 
page, Kautsky spoke of 1,the irresistible and Inevitable 
nature of the revolution," but nevertheless maintained "that 
men are men and not puppets," that "[p]atiently to yield to 
what may seem unavoidable is not to allow the social revolu­
tion to take its course, but to bring it to a standstill." 
The "breakdown of the present social system [is] unavoid­
able," but "we do not mean that some fine morning the ex­
ploited classes will find that, without their help, some
144
good fairy has brought about the revolution."
Similarly, in another part of the book, Kautsky de­
scribed a logically necessary "final result" of capitalist 
development: "the concentration of all the instruments of 
production in the hands of one person or one stock com­
pany...." But this "final result" would never in actuality 
come about, since the "suffering" of the mass of people
09
"would be so great that [they] will first overthrow capital- 
145
ism." The notion that the revolution will come about due
to "unbearable conditions" and "degradation" is repeated
146
elsewhere in the book, and places in jeopardy Kautsky*s 
later claims that he did not hold to an *immiseration* 
thesis .
The ’official* response to Bernstein's revisionism was
provided by Kautsky in 1899, in his Bernstein und das sozi-
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aldemokratische Programm. Following some jabs at Bern­
stein's critique of materialism, Kautsky moved to an attack 
on the economics of revisionism. Although extremely witty, 
Kautsky*s passages in defense of the Marxist labor theory of 
value are rather short of economic-theoretical content. 
Recall that Bernstein had claimed that the "Boehm--Bawerk 
theory" (subjective value theory) and Marx's theory were, in 
effect, the same due to their 'one-sidedness*; Bernstein
thus considered his own "eclecticism" to be the "rebellion
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of sober reason" against dogma. Kautsky ridiculed
Bernstein, remarking how strange it was that all of the
smart people responsible for the development of the two
theories of value had never before noticed the congruence
pointed to by Bernstein, and continued to attack each other
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with undiminished vigor. As for Bernstein's 'rebellious­
ness', Kautsky argued that genuine rebels were rarely eclec­
tics, that they searched for integrity and unity of ideas. 
V,'hen someone is able to equate an aspect of Marx with an
150
aspect of Boehm-Bawerk, "it is a long way from rebellion!"
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In regard to Bernstein’s unhappiness with a supposed
Marxist theory of ’’breakdown,” Kautsky argued that Marx and
Engels never held a "breakdown" theory, that "the word stems
from Bernstein...," as does the notion of an "absolute
151
immiseration” of the proletariat. Moreover, the Erfurt
Programme of the SPD, which Bernstein helped draft, contains
152
no mention of "breakdown." As correct as these claims may 
have been, it has already been seen how Kautsky's own com­
mentary on the Erfurt Programme might allow an interpretation 
such as Bernstein's.
Bernstein's use of statistics purportedly showing the 
persistent stability of small and medium producers (offered 
in opposition to Marx's theory of the concentration and 
centralization of capital), in Kautsky's view, was both 
shoddy and shallow. First, Bernstein did not trace develop­
ments over time, he merely pointed to the large numbers of
small and medium producers in various countries at specific
153
moments ijn time. Second, Kautsky developed the argument 
that many of the independent albeit marginal small producers 
in the capitalist economy are merely another (the latent) 
form of the reserve army of labor. Especially in agricul­
ture, a substantial portion of small producers are not so 
much viable in (capitalist) economic terms as they are
merely marking time, and able to do so precisely because
154
they are non-capitalist.
And finally, when Bernstein spoke of cartels he did so 
seeking to demonstrate the possibility of a 'planned' capi­
talism, thereby supposedly disproving Marx's assertions of
91
the necessity of crisis under capitalism. But why then, asks 
Kautsky, did Bernstein completely ignore the cartels, pre­
tending that they did not exist, when he developed his
critique of Marx’s theory of the concentraton of capital?
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Bernstein simply could not have it both ways.
Throughout the first decade of the twentieth century,
as Lenin would later say, Kautsky was ’’still a Marxist.”
That is, he regarded the bourgeois state as a class state,
and recognized the need for the proletariat to conquer state 
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power. In The Road to Power (1909), for example, he at­
tacks the reformers and revisionists for mistaking the de­
velopment (concentration) of capital on the one hand, and 
the growth of the proletariat (and its organizations) on the 
other, for the "peaceable growth into Socialism" or even the 
"midst of Socialism." Rather,
[w]hat appears to the 'reformers’ as a peaceable growth 
into Socialism, is only the growth in power of two antag­
onistic classes, standing in irreconcilable enmity to 
each other.[157]
But Kautsky was also cautious, a trait which earned him the 
scorn of Rosa Luxemburg, among others. Socialists, in 
Kautsky's view, should refrain from "any purposeless provo­
cation of the ruling class" until such a time that capital­
ism can be simply pushed over. In an elliptic reference to 
Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, Kautsky criticized that "fac­
tion" of the SPD which seeks "to enrage the capitalist"
158
rather than weaken him.
* * *
The recurrent image of Kautsky is thus one of constant
92
ambivalence: freedom vs. necessity, revolution vs. parlia­
mentarism. Nowhere is this ambivalence more clearly expres­
sed than in his attitude towards militarism. The 'orthodox* 
Kautsky found it necessary to link imperialism with militar­
ism and the arms race, concluding that capitalism (imperial­
ism) leads to wars of conquest. By contrast, the interests
of the proletariat were peaceful and "identical... in all
159
lands where capitalist production prevails." But after 
1910, precisely as war seemed more and more likely, Kautsky 
(and other members of the Second International’s center, 
such as Plekhanov) found that pacifism was the only approach 
consistent with determinism and a commitment to parliamenta­
ry tactics.
Although socialism was the only ultimate guarantee of 
peace, so ran the line of reasoning, it was not immediately 
on the agenda, _i.e., capitalism had not yet reached a suf­
ficiently 'mature* state for the revolution to ’occur*. 
Consequently, something had to be done in the short term to 
prevent war, until the inevitable advent of socialism abol­
ished it forever. The official position paper of the SPD 
executive thus stated:
It will be too late to resist once war has broken out. 
Vfhat is vital is to avoid a spirit of belligerence 
spreading among the masses. Because modern war can hardly 
happen without the agreement of the masses and if it does 
happen the rulers have everything to fear from its deadly 
consequences.[160]
It was felt among the center that the labor movememnt 
in all nations was too weak to prevent war, and that there­
fore a common front needed to be forged, one which united
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the worker's parties (whose commitment to peace was taken 
for granted) and pacifist elements from the petty bourgeoi­
sie and the bourgeoisie. "The proper field of anti-war
161
activity therefore was the press and the Parliament," 
rather than the 'adventurist' and 'semi-anarchist' mass ac­
tions advocated by, for instance, the majority of the French 
section of the International.
In the realm of theory, these pacifist politics com­
bined with the deterministic strain in the center's social 
theory to produce a position which increasingly affirmed 
that capitalist development (during the imperialist phase in 
particular) generated detente rather than conflict. The 
inexorability of war had become transformed into the inevi­
tability of peace. Kautsky in particular began to conceive 
of a peaceful phase of "ultra-imperialism," wherein the 
major capitalist nations would enter into an unholy alliance 
of sorts. He reasoned that two factors were responsible for 
the diminishing likelihood of inter-imperialist conflict. 
First, the growing "opposition of the more developed agrar­
ian zones [colonies— N.K.], which threatens not just one or 
other of the imperialist states, but all of them together." 
Second, the arms expenditures required to maintain an empire
were creating an ever growing economic burden on the impe-
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rialist nations, and would have to be renounced.
Like Kautsky, the French historian Paul Louis, repre­
senting a minority tendency in the French movement, argued 
that capitalism was entering an epoch of peaceful policies
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for three reasons. First, anticipating Kautsky, he noted the
financial burden of the arms race. Second, he argued that
the possibility of conflict existed only while there still
remained uncolonized areas of the world, and since by the
time he wrote the entire world had been partitioned, the
imperialist nations would peacefully settle down to exploit 
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their domains. And finally, economic crises, with their
concommitant uncertainties, would create cautious attitudes
164
and reduce the likelihood of war.
These views gained widespread currency. Similar the­
ories were advanced by Rudolf Hilferding, Ledebour, Haase 
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and Bebel. The extent of delusion can be glimpsed by 
noting that Louis' article was published in June 1914, while 
Kautsky's appeared in print in September of the same year, 
when the war had already begun. The editors of Die Neue Zeit 
appended a short note to Kautsky's article which baldly 
stated that the work, which dismissed the likelihood of war, 
"has not lost its relevance" despite the outbreak of 
fighting.
Kautsky did not become a German patriot. Most accounts
have it, as already noted, that he only 'acquiesced' to the
war. Kautsky argued that "the International ceases to be an
effective instrument in times of war. It is, on the whole, a
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peace instrument." His view of socialist tactics against
the war is summed up by G.D.H. Cole:
[N]ot to stir up the proletariat to mass strikes or 
armed insurrection, but to bring the Socialist Parties of 
the warring countries back to their senses, and thus to 
set on foot a powerful movement in favor of a negotiated 
peace.[167]
Rather than seeking to effect a split with the outright 
chauvinists in the International, Kautsky continued to ex­
press verbal opposition to the war, but only to the degree 
allowable from within the SPD. For instance, during the 3. 
August Reichstag Group debate he urged the parliamentary 
representatives of the SPD to condition voting in favor of 
war credits to a promise from the government as to the
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defensive character of the war. The proposal was rejected.
Later, in June 1915, Kautsky collaborated in drawing up a
manifesto "Against Annexations." The document had the polit-
169
ical effect which one might imagine.
So the pronounced ambivalence between freedom and ne­
cessity in Kautsky*s work found its expression in his polit­
ical positions. At first imperialism was seen as necessarily 
leading to war, but by 1912 imperialism had become only one 
'policy* among many possible ones, so that it could be 
’changed* even within the framework of the bourgeois state.
Finally, as must ultimately happen with any undercon­
sumption theory, Kautsky*s underconsumptionism caused him to 
seek the 'difficulties' of capitalism outside of capitalist 
production. The decisive factors became the (threat of) 
revolt of the colonies against imperialism, the fiscal cri­
sis of the state, etc. These 'difficulties’, which all of 
the national bourgeoisies had in common, would force them to 
co-operate, to pursue peaceful policies, as a means of 
simple survival.
As with Kautsky, Plekhanov's politics conform to his
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his theoretical system. Plekhanov was strongly influenced by 
the Manifesto, which first introduced him to the work of 
Marx and Engels. Having become a Marxist, Plekhanov*s cen­
tral concern, in the Russian context, was to show that the 
mainspring of social development was the class struggle and 
that consequently the (populist) effort to achieve socialism
via individual persuasion and/or terrorist acts was 
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misplaced.
This project involved, as was seen above, demonstrating 
that capitalism in Russia was already implanted and develop­
ing. Plekhanov found considerable support in (and took very 
much to heart) those passages from the Manifesto proclaiming 
the progressive mission of capitalism. Unlike Marx, however, 
Plekhanov never developed the corollary aspect— the uneven 
and contradictory nature of capitalist development.
As argued in Chapter I above, Marx arrived at his 
results when he ceased to treat history in a 'philosophical* 
manner and in very general terms. Plekhanov's weakness was 
never to have fully grasped this advance over the Manifesto, 
and its methodological consequences. Even when Plekhanov 
believed that he was conducting 'concrete' investigations, 
he remained trapped within his 'philosophical* theory of 
history. This accounts for his infatuation with the progres­
sive character of capitalism in Russia, and it is also the 
source of the determinism which Colletti attacks. In the 
absence of an explanation of the determinism in Plekhanov's 
thinking, one is forced to conclude, with Colletti, that he 
was merely a philosophical sinpleton--Plekhanov*s real fail­
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ing, however, was not that he held naive philosophical views 
(he was in fact an impressive thinker), but that he sought 
to understand history philosophically.
It is not so strange, therefore, that Plekhanov cham­
pioned the socialist cause by ’supporting' capitalist de­
velopment. Perhaps his greatest political concern was the 
premature siezure of power by the working class, a concern
which surfaced both during the 1905 Revolution ("They should
171
not have taken up arms....") and after October 1917.
At the outbreak of World War I, Plekhanov became a 
staunch nationalist. In 1915, he published 0 voine ('On the 
War*), which consisted of a scathing attack on the "vulgar 
nationalism" of the German and Austrian social democratic 
parties. For Plekhanov, it was clear that since Germany 
violated Belgian neutrality, attacked France, etc., that 
Germany was more 'guilty' than the other imperialist nations 
and deserving of defeat. While this line of argument may 
have been convincing to some, Plekhanov no doubt weakened 
his case by including, amidst condemnations of "vulgar na­
tionalism," passages which justified Russia's entry into the
war on the grounds that it would not do to "lose all influ-
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ence on the Balkan peninsula."
In full conformity with his theoretical approach, Ple­
khanov *s attitude to the war was also conditioned by the 
prospects for socialism (read: further capitalist develop­
ment) which the possible outcomes of the war implied. A 
German victory, he reasoned, would "halt our [Russian] eco­
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nomic development, put an end to the Europeanization of
173
Russia and perpetuate the old order." His biographer Baron
notes the assymetry of Plekhanov*s claim that while a German
victory would dim hopes for socialism, a Russian victory
would brighten them, in Russia as well as in the other
countries which would "be spared the burden of onerous
174
exactions, or, worse yet, foreign domination.'*
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E. Rosa Luxemburg, Vladimir I. Lenin, 
and the ’Left Revolutionary* Response to Revisionism
Along with Plekhanov, Rosa Luxemburg was among the 
first to enter the debates around Bernstein's revisionism.
In large measure, she took over the task of pummeling Bern­
stein shortly after it was begun by Parvus (Alexander 
175
Helphand).
As noted earlier, Luxemburg's most comprehensive asses-
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sment of revisionism proceeded not so much from a direct 
asault on the foundations of Bernstein's critique (£.g., she 
only devotes a page to Bernstein's rejection of the labor 
theory of value); the bulk of her response revolved instead 
around efforts to draw out the 'other side' of the issues 
raised by Bernstein, i.e., to deploy Bernstein's own argu­
ments against him. For example, where Bernstein placed em­
phasis on the "creative" functions of credit, Luxemburg 
argued that credit
immensely increases the capacity for the expansion of 
production, and thus constitutes an inner driving force 
that constantly pushes production to exceed the limits of 
the market. After having provoked overproduction, credit 
destroys, during the crisis, the very productive forces 
it itself created. At the first symptom of the stag­
nation, credit melts away. It abandons the exchange proc­
ess just when it is still indispensable....[177]
And while Bernstein identified a "more [highly] developed
credit organization" with enhanced "possibilities of adjust- 
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raent," Luxemburg conversely considered that the increased 
"elasticity" which accompanies the advance of systems of 
credit
renders all capitalist forces extendable, relative, and 
sensitive to the highest degree. Doing this, it facili­
tates and aggravates crises, which are nothing but the
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periodic collisions of the contradictory forces of the 
capitalist economy.[179]
Similarly, for Bernstein the emergence of cartels and 
trusts signalled the possibility of planned production and 
the amelioration of crises stemming from the "anarchic" 
nature of capitalist production, a claim to which Luxemburg 
offered a threefold counter-argument.
First, Bernstein's contentions would be valid only if 
cartels were dominant in all branches of production. But 
since the "aim" of a cartel is to appropriate for itself 
(for its own branch) a share of the profit produced in other 
branches, cartelization cannot become a "generalized" phe­
nomenon because "when it is extended to all important 
branches of industry, this tendency cancels its own influ­
ence." Second, cartels generally succeed in obtaining 'mo­
nopoly' profits domestically only at the expense of 'dump­
ing' a large portion of their output on foreign markets at 
low prices. "The result is the sharpening of competition 
abroad and increased anarchy on the world market...." Final­
ly, once production has outstripped the capacity of the 
market, "the forced partial idleness of capital" reaches the 
point where those capitals which have been "'socialized' 
through organization [j^.e., the cartels— N.K.] will tend to 
revert once again to the form of private capital." With the 
onset of crisis, "each individual portion will prefer to 
take its chances alone," and the cartels "will burst like




Luxemburg was perhaps rather more successful in her
rejection of Bernstein’s ’empirical’ propositions. Recall
that the accumulation of capital, in Bernstein’s conception,
was not at the same time a process of concentration of
capital; evidence for this claim was found in statistics
which indicated rising numbers of middle-sized enter- 
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prises. Luxemburg's response consisted in pointing out 
that to understand concentration as merely the steady disap­
pearance of smaller capitals was to miss the thrust of 
Marx’s theory of accumulation, viz., that smaller capitals 
are the ’’pioneers” of industry, developing new techniques of 
production in established branches, and carving out entirely 
new branches of production. Having performed the 'entrepre­
neurial' function, these capitals immediately "find them­
selves under the influence of two antagonistic tend- 
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encies...." On the one hand, the process of accumulation 
engenders mechanization and a concommitant rise in the scale 
of operations, while on the other, periodic crises and the 
attendant devalorization of old capital (temporarily) re­
store the conditions in which smaller capitals are able to 
introduce innovative techniques or extend capitalist produc­
tion to new spheres of activity.
The struggle of the average-size enterprise against big 
capital cannot be considered a regularly proceeding bat­
tle in which the troops of the weaker party continue to 
melt away directly and quantitatively. It should rather 
be regarded as a periodic mowing down of small capital, 
which rapidly grows up again only to be mowed down once 
more by large industry.[183]
Bernstein simply misused the statistics: the concentration
of capital empirically
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shows itself, first, in the progressive increase of the 
minimum amount of capital necessary for the functioning 
of enterprises in the old branches of production; second, 
in the constant diminution of the interval of time during 
which the small capitalists conserve the opportunity to 
exploit the new branches of production. [184]
Bernstein had also provided statistics on stockowner-
ship, aiming to demonstrate that the observable increase in
the number of shareholders further refutes Marx’s thesis and
suggests that the "increasing number of capitalists" attests
to a dispersal, rather than a concentration of social 
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wealth. By finding an "increasing number of capitalists,"
while at the same time maintaining that he speaks only of
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"men and not of entrepreneurs," Bernstein committed an
error, in Luxemburg's view, by moving the discussion "from
the relation between capital and labor to the relation
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between rich and poor.": For Bernstein, the category 'cap­
italist' was merely "a fiscal unit." Rather than "a category
188
of production" it represented only a claim to income.
For various reasons, in Luxemburg's opinion, Eern-
stein's conception (and that of the other revisionists) of
189
the transition to socialism was rooted in idealism. In
Social Reform or Revolution Luxemburg listed the limitations
190
of trade union activity; critiqued the notion that pro­
tective labor legislation was "a piece of 'social control*,
191
and as such--a piece of socialism;" tried to point out
the utopianism of seeking a road to socialism in the estab-
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lishnent of co-operatives; etc. First and foremost, how­
ever, Luxemburg argued that Bernstein's idealism was a di­
rect result of his rejection of the theory of capitalist
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collapse. For Luxemburg, "the theory of capitalist break­
down...is the cornerstone of scientific socialism,” without 
which the "objective necessity of socialism, the explanation
of socialism as the result of the material development of
193
society, falls away."
A theory of breakdown in well developed or coherent 
form is absent in Social Reform or Revolution, but this 
hardly represents a failing of a short polemical pamphlet. 
Beyond the claim that "as a result of its own inner contra­
dictions, capitalism moves toward a point when it will be
194
unbalanced, when it will simply become impossible,"
Luxemburg made no specific argument, although she several
times hints that the root cause of capitalism*s problems
lies in the tendency of production to outstrip the capacity 
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of the market. Her full theoretical presentation of these 
issues appeared more than a decade later in The Accumulation 
of Capital (1913) and was further elaborated in The Accumu­
lation of Capital— An Anti-Critique (written in 1915, first 
published posthumously in 1921).
* * *
The early chapters of The Accumulation comprise a his­
torical survey of theories of economic reproduction, which 
was used by Luxemburg to justify her claim that the investi­
gation of economic phenomena must begin from the standpoint 
of reproduction. In particular, as Luxemburg later clarified 
in the Anti-Critique, under capitalism the question of re­
production was bound up with the accumulation of capital.
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The latter was the sine qua non of the capitalist mode of
production, and hence (methodologically) the correct point 
196
of departure.
Moreover, argued Luxemburg, it was only possible to
understand accumulation from the perspective of the '’total,"
or social, capital. She reasoned that the contrary approach,
the perspective of the "individual" capital ("the popular
platform of vulgar economics"), created difficulties, viz.,
that the conditions which must obtain for accumulation to
take place (ts.g. , realization) seem to 'disappear' into the
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circulation process of other (individual) capitals. If
the problem of reproduction was examined from the standpoint
of the social capital, however, the requisite conditions of
accumulation had nowhere to go— they could not vanish, they
had to must remain visible.
Luxemburg believed that Marx went further than most in
correctly posing the relevant problems, because "for the
first time in the second volume of Capital" he approached
the problem of capitalist reproduction "from the standpoint
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of total capital." Having examined the (second) example 
of expanded reproduction which Marx offered in Chapter 21 of 
vol. 2, Luxemburg concluded that Marx's solution was formal­
ly correct— but whether this solution could be regarded as 
theoretically sound, or if it was merely an "exercise" in 
solving "fool-proof" mathematical models, could only be
determined by reference to "the concrete social conditions
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of accumulation."
V'hat are the "concrete social conditions?" Accumulation
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is impossible, Luxemburg argued, unless at least a portion 
of the total surplus value produced is realized and thrown 
back into production, i_.e. , the valorized commodity capital 
as it emerges from the production process must be success­
fully transformed into money capital and then capitalized in 
the form of additional means of production and means of 
subsistence. Marx's schemes of reproduction do indeed demon­
strate where the surplus value goes once it is returned to 
production. But merely the ("subjective") "desire [!] to 
accumulate" on the part of capitalists, and the existence of 
correct (technical) proportions between the various depart­
ments of production, can only be the necessary conditions 
for accumulation to proceed— they are not in themselves 
sufficient. What is presupposed in all of this, Luxemburg 
argued, is "a previous capitalist incentive to enlarge pro­
duction" in the form of an "effective demand" for the por-
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tion of the surplus product to be capitalized.
So the "concrete social conditions of accumulation" 
require that an "effective demand" for the surplus product 
arise prior to its (the surplus product's) production (else 
the capitalists would have no incentive to produce it). What 
is the source of this demand? Luxemburg considered all of 
the possibilities, and concluded that neither the capital­
ists nor the workers could serve as the origin of the 'ex- 
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tra' demand.
She argued that workers cannot consume the surplus 
product since they are only paid for the value of labor
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power, and in the limiting case (if the ’surplus’ accrued in 
its entirety to the direct producers) there could be no 
capitalism or, indeed, any class society. Capitalists, on 
the other hand, could not ’’spend the total surplus value 
like water [because then] there would be no accumulation,” 
i,.«3. , at least part of the surplus value must be saved, or 
there can only be simple reproduction (without accumula­
tion) .
It is at this point that Luxemburg’s error can be 
readily identified. She had begun her analysis of reproduc­
tion by ”imagin[ing] that all goods produced in capitalist 
society were stacked up in a big pile someplace,” a pile of 
goods which must be adequate to (i) provide for the subsist­
ence of all social classes, (ii) replace used up fixed and
circulating constant capital, and (iii) provide a source for
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expanding production (accumulation). Clearly, the "pile” 
was conceived in material terms, .i.e., a "pile" of use- 
values.
On the same page that Luxemburg considered the disposi­
tion of this "total stock of commodities," however, she also 
made the assertion quoted above that the capitalists could 
not "spend the total surplus value like water" if accumula­
tion was to be possible. But capitalists accumu­
late. ..precisely by ’spending’ their surplus value, by 
throwing money capital back into circulation. Luxemburg 
merely confused ’spending’ in the form of individual or 
personal consumption (in which use-values certainly do 'dis­
appear', i..e. , leave the process of circulation) with
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'spending' in the form of productive consumption (in which 
money is thrown back into circulation in order to obtain 
use-values which do not disappear into individual consump­
tion) .
Several critics of Luxemburg's analysis find fault with
this portion of her work without, however, pointing to the
crucial failure to distinguish between individual and pro-
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ductive consumption which is at the heart of the problem. 
Nikolai Bukharin, writing in 1924, and Michael Bleaney in 
1976, both see Luxemburg's error as residing in the "imagery 
of heaps." Bleaney writes:
[Luxemburg] imagines the entire social capital being 
laid out as one lump, and that the whole of the surplus 
value has to be realized simultaneously, at the end of 
the period, rather than gradually throughout the course 
of it. Hence the images of commodity heaps rather than a 
continuous flow of production....[204]
The difficulty does not lie in the pace (gradual vs. 
all at once) at which surplus value is realized. Because of 
Luxemburg's incorrect pcsing of the matter, an insoluble 
dilemma necessarily appears from whichever side the problem 
is examined, irrespective of the pace of realization. Either 
the capitalists fritter away the surplus value, in which 
case there is no realization difficulty but there are also 
no savings left to be used for accumulation; or the capital­
ists save part of the surplus value, in which case there is 
a shortage of effective demand, some of the surplus product 
remains unsold, and there is no incentive for further accu­
mulation. Either way, 'extra' purchasing power is needed.
Luxemburg did not perceive her error, and went on to
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examine the possible sources of the ’extra' demand which she
imagined was necessary for accumulation to proceed. The only
conclusion, given the parameters established by Luxemburg,
was that the increase in demand had to come from outside the
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two departments of social production which appear in
Marx’s tableau, i..e., from outside capitalist society. And
if the realization of surplus value, and hence accumulation,
are dependent on the existence of non-capitalist "buyers,’’
it follows that the
theoretical assumption of a society of capitalists and 
workers only...no longer seems adequate when we deal with 
the accumulation of gross social capital. As this repre­
sents the real historical process of capitalist develop­
ment, it seems impossible to me to understand it if one 
abstracts from all conditions of historical reality.[206]
According to Luxemburg, Marx incorrectly held to the 
"bloodless theoretical fiction" of a purely capitalist so­
ciety while correctly (and legitimately) conducting the 
investigation from the standpoint of the total social capi­
tal. Luxemburg thus maintained that the abstraction of a 
society composed only of workers and capitalists was ad­
equate to vol. 1, where (she thought) the object of analysis 
was the accumulation of the individual capital, but that 
pre-capitalist strata and regions had to be considered as 
soon as the enquiry shifted to an analysis of the social 
capital.
But the pre-capitalist areas...are precisely non-capi­
talist, and in order for them to serve as markets, capital 
must transform the natural economies which prevail there 
into commodity economies. As Luxemburg puts it, slaves can
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be forced to work, but only commodity producers can also
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serve as buyers. The peoples of the peripheral areas are
thus made 'free' in a ’liberation' which capital conducts
with its familiar " ’heroic means', the axe of political 
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violence."
Luxemburg felt that her demonstration of this impera­
tive need for capital to penetrate non-capitalist regions
constituted a "wholly new and strictly scientific analysis
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of imperialism and its contradictions." Having established 
the basis of imperialism, Luxemburg continued the line of 
her reasoning:
[A]s soon as simple commodity production has superseded 
natural economy, capital must turn against it. No sooner 
has capital called it to life, than the two must compete 
for means of production, labor power and markets....
The general result of the struggle between capitalism 
and simple commodity production is this: after substitut­
ing commodity economy for natural economy, capital takes 
the place of simple commodity economy.... Thus capital 
cannot accumulate without the aid of non-capitalist or­
ganizations, nor, on the other hand, can it tolerate 
their continued existence side by side with itself. Only 
the continuous and progressive disintegration of non­
capitalist organizations makes accumulation of capital 
possible.
The premises which are postulated in Marx's diagram of 
accumulation accordingly represent no more than the his­
torical tendency of the movement of accumulation and its 
logical conclusion.[210]
Thus the purely capitalist society, said Luxemburg, 
which could not be legitimately 'assumed' into existence as 
Marx had tried to do in vol. 2, was nevertheless the logical 
final result of capitalist development on a world scale. 
Luxemburg's analysis, however, showed that in a purely capi­
talist world, "accumulation, _i ,e_. , further expansion of 
capital, becomes impossible." The collapse or breakdown of
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capitalism follows as an "objective historical necessity."
The schema of expanded reproduction "is precisely in its
insolubility the exact prognosis of the economically una-
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voidable downfall of capitalism...."
With the twilight of imperialism, according to Luxem­
burg, the "decisive struggle" shifts away from colonial 
forays, and "catastrophe" comes full circle to haunt the 
imperialist powers themselves. In the centers, "the civi­
lized peoples of Europe" experience the disaster of contin­
uous war, and under these circumstances "the position of the
proletariat with regard to imperialism leads to a general
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confrontation with the rule of capital." Elsewhere, 
Luxemburg argued that the impending breakdown and "the abso­
lute and undivided rule of capital aggravates class struggle 
throughout the world...to such an extent that...it must lead
to the rebellion of the international proletariat against
213
the existence of the rule of capital."
There is an ambiguity here. Although Luxemburg speaks 
of a "general confrontation," in one passage the arena of 
conflict is Europe, while in the other it appears to be 
global. Despite this vagueness, one thing is absolutely 
clear: all traces of national differences have disappeared, 
and internationalism reigns. Luxemburg’s theoretical conclu­
sions thus strongly echo propositions found in the Manifesto 
sixty years earlier, _i .e. , the internationalism of the work­
ing class is an objective condition which the historical 
development of capitalism enjoins upon the proletariat.
1 11
Actually (and paradoxically, given the next point to be 
made), Luxemburg's underconsuraptionism places the critical 
determinant of capitalist development, working class inter­
nationalism, and the socialist revolution itself outside 
capitalist society, i_.e_. , the possibility of capitalist 
development depends on the existence of non-capitalist 
areas.
One of the inferences drawn by Luxemburg from this 
analysis concerns the prospects of revolt against imperial­
ism by the oppressed peoples of the colonies- Paradoxically, 
given the centrality of the 'non-capitalist areas' to her 
analysis, she ignored the possibility of a conscious, genu­
inely anti-capitalist revolutionary movement developing in 
those regions only recently penetrated by capital, i...e. , the
class struggles in the colonies (whether against imperialism
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or otherwise) are regarded as ineffectual. The decisive 
conflict must either wait until the entire world is capital­
ist or, if it takes place sooner, must come through the
215
initiative of the European working class.
Luxemburg's inclination to disregard the internal dy­
namic of the dominated social formations is presented as a 
virtue by J.P. Nettl in his two volume biographical tome. 
While Nettl generally prefers to downplay Luxemburg’s theo­
retical work, he argues that on the question of colonialism 
The Accumulation of Capital yielded a "meaningful result" 
and cori’ectly anticipated certain trends in capitalist world 
economy. Specifically, he argues that
[o]nce the notion of colonial exploitation becomes cen­
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tral and is brought up to date, the basic confrontation 
between rich and poor societies— which is today’s real 
dialectic--subsumes the 'old* form of class conflict 
within society.... This then is an ’international* or 
'class' line-up that cuts across national boundaries or 
rather makes these boundaries into mere markers of auton­
omy rather than absolute isolation— as Rosa Luxemburg 
actually advocated.[216]
Given Luxemburg’s drubbing of Bernstein precisely on
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the conflation of 'rich-poor' and 'class' contradictions, 
it seems plausible to doubt whether she would have accepted 
these efforts by Nettl on her behalf.
The Accumulation of Capital was characterized by Luxem­
burg herself as "a purely theoretical study on an abstract
218
scientific problem...." Yet the conclusions reached 
therein had earlier seen the light of day in their 'practi­
cal' incarnation as the polemic against Bernstein, and they 
subsequently re-appeared in her political writings during 
the war. Thus, for example, The Crisis in the German Social
Democracy (The Junius Pamphlet), written in 1915, repeats 
Luxemburg's familiar theses: the "weakness" of the proletar­
iat, i_.e^  , its capitulation to patriotism, would be recog­
nized and criticized by the working class as an "error" and
rectified by "the inexorable laws of history" which "assure"
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the proletariat of "its final victory."
Luxemburg never clearly articulated the theoretical
relation betwen her abstract writings and the more concrete
220
investigations, although she was certainly aware that
some form of connection existed. In partcular, Luxemburg
generally expressed this notion by reference to some neces-
221
sary 'unity' of theory and practice.
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By way of a critique, it would doubtless be possible to
identify instances where Luxemburg ’concretized' abstract
222
theoretical results, and then to link these with her 
conclusions regarding proletarian internationalism. There 
is, however, an even more striking characteristic of Luxem­
burg's theoretical work which portends her judgements on the 
international solidarity of workers— an extreme teleology 
renders internationalism the necessary consequence of a 
historical 'goal' pre-ordained by Luxemburg's theory of 
accumulation. This is clearly evident when she wrote that
the class struggle is only the ideological reflection of 
the objective historical necessity of socialism, result­
ing from the objective impossibility of capitalism at a 
certain stage.[223]
It really could not have been put more plainly: the class 
struggle, rather than being the mainspring of history, has 
been reduced to the pale mirror of a historical finality 
inscribed within and by the theory.
This particular vision of the historical process, co­
herently worked out only in 1913 with the writing of The 
Accumulation of Capital, had nevertheless been implicitly 
present in Luxemburg's work from the start. As early as 
1899, in Social Reform or Revolution, Luxemburg character­
ized the revisionist and opportunist current as merely a
normal and expected "vacillation and hesitation" along the
224
movement toward "the great final goal."
Despite her incisive and anticipatory condemnation of 
225
the opportunists, the teleological thrust of Luxemburg's 
theory kept her from posing the emergence of revisionism as
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a (theoretical, rather than practical) problem to be ex­
plained. Her inability to theorize a basis for opportunism 
beyond that of a minor eddy in the channel of history would 
later, in 1914, prevent Luxemburg from arriving at either a 
satisfactory account of the collapse of the International, 
or (more importantly) an effective, concrete and revolution­
ary anti-war strategy. These points will be discussed in 
subheading F below.
This would seem an appropriate place at which to stress 
that nothing in the present work seeks to impugn Luxemburg 
as a person or revolutionary. Her failure to articulate a 
coherent anti-war strategy does not, of course, in any way 
obscure her valiant and heroic opposition to the war, for 
which she was imprisoned. It is necessary to point this out 
because some authors perplexingly continue to interpret any
theoretical criticism of Luxemburg as an effort to tarnish 
226
her image.
Norman Geras, for example, has recently pointed out
that Luxemburg’s theory of capitalist breakdown provides
grist for the mill of those political enemies who seek to
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ascribe a fatalism to her outlook. In one of the more
sophisticated efforts to "recover" Luxemburg, Geras claims
that while it is undoubtedly true that she held to a theory
of an absolute limit to accumulation (breakdown), Luxemburg
did not believe that capitalist collapse assured the passage
to socialisn--for the latter, conscious political interven-
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tion was necessary. Consequently, Geras argues, far from 
being a fatalist, Luxemburg left open the possibility of an
1 15
historical alternative, a contingency best expressed in her
229
formula (borrowed from Engels): 'Socialism or Barbarism*.
Geras advances an interpretation of this slogan which 
seeks to remove the apparent contradiction between the in­
evitability of breakdown and the open-endedness of 'social­
ism or barbarism'. How? For a 'dialectician', as Marx once
ironically remarked, "nothing simpler... than to posit [these
230
opposites] as identical," so Geras merely maintains that
these seemingly irreconcilable perspectives,
these two ideas, so far from being contradictory, are not 
even different. They are one and the same idea. For 
Luxemburg, 'barbarism* signifies nothing other than the 
collapse of capitalism.[231]
Thus the breakdown merely shows "that it is not socialism 
but barbarism that is inevitable." And moreover, the col­
lapse itself is "a process of which both the forms and the
232
end result are a species of barbarism."
It is not immediately obvious what this line of reason­
ing seeks to prove, what in Luxemburg's work it seeks to
salvage, or how it is to be interpreted in light of Luxem­
burg's own insistence regarding the objective necessity of 
socialism. By counterposing the inevitability of barbarism 
(collapse) to the contingency of socialism in Luxemburg's 
work, Geras seems pleased to discover that for "Luxem­
burg...what the inevitability of capitalist collapse proves
is not the redundancy, but the urgent indispensability, of
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conscious revolutionary struggle...." Moreover, Geras 
holds that his operation has displaced the tension (between 
activism and fatalism) which many commentators have found in
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Luxemburg's work.
But no displacement of the activism-fatalism couplet is 
accomplished merely by pointing out that for Luxemburg the 
emergence of socialism entails development of the 'subjec­
tive factor'. Rather, the contradiction remains precisely 
because Luxemburg affirms a strict separation of "social
consciousness...as an active factor" from "the blind game of 
234
forces." Thus everything is predetermined except the pro­
letariat's active intervention— far from any displacement,
the tension remains in the form of 'fatalism with a volunta- 
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rist twist'. This brings an important point into sharp
relief. Obviously, Luxemburg was not a fatalist (far from
it) in the sense that she was a dedicated revolutionary
activist. In fact, Luxemburg's formula reveals a belief in
the power of activism such as to border on voluntarism,
_i , the 'choice' between barbarism and socialism hinges on
whether or not we 'act*. There is naturally a trivial sense
in which this is true, but the notion of revolution as a
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'choice* remains a fundamentally idealist one.
Y/hile conceding that "it is not easy to make sense" of 
Luxemburg's theory of breakdown, or of the attendant "apoca­
lyptic vision," Geras argues that the chief virtue of Luxem­
burg's work, and his interpretation of it, consists in a
recognition of "the profoundly and inescapably contradictory
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nature of the whole of capitalist development." Geras 
condemns as "mechanistic" that view which conceives capital­
ism as a "progressive" system in its 'youth' but bound by
117
fetters in its 'maturity*. Rather, the "bad sides" of capi-
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talism emerge with the "good" from "the very origins."
These topics raised by Geras are important ones, to be 
sure, although hardly original. Yfhat seems inappropriate, 
however, is his effort to attribute such views to Luxemburg. 
Moreover, this effort is simply puzzling if another of 
Geras' articles on Luxemburg, "Between the Russian Revolu­
tions," is taken into consideration. Rather than chronicling 
the "good sides" and "bad sides" of capitalist development, 
Geras here approvingly describes Luxemburg's attitude toward 
bourgeois democracy in terms decidely similar to those just 
dismissed as "mechanistic:"
Bourgeois democracy, according to Luxemburg, had played 
a necessary though limited historical role in the bour­
geoisie's struggle against feudalism and in its mobiliza­
tion of the masses in that cause. But so soon as this 
struggle was completed or compromised, so soon as its 
'stimulating fire* went out,...then bourgeois democracy 
lost its historical purpose, became useless and dispen­
sable to the bourgeoisie itself.... Hence the assertions 
that 'democratic institutions...have completely exhausted 
their fxmction as aids in the development of bourgeois 
society,' that * liberalism... is now absolutely useless to 
bourgeois society,' that 'bourgeois democracy must logi­
cally move in a descending line1 ....[239]
The point is that unless the "process" of collapse is 
presumed to begin at the very dawn of capitalism, the only 
possible interpretation of the breakdown theory is precisely 
the one originally opposed by Geras, viz., that the main­
springs of capitalist development gradually become its fet­
ters. Likewise, it is not necessary to accept the misguided 
platitudes of the various "philosophies of pure progress" in 
order to oppose a notion of the capitalist 'dialectic* as 
leading to "the complete absence of culture and civiliza-
1 18
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tion...total social breakdown, chaos.” It is entirely 
possible to uphold the immanence of contradiction, crisis 
and unevenness in capitalist development, to affirm the 
historicity of the system itself, and to work for its over­
throw, without subscribing to a teleological philosophy of 
history (even a sophisticated one). It is no accident that 
Geras closed his essay with a pithy quotation from the 
consummate prophet of darkness, Herbert Marcuse.
* * *
For a variety of reasons, an adequate treatment of 
Lenin’s position, given the objectives and context of this 
study, presents difficulties by comparison with, for exam­
ple, Luxemburg or Bernstein. First, Lenin never furnished a 
theoretical treatise comparable to Luxemburg's The Accumula­
tion of Capital (or even her Anti-Critique). Consequently, 
it is necessary to construct Lenin’s theoretical system from 
fragments scattered throughout the forty-five volume Col­
lected Forks and from the theoretical approach which implic- 
itly informs his 'practical' writings. Moreover, Lenin never 
exercised the central presence of a Kautsky, Bernstein or 
Luxemburg within the Second International (especially prior 
to the 1907 Stuttgart congress)— Lenin’s real significance 
only became apparent after the outbreak of the war. Rather 
than producing, for example, a direct response to Bernstein, 
Lenin almost always conducted his encounters on Russian 
terrain— thus one finds polemics directed against "our
Bernstein" or the "Russian revisionists." While this by no
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means suggests a necessary shortcoming on Lenin's part, it
119
does complicate somewhat the task of contrasting his posi­
tion to those held by Marxists more directly involved in the 
West European struggles. The most legitimate approach to the 
analysis of Lenin's thinking is one which 'straddles' the 
collapse of the Second International and the emergence of 
the Third International.
Aside from some elementary primers on Marx's doctrines, 
the most significant of Lenin's writings which explicitly 
put forward his theoretical considerations on the accumula­
tion process are only three in number and were (unfortunate­
ly) all written before Lenin turned twenty-nine. It is by 
now a commonplace that these works were directed against the 
Narodniks (agrarian-populists), in opposition to whom Lenin
sought to demonstrate the viability of capitalist develop-
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ment in Russia.
The Narodniks took: as their starting point the condi­
tions which obtained in late nineteenth-century Russia: a 
relatively underdeveloped capitalist sector co-existing with
(and within) a large, predominantly simple commodity and
243
natural economy. While correctly observing increasing pov­
erty and destitution among the mass of the peasantry, the 
Narodniks were incorrect to see in this a perfectly general- 
izable trend of "impoverishment of the people.'' Rather, the 
process actually consisted in the differentiation of petty 
commodity producers into a relatively well-off stratum of 
embryonic 'entrepreneurs’ on the one hand, and on the other, 




For the Narodniks, it seemed self-evident that a vigor­
ous capitalism would be characterized by a thriving, well 
developed market for commodities, a feature which Russia 
decidedly lacked. Moreover, the "impoverishment’' which the 
Narodniks observed and constantly drew attention to could 
only serve, in their view, to even further restrict the 
extension of the market. Eventually, any continued develop­
ment along capitalist lines would simply become impossible.
Against these arguments, Lenin brought to bear the full 
force of his considerable polemical talents. "On the So- 
Called Market Question," an article directed against a Na­
rodnik author, sought to rectify what to Lenin seemed an 
erroneous application of Marx’s reproduction schemes. After 
correcting and clarifying some technical issues, Lenin un­
dertook to critique the Narodnik counterposition of a capi­
talist "sphere" to the "people’s system." The Narodnik ef­
forts centered on articulating the relationship between the 
two sectors, but Lenin proceeded from what he considered to 
be a symptomatic weakness of their theory, viz., the impos­
sibility of explaining, from the Narodnik point of view, how 
Russian capitalism arose in the first place.
For a Marxist it was possible to grasp, Lenin argued,
not only how capitalism could develop from simple commodity
production, but also to understand the further development
and extension of the capitalist node of production. From a
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tableau representing six production "periods," Lenin traced 
the process by which a natural economy in period one is
121
transformed first into a simple and then into a capitalist 
commodity economy with an extensive division of labor. In­
deed, the "development of capitalism depicted in this table
is accompanied by the 'impoverishment' of the 'people'"...
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but also (!) by "an expansion of the market."
The first conclusion which Lenin drew from his analysis
is that under a regime of commodity production, "the concept
'market' is quite inseparable from the concept of the social
247
division of labor...." The extension and deepening of the 
division of labor determine the "dimensions of the market," 
and since there are no theoretical limits to the division of 
labor under capitalism, there is also no "problem" as re­
gards growth of the market. Contrary to the expectations of 
the Narodniks, the transformation of natural economy into an 
economy of simple commodity producers, and the differentia­
tion of these into an incipient proletariat and rural bour­
geoisie, far from restricting the growth of the market, are
actually part and parcel of the extension of market rela- 
248
tions.
The emergence of capitalism, as Lenin informed the
Narodniks, was not an "accident" or the result of "taking
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the wrong road." A Marxist analysis could prove the genesis 
of capitalism in the conditions of simple commodity produc­
tion, and Lenin provided statistics on land holdings, the 
employment of instruments of labor and the hiring of wage
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labor in order to explain the process of differentiation.
While the mass of poor peasants was becoming increasingly
1 2 2
dispossessed, an examination of the statistics on grain
marketings shows that this
’impoverishment of the masses’, the complete decline of 
the farms of 40% of the peasants, the formation of a 
rural proletariat have led to the produce of 90,000 
[additional] dessiatines of land under crops being thrown 
on to the market.[251]
Impoverishment of the masses, but growth of the market— the 
solution to this Narodnik paradox consisted in showing that 
impoverishment was a phenomenon inextricably bound up with 
proletarianization.
The bulk of ”0n the So-Called Market Question" had been 
devoted to elucidating the argument outlined above, viz., 
that the development of capitalism is at the same time the 
extension of the market. The first portion of the article 
had also, however, schematically raised some separate (al­
beit related) problems concerning the relationship between
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the two departments of social production.
Lenin's Narodnik adversary had argued that in Marx's
reproduction schemes accumulation in Department I took place
entirely "independently" of production in Department II.
Lenin replied that this interpretation was incorrect if for
no other reason than that accumulation (the expansion of
production) required additional outlays on variable capital,
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which would be spent on the product of Department II. The 
grain of truth in the Narodnik argument, however, concerned 
the "predominance" of Department I in capitalist develop­
ment, in the sense that the inevitable mechanization of
production under capitalism implied a more rapid growth of
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Department I relative to Department II. But beyond purely
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gestural indications, at this tirae Lenin provided neither a 
detailed investigation of this phenomenon, nor did he sug­
gest the relationship of these issues to the "market ques­
tion . "
The latter connection was explicitly and systematically 
drawn out in "A Characterization of Economic Romanticism." 
This theoretical article linked the two previously disjoint­
ed domains, i_.e^, the accumulation of capital and the reali­
zation problem. Lenin posed the issue unambiguously:
To expand production it is first of all necessary to 
produce means of production, and for this it is conse­
quently necessary to expand that department of social 
production which manufactures means of production, it is 
necessary tc> draw into it workers who immediately present 
a demand for articles of consumption, too. Hence 'con­
sumption' develops after 'accumulation' or after 'produc­
tion' ; strange though it may seem, it cannot be otherwise 
in capitalist society.[255]
Likening the Narodnik doctrine to Jean Sisraondi's un­
derconsumption theory, Lenin pointed out that both incor­
rectly posit that "production must correspond to consump-
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tion,...production is determined by revenue." Also, both 
the Narodniks and Sismondi drew false inferences from their 
respective analyses:
'Those who urge unlimited production are mistaken', 
says Sismondi (I, 121). Excess of production over revenue 
causes over-production (I, 106). An increase in wealth is 
beneficial only 'when it is proportionate to itself, when 
none of its parts develops with excessive rapidity' (I, 
409). The good Sismondi thinks that 'disproportionate' 
development is not development (as our Narodniks do); 
that this disproportion is not a law of the present 
system of social economy, and of its development, but a 
’mistake' of the legislator, etc.; that in this the 
European governments are artificially imitating England, 
a country that has taken the wrong path.[257]
For Lenin, however, accumulation could be possible
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precisely (and only) if there was an "excess of production
over revenue." And the very process of accumulation, since
it presupposes additional otitlays on constant and variable
capital, "creates a market for [its output] and itself
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determines consumption."
Nevertheless, the rates of development of the two de­
partments of social production must be unequal, for the same 
reason that Lenin gave earlier (the mechanization of produc­
tion which accompanies capitalist development implies a more 
rapid growth of Department I). Under these conditions, 
therefore, the 'market' as a whole may expand, while the 
market for consumer goods stagnates or even contracts.
This development of the productive forces of society 
without a corresponding development of consumption is, of 
course, a contradiction, but the sort of contradiction 
that exists in reality, that springs from the very nature 
of capitalism.[259]
Thus Lenin clearly rejected any formulation of a 'rea­
lization problem* per se, , any conception which poses
the realization of surplus value as a special 'difficulty', 
and ascribes to this 'difficulty* the character of an imma­
nent feature of the capitalist mode of production. Granted, 
as Lenin argued in The Development of Capitalism in Russia, 
the process of accumulation proceeds as a series of disloca­
tions and crises, some of which appear in the form of crises 
of realization (unsold commodities). Indeed, capitalism 
'knows' no other form of development. The point, however, is 
that
if one speaks of the 'difficulties' of realization, of 
the crises, etc. arising therefrom, one must admit that
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these 'difficulties’ are not only possible but are neces­
sary as regards all parts of the capitalist product, and 
not as regards surplus value alone.[260]
The ’difficulty* is hence not one of realization as such,
but of the disproportionalities which arise from the anarchy
of capitalist production.
Roman Rosdolsky has recently drawn attention to an
apparent problem in Lenin’s theory. Since for Rosdolsky the
"contradiction between production and consumption... plays a
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key role in Marx’s theory,” he is troubled by Lenin’s 
treatment of realization. On the one hand, Lenin had argued:
'The consumer power of society* and the 'proportional 
relation of the various branches of production’— these 
are not conditions that are isolated, independent of, and 
unconnected with, each other. On the contrary, a definite 
condition of consumption is one of the elements of pro­
portionality. [262]
Rosdolsky concedes that ’consumption’ and ’proportion­
ality’ are related, but claims that "it in no way follows 
from this that the concepts... cannot be separated from one
another, or that they should always be regarded as equiva- 
263
lent." The reasoning here seems faulty. First, Lenin never 
claimed that consumption and proportionality were "equiva­
lent." Second, it is_ the case that in Marxist theory con­
sumption cannot be "separated" from proportionality— or more 
generally, from the pattern of accumulation. Consumption is 
determined by accumulation, i_.ji. , the investment spending of 
capitalists fixes both the outlays on variable capital 
(hence workers’ consumption) and the capitalists' own con­
sumption. It is in bourgeois economic theory that consump­
tion takes on the aspect of an independent category, govern­
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ed by exogenously given 'preferences' and 'endowments*.
Rosdolsky then goes on to claim that Lenin contradicted 
the statement just quoted above when he (Lenin) wrote:
It follows from [Marx's] theory that even with an 
ideally smooth and proportional reproduction and circula­
tion of the aggregate social capital, the contradiction 
between the growth of production and the narrow limits of 
consumption is inevitable.[264]
So it seems it must be one or the other: either Lenin 
is "uncomfortably close" to a disproportionality theory of 
crisis, or he recognizes the production-consumption "contra­
diction" and is consequently not fully consistent with his 
arguments on the realization problem. Rosdolsky, however, 
somewhat ungenerously chooses to attribute both shortcomings 
to Lenin, concluding that Lenin at the same time contradict­
ed himself, and held what "essentially amounts to a dispro-
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portionality theory of crises...."
Now, Rosdolsky is entirely correct in his claim that 
Lenin's crisis theory is "essentially" one of disproportion- 
ality; this will be further discussed below. But Lenin is 
fully consistent, contrary to Rosdolsky's contention, on the 
production-consumption relation. The passage from Lenin just 
cited, which made mention of "the contradiction between the 
growth of production and the narrow limits of consumption," 
is read by Rosdolsky as an endorsement of the "overproduc­
tion" (_i .e^, underconsumption) theory which Lenin had ear­
lier rejected (hence the seeming inconsistency). Lenin is 
very clear, however, regarding the content of the produc­
tion-consumption * contradiction':
In a developing capitalist society [the output of con-
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stant capital] must necessarily grow more rapidly than 
all the other parts of the product. Only this law will 
explain one of the most profound contradictions of capi­
talism: the growth of the national wealth proceeds with 
tremendous rapidity, while the growth of national con­
sumption proceeds (if at all) very slowly.[266]
Rosdolsky has thus not uncovered any inconsistency in 
Lenin's notion of the production-consumption 'contradic­
tion*— he has merely overlooked the fact that Lenin ascribes 
an entirely different meaning to the expression than does 
Rosdolsky. Lenin's formulation is thus in full accord with 
his earlier rejection of realization as a particular 
'problem*.
Rosdolsky's confused treatment of Lenin stems in part
from his own lack of clarity on the 'overproduction* theory.
From the rather surprising statement that Marx's views on
the question were a "synthesis" of Ricardo and Sismondi, and
after conceding that "capitalist production does in fact
create its own market," Rosdolsky claims that capitalism
nevertheless does not "abolish" the realization problem, but
only "solves" it "dialectically." He says that
from this [dialectical] perspective the extended repro­
duction of capital is neither 'impossible', nor can it 
proceed ad infiniturn, since the capitalist mode of pro­
duction must reproduce its internal contradictions at a 
continually higher level, until the 'spiral' of capital­
ist development reaches its end.[267]
But if capitalism can "solve" the realization problem 
for one period, it can equally be "solved" for any number of 
periods. An overproduction "contradiction" postponed until 
the "end" of the capitalist "spiral" is, after all, still an 
overproduction problem. And leaving "dialectical" explana­
tions aside for a moment, overproduction always has one
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ultimate cause, viz., the inability of the system to gener­
ate sufficient effective demand to realize the entire com­
modity product— in other words, underconsumption. Ros- 
dolsky's rejection of underconsumption explanations of the 
realization problem is thus purely gestural. He has simply 
fallen into the familiar and erroneous habit of considering 
"overproduction" as somehow ’different’ from "underconsump­
tion. "
Strictly speaking, after 1899 Lenin never produced any 
'theoretical' investigations of the accumulation process. In 
the year that Rosa Luxemburg’s The Accumulation of Capital 
was published (1913), Lenin jotted down some unfavorable 
marginal comments, and also stated in a letter to Lev 
Kamenev:
I have read Rosa's new book Die Akkumulation des 
Kapitals. She has got into a shocking muddle. She has 
distorted Marx. I am very glad that Pannekoek and 
Eckstein and 0. Bauer have all with one accord condemned 
her, and said against her what I said in 1899 against the 
Narodniks.[268]
* * *
Beyond these strictly marginal and incomplete frag­
ments, it is only possible to draw inferences regarding the 
mature Lenin's theoretical perspective from a critical as­
sessment of what is perhaps his best known work, Imperial­
ism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (1916). From the start, 
however, the nature of the book imposes certain limitations 
which nay make the undertaking unfeasible. Imperial ism is a 
non-theoretical text (in the sense that it does not seek to 
develop a theory of imperialism as does, for example, Niko­
129
lai I. Bukharin's contemporaneous Imperialism and World 
Economy); as all 'non-theoretical' works, however, Imperial­
ism is of course informed by an implicit theoretical per­
spective which the symptomatic reading can uncover and make 
explicit. The genuine obstacle to laying bare the implicit
theory of Imperialism Is suggested by the subtitle of the
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book itself: "A Popular Outline." Less a book than a
pamphlet, serious doubts must be expressed regarding the
extent to which any significant theoretical points can be
inferred from Imperialism. As Anthony Brewer has observed,
however, the canonization of the booklet has created a
situation In which criticism of the edifice of post-Leninist
thinking on imperialism must begin with an assessment of the
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(implicit) theory of Imperialism itself.
Lenin's aim in writing Imperialism was to refute 
Kautsky's notion of imperialism as the "preferred policy" of 
finance capital. Rather than a particular "policy," which 
could at a later time be supplanted by a different "policy," 
Lenin argued that imperialism was a specific, historically 
concrete stage of capitalist development and, as such, 'nec­
essary* . "[I Imperialism is the monopoly stage of capital­
ism," according to Lenin's "briefest possible definition," a 
definition which must be supplemented by drawing out the 
five "basic features" of imperialism:
(1) the concentration of production and capital has 
developed to such a high stage that it has created monop­
olies which play a decisive role in economic life; (2) 
the merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and 
the creation, on the basis of this 'finance capital', of 
a financial oligarchy; (3) the export of capital as
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distinguished from the export of commodities acquires 
exceptional importance; (4) the formation of interna­
tional monopolist capitalist associations which share the 
world among themselves, and (5) the territorial division 
of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers is 
completed.[271]
Primarily the third, and to a certain extent the first, of
these "basic features" are of immediate relevance here.
Lenin's treatment of the "monopolies" requires only 
brief mention. Cloaking his discussion in pseudo-Hegelian 
verbiage, Lenin writes of the particular "attributes" of 
capitalism which, at a certain stage of its development, are 
"transformed into their opposites." Thus:
Free competition is the basic feature of capitalism, 
and of commodity production generally; monopoly is the 
exact opposite of free competition, but we have seen the 
latter being transformed into monopoly before our 
eyes....[272]
I will only mention the problems which are apparent in this 
passage: (i) the discussion in Chapter I, subheading B above 
suggests that this formulation of the competition-monopoly 
relation is not adequate to Marxist theory; (ii) if "free 
competition" is the "basic feature" of capitalism, and "mo­
nopoly" is the "exact opposite" of "free competition," it 
becomes difficult to think of imperialism as a stage of 
capitalism, .i.e., imperialism seems to become qualitatively 
different from capitalism. Textual evidence can be cited to
support the claim that Lenin vacillated between the two 
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posi tions.
The significance of the monopolies consists in their
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ability to earn above average profits, to forecast and 
plan raw material requirements and market demand, and to
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establish "the most complete socialization of production." 
Lenin stressed, however, that this socialization and rudi­
mentary planning was incapable of ameliorating capitalism's 
recurring periods of crisis.
[T]he monopoly created in certain branches of industry 
increases and intensifies the anarchy inherent in capi­
talist production as a whole. The disparity between the 
development of agriculture and that of industry, which is 
characteristic of capitalism in general, is increased.
The privileged position of the most highly cartelised, 
so-called heavy industry, especially coal and iron, 
causes Ta still greater lack of co-ordination' in other 
branches of industry....[276]
The above passage clearly links capitalist crises to
the "anarchy" of capitalist commodity production, and is
suggestive of a disproportionality theory of crisis. Lenin
would therefore seem to be fully consistent (at least on the
issue of crisis theory) as between 1916 and his polemics
against the Narodniks almost twenty years earlier. But note
that the reasoning which seeks to connect the appearance of
monopoly (and the possibility of regulation) in some sectors
with even greater anarchy in others is, at best, poorly
developed; Lenin does no more than suggest that rapid rates
of technological change in the monopolised sectors lead to
greater "disparity" and, consequently, greater "anarchy and 
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crises."
A few pages previously, speaking of the emergence of 
monopolies, Lenin cryptically suggested that monopolies and 
(partial) regulation do not abolish the contradictions in­
herent to capitalism because while "[p]roduction becomes
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s o c i a l a p p r o p r i a t i o n  remains private." If he somehow 
intended this notion to be linked with the subsequent argu­
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ments about crisis, Lenin gave no explicit indication of it 
in Imperialism.
The link was made nineteen years earlier, however, in 
the section on crises in "A Characterization of Economic 
Romanticism.” There Lenin had counterposed the "scientific 
analysis of accumulation" (Marxism) to the views of the 
"Russian followers of Sismondi" (Narodniks). According to 
Lenin, the Narodniks explained crises "by the contradiction 
between production and consumption by the working class," 
whereas Marxists referred to "the contradiction between the 
social character of production and the private character of 
appropriation." On the same page, Lenin summed up the argu­
ment: "To put it more briefly, [Narodnism] explains crises
by underconsumption, [Marxism] bv the anarchy of produc- 
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tion."
Without ambiguity, Lenin thus equated the social pro­
duction/private appropriation contradiction with the anarchy 
of production; they were, in his view, the same explanation 
of crisis. The difficulty is that Lenin never elaborated his 
understanding of this identification, and an elaboration 
would seem necessary since the reasoning involved is by no 
means transparently obvious.
Returning to Imperialism, there are two possible inter­
pretations. On the one hand, Lenin could have intended to 
equate the anarchy of production with the social production/ 
private appropriation contradiction as he had in the 1897 
article. In this case, the sane difficulty arises as
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before— there is no adequate explanation provided. On the 
other hand, the two contradictions could be regarded as 
distinct. If this alternative is chosen, and Lenin’s views 
regarding the monopolies' abilities to plan production and 
sales are taken at face value, there is no indication given 
of why crises should be intrinsic to the imperialist stage 
of capitalism except for the obscure and unexplained refer­
ence to the social production/private appropriation con­
tradiction .
In Lenin's argument, the issues of crisis and monopoly
are theoretically connected, albeit loosely, to the third
"basic feature" of imperialism, the export of capital. The
"monopolist position" of the "rich countries" leads to the
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accumulation there of an "enormous 'surplus of capital'."
But "there could be no question of a surplus of capital," 
continues Lenin, "if capitalism could develop agricul­
ture ,...[ and] if it could raise the living standards of the 
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masses." In the same paragraph, Lenin advances the corol­
lary argument:
The need to export capital arises from the fact that in 
a few countries capitalism has become 'overripe' and 
(owing to the backward state of agriculture and the 
poverty of the masses) capital cannot find a field for 
'profitable' investment.[282]
By contrast to those nations where capitalism is "over­
ripe," the prospects for profitable investment are relative­
ly greater in the "backward countries," where "capital is
scarce, the price of land is relatively low, wages are low,
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[and] raw materials are cheap."
The argument seems clear enough, although incompletely
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developed: monopoly, the underdevelopment of agriculture and 
restricted mass consumption in the developed capitalist 
countries combine to provide a dearth of profitable invest­
ment outlets. As a consequence, capital is exported to the 
peripheral areas in order to take advantage of the relative­
ly more profitable investment opportunities there.
Somewhat surprisingly, Lenin's approach has been inter­
preted as an underconsumption theory. Anthony Brewer, for 
example, writes:
If the reference to the poverty of the masses and the 
backwardness of agriculture is to mean anything, it must 
surely represent an underconsumptionist analysis. Accumu­
lation is held up by lack of markets.... This is the 
argument put forward by [John] Hobson, and Lenin thought 
very highly of Hobson and drew on his analysis 
extensively.[284]
On the other hand, however, Brewer qualifies his assessment
by pointing to Lenin’s anti-underconsumption polemics a-
gainst the Narodniks. Brewer concludes by adopting a rather
agnostic stance, claiming that "clearer evidence of a change
of mind" from the anti-Narodnik writings would be necessary
before Lenin could be characterized as an underconsumption-
ist.
Clearer evidence does exist, but not for a change of
mind on Lenin's part. In the very paragraph in question,
where Lenin points to the limited consumption of the masses
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as one of the causes of stagnant profitability, he also 
rails against the "petty bourgeois critics of capitalism" 
who suggest that imperialism could be 'reformed' by a more 
just distribution of income, i.e., by raising the consump­
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tion of the masses. Although he does not explicitly say so
here, Lenin's allusion is no doubt to Hobson, because Lenin
characterized Hobson in precisely the same manner on other 
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occasions. So while Brewer is correct to point out that
Lenin "thought highly" of Hobson's work, this favorable
assessment did not amount to an unequivocal endorsement—
notably, it was specifically Ilobson's underconsumptionism
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that Lenin singled out for criticism.
Moreover, a theoretical criticism may be addressed at
Brewer himself. Underconsumption arguments typically fasten
to an alleged difficulty in realizing the surplus value
embodied in commodity capital under conditions of expanded 
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reproduction. In Lenin's case, there was never any refer­
ence to an unsaleable or unrealizable portion of the surplus 
product. Instead, the discussion in Imperialism concerned 
the existence of a relative surplus of capital seeking 
(more) profitable investment outlets. Lenin is explicit— the 
capital is in money (not commodity) form, _i.e., surplus 
value which has already been realized. If Brewer Interprets 
this as an underconsumption milieu, he is simply in error.
On the basis of this evidence it seems reasonable to sup­
plant Brewer's agnosticism with a stronger statement—
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Lenin's theory is not a variety of underconsumptionism,
* * *
Thus there are, to be sure, considerable weaknesses in 
Lenin’s thinking. The real strength of Lenin's approach is 
revealed, however, precisely in and through an investigation 
of the tensions and seeming inconsistencies which are appar­
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ent throughout his work. This is not an apologia. Certain of 
Lenin’s theses may have been wrong, weak on internal logical 
consistency, or incompletely worked out. These limitations 
have been pointed to above. The favorable appraisal of his 
work as a whole, however, depends more on the demonstration 
that Lenin displayed considerable sophistication in linking 
concrete analysis with abstract theoretical principles, that 
he allowed the theory to guide the concrete work, without 
falling into the by now familiar trap of metamorphosing the 
abstract, of treating the concrete as merely the outward 
manifestation of abstract theory.
For example, it was no doubt a weakness on Lenin's part 
to hold a disproportionality theory of crisis (having deci­
sively rejected underconsumptionisra and failed to appreciate 
the falling rate of profit explanation), and simultaneously 
to insist on the inevitability of crisis under capitalism, 
without having clearly explained why a planned capitalism 
would be unable to do away with the anarchy of the market.
But it was a strength to maintain that the inevitabili­
ty of crisis (despite the fact that this notion was poorly 
worked out) did not allow the deduction of the necessity of 
capitalist collapse, and certainly not the a priori elabora­
tion of the necessary forms of that collapse as Luxemburg 
sought to do (see also in Chapter III below the discussion 
of the second congress of the Communist International, at 
which Lenin rejected the notion of a 'hopeless' final crisis 
of capitalism from which there is no escape). The crisis is 
inevitable, but the collapse is not; the socialist revolu­
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tion is not made by will alone, nor is it automatically 
called forth by the crisis; yet the crisis creates the 
objectively revolutionary situation, which can be exploited 
by the intervention of political movements. Lenin’s analysis 
of the concrete situation reveals a complex interplay of 
both abstract theory and highly particular, concrete inves­
tigation. The abstract is not merely a general (inferred) 
case of the concrete, nor is the concrete a metamorphosis of 
the abstract. Both (or several) levels of analysis co-exist 
throughout the analysis in constant interaction, one never 
predominates over the other(s), the two (or more) never 
collapse into one. There is no trace of teleology, but 
neither is there ’freedom’.
Before turning to an examination of Lenin’s assessment 
of the prospects for working class internationalism, one 
more illustrative example will help to demonstrate his meth­
od and his conception of history and politics.
In the period of reaction after the Russian Revolution 
of 1905, especially during the tenure of Pyotr A. Stolypin 
as Chairman of the Tsar's Council of Ministers (1906-1911), 
the agrarian question loomed large in the debates among 
Russian socialists. Briefly, Stolypin's policies sought to 
break up the persistent communal form of Russian village 
agriculture, and solidify private ownership (in order to 
ensure ’stability', i..£• , capitalism), but without dis­
mantling the large landed estates and the ’superstructure’
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of the landed oligarchy. In other words, Stolypin was
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pursuing a path of development in agriculture along the
lines that Lenin had for some time been describing as the
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path to capitalism in agriculture ''via Junker.”
Briefly, Mensheviks such as Plekhanov, Pavel Axelrod 
and Theodore Dan were convinced that the success of 
Stolypin's policies was 'impossible'. Since, in their view, 
capitalist development was already underway in Russia, the 
only policy which could provide a viable capitalist solution 
of the agrarian question was a policy which banked on the 
liberal bourgeoisie, not the reactionary landed oligarchy. 
Stolypin's measures, which relied on the oligarchy and on 
the 'strong' peasant, flew in the face of the laws of his­
torical development. Consequently, the Mensheviks sought to 
establish a "bloc" with the Kadets (party of the progressive 
bourgeoisie), and in general strove to promote the full 
development of a bourgeois republic (recall the discussion 
of Plekhanov's politics in subheading D above).
Lenin's analysis, by contrast, once again displayed a 
striking character. Abstractly, the laws of capitalist de­
velopment were at play in the countryside, had produced a 
"peasant bourgeoisie" and a "peasant proletariat," and 
therefore had introduced a specifically capitalist class 
dynamic in the Russian rural sector. The task on the agenda 
was consequently land reform (and on this the Mensheviks and 
Bolsheviks, indeed the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Harod- 
niks, were all in agreement). But the Menshevik vision of 
this reform, seemingly 'radical' because it anticipated the 
sweeping away of all vestiges of feudalism, obscured the
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fact that "two objectively possible, and historically not 
yet finally chosen, 'solutions’ of the agrarian ques­
tion... are feasible." If things went "favourably" for 
Stolypin, he could succeed:
[Stolypin's plan] means the 'solution' of the agrarian 
question in bourgeois Russia in the sense of the final 
consolidation of private property over all the 
land.... This will be a solution of the Prussian type, 
which will certainly ensure the capitalist development of 
Russia, but an incredibly slow development, endowing the 
Junker with authority for many years....[292]
The Stolypin solution, contrary to the Menshevik's 
claims, was 'radical* in the sense that it was already 
breaking up the village commune and the archaic agrarian 
structures in Russia. True enough, the other option— the 
peasant-bourgeois, or "via farmer," path— was more radical 
yet because it involved the complete breaking up of the 
oligarchy's landholdings. But the Mensheviks were mistaken 
in thinking that the liberal bourgeoisie was capable, in 
Russia, of carrying out such inroads on the oligarchy's 
property. In the meantime:
The success of Stolypin's policy would involve long 
years of violent suppression and extermination of a mass 
of peasants who refuse to starve to death and be expelled 
from their villages. History has shown examples of the 
success of such a policy. It would be empty and foolish 
democratic phrase-mongering for us to say that the suc­
cess of such a policy in Russia is 'impossible'. It is 
possible! But our business is to make the people see 
clearly at what a price such success is won, and to fight 
with all our strength for another, shorter and more rapid 
road of capitalist development through a peasant revolu­
tion. A peasant revolution under the leadership of the 
proletariat in a capitalist country is difficult, very 
difficult, but it is possible and we must fight for 
it.[293]
These examples offer a glimpse into Lenin's manner of
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treating the "concrete analysis of a concrete situation." On 
the problem of the demise of proletarian internationalism, 
Lenin was able to offer a more successful materialist analy­
sis than either the theoreticians of the center or revolu­
tionaries such as Luxemburg. The center, it will be recal­
led, disintegrated into a variety of acl hoc responses to the 
war. Luxemburg, as will be seen in greater detail in sub­
heading F below, emphasized the ideological bankruptcy of 
the International's leadership.
Lenin never denied the ideological component of revi­
sionism, terming it "opportunism." Quite early on, in What 
Is To Be Done? (1902), he wrote:
That struggle is desirable which is possible, and the 
struggle which is possible is that which is going on at 
the given moment. This is precisely the trend of unbound­
ed opportunism, which passively adapts itself to 
spontaneity.[294]
The theoretical and ideological aspects of revisionism were 
plain enough: the denial of a scientific socialism, the 
denial of the class struggle in 'democratic' bourgeois so­
ciety, etc. All of this had been "presented by Bernstein," 
and finally (in 1899) the opportunist's political practice
was "demonstrated by [Alexandre] Millerand" with his ac-
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ceptance of a portfolio In a bourgeois government.
The Marxist considers political questions concretely,
from a class standpoint, and this "makes all the difference"
between Marxism and opportunism which, for example on the
national question,
imagines that democracy eliminates the class struggle, 
and that is why [the opportunist] presents all his de­
mands in an abstract way, lumped together, 'without res­
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ervations', from the standpoint of the interests of the 
'whole people*, or even from that of an eternal and 
absolute moral principle.[296]
Like Luxemburg, Lenin linked the emergence of revision­
ism to the effect of petty bourgeois currents within the 
working class movement:
The inevitability of revisionism is determined by its 
class roots in society.... Why is it more profound than 
the differences of national peculiarities and of degrees 
of capitalist development? Because in every capitalist 
country, side by side with the proletariat, there are 
always a broad strata of the petty bourgeoisie.... A 
number of new 'middle strata' are inevitably brought into 
existence again and again by capitalism.... It is quite 
natural that the petty-bourgeois world-outlook should 
again and again crop up in the ranks of the broad work­
ers’ parties.[297]
So there can be no doubt that Lenin recognized the 
importance of the ideological components of opportunism, 
viz., the incursion of petty bourgeois aspirations into the 
working class movement, faith in the neutrality and univer­
sality of bourgeois democracy, limiting the political objec­
tive to that which appears possible at a given moment, and 
so on. But beyond the characterization of opportunism as an 
ideological deviation, it was necessary for Lenin to explain 
the phenomenon by reference to the material development of 
capitalism. Moreover, the analysis of this development could 
not be a direct mapping of the theory found in Capital onto 
concrete reality (or vice-versa, the theorization of partic­
ular concrete phenomena into the general theory of capital), 
i_.£. , it could not be an approach such as the one Luxem­
burg's methodology repeatedly induced her to adopt as a 
consequence of her explicit requirement that the theory in 
Capital lay out the "concrete conditions" necessary for
142
capitalist development (recall pp. 105-106 above). In other 
words, there was more to the opportunist current than merely 
the incursion of a petty bourgeois ideological deviation, it 
was not merely a "hesitation" or "vacilation," as Luxemburg 
characterized it. Rather, opportunism found roots in, and 
was constantly reproduced by, a "negative feature in the 
European labor movement, one that can do no little harm to 
the proletarian cause." This feature consists of the con­
crete benefits of colonialism which accrue to workers in the
industrialized nations. Lenin notes that
as a result of the extensive colonial policy, the Euro­
pean proletarian partly finds himself in a position when 
it is not his labor, but the labor of the practically 
enslaved natives in the colonies, that maintains the 
whole of society.... In certain countries this provides 
the material and economic basis for infecting the prole­
tariat with colonial chauvinism.[298]
This phenomenon may only be temporary, in Lenin’s view, but 
it must be understood as a material (and hence political) 
reality of the period in question. Lenin's estimation of the 
significance of this material basis for opportunism only
increased with the unfolding of events. In his notebooks on
imperialism (published as vol. 39 of the Collected Works), 
Lenin comments that "social-chauvinism is as inevitable a 
product of imperialism as wireless-telegraphy"; he repeated­
ly links working class opportunism and social-chauvinism
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with the "benefits" of colonial policy. With the publica­
tion of Imperialism, this emphasis became even clearer when 
Lenin chastized the Marxist Rudolf Hilferding for taking "a 
step backward on this question compared with the frankly
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pacifist and reformist Englishman, Hobson." The latter's 
insight, according to Lenin, was the recognition that impe­
rialist "superprofits" enable the creation of a corrupt
"labor aristocracy," which becomes "the principal social
301
(not military) prop of the bourgeoisie."
The only political deduction of a general sort which 
could legitimately be drawn from the analysis of the phenom­
enon of opportunism and its material basis was that of the 
necessity in general of decisive and conscious political 
intervention of a particular type— hence the deduction and 
evolution of the organizational forms of the Bolshevik po­
litical party. In the Bolshevik conception, the limits of 
the possible are given by the unity of the objective and 
subjective in the concrete moment. The 'objectively revolu­
tionary situation' cannot in the literal sense be 'created', 
but it can (and will, given the chance) slip away. . .
As such, no strategic or tactical implications (other 
than party organization and the theory of intervention in 
the conjuncture) could be deduced from general principles, 
and the appropriate methods of the struggle for revolution­
ary and internationalist politics varied according to the 
circumstances. Prior to the war, the fight against opportun­
ism could (had to) be waged from within a 'unified' Interna­
tional. After the outbreak of war, as will be seen below, 
the tactics of splitting off from the chauvinist currents 
and the formation of a new International became necessary. 
Even so, the question of a split at that time was not a 
'simple' one, but was governed by the tempo of the develop­
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ment of the crisis. The subtlety of Lenin’s political sense 
often evades both critics and admirers. In one and the same 
(unflattering) analysis, therefore, it is possible to dis­
cern evidence of a Lenin who was at one time a mechanical 
determinist, seeing concrete events as inevitable stages of
a pre-ordained process, and at another time hatching con-
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spiracies and plots of which he alone was the master.
Lenin’s associate Nikolai I. Bukharin, in his anticipa­
tory Imperialism and World Economy (1915), provided an anal­
ysis of the material basis of working class national chau­
vinism which basically concurred with Lenin's 1916 Imperial­
ism, although in a broader and more general fashion. In 
addition to the obvious conflict of interests between capi­
tal and labor which accumulation engenders, wrote Bukharin, 
there exists a parallel but contradictory tendency in capi­
talist development. During each of its concrete phases, 
capitalism is able to forge material and ideological ties 
which establish fleeting (but politically significant) com­
monalities of interest between capitalist and worker. In the 
early phase of capitalist development,
when the working class had just begun to emerge and to 
separate itself from the small entrepreneurs, when so- 
called patriarchal relations prevailed between master and 
worker, the latter to a considerable degree identified 
his interests with the interests of his exploiter.
This identification of interests which are in sub­
stance totally opposed to one another was, to be sure, 
not suspended in the air. It had a very real basis. ’The 
better the business of our shop, the better for m e ’, the 
worker of that time used to reason.[303]
Somewhat later, working class opposition to capital 
came to be mediated by the "craft ideology" of trade union­
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ism ("our sphere of production”) and "the so-called working
class protectionism with its policy of safeguarding ’nation- 
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al industry'." Finally, in the imperialist era, when nar­
row trade unionism (and to a lesser extent, working class 
protectionism) is gradually overcome, there remains (and at 
times is strengthened) "the bond of unity between the work­
ing class and the greatest organization of the bourgeoisie,
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the capitalist state." This bond, finding its expression
"in the ideology of worker's patriotism," is cemented by
colonialism, and the "industrial prosperity" (which includes
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higher wages) accompanying imperialist "super-profits." 
Despite flaws, which will be further noted below, Bukharin's 
conceptualization of the bourgeois state was remarkable in 
its anticipation of corporatism in both the democratic and 
totalitarian forms.
The final subheading of this chapter analyzes the var­
ious responses to the outbreak of war among the revolution­
ary left.
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F. Agitation for Peace, Revolutionary Action,
and Defeatism
As noted at the end of subheading B earlier in this 
chapter, the commencement of hostilities completely trans­
formed the political terrain of the Second International. 
Apart from those social imperialists who merely adopted 
positions identical to those of the ruling-class parties, 
the bulk of the Marxist and militant non-Marxist groupings 
fell into a ’defense of the fatherland* faction on the one 
hand, and a 'pacifist' faction on the other. The major 
figures (and their theoretico-political positions) in these 
tendencies have already been discussed in subheadings C and 
D above. At this point, attention will focus on the small 
group of revolutionary leftists, which became increasingly 
visible amid the debris of the International.
Among the revolutionary left there was uniform condem­
nation of the war and bitterness toward those socialists who 
supported it, particularly the hypocritical center. An exam­
ination of the revolutionary left's analysis of the war and 
the collapse of the International is especially illuminating 
precisely because of the very similar ’gut' reactions of its 
leaders: given the outrage and revulsion the revolutionaries 
all shared, it becomes all the more clear in their case how 
theoretical and methodological differences produced varying 
analyses and political stances, despite almost identical 
instinctual responses.
Trotsky astutely ascribed the capitulation of popular 
sentiment (in favor of the war) to the mass of unpoliticized
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proletarians and petty bourgeois who tend to flow with the 
tide of great historical events:
Mobilization and the declaration of war awaken fresh 
expectations in [petty bourgeois and working class] 
circles whom our agitation practically does not reach and 
whom, under ordinary circumstances, it will never en­
list.... The same thing happens as at the beginning of a 
revolution, but with one all-important difference. A 
revolution links these newly aroused elements with the 
revolutionary class, but war links them— with the gov­
ernment and the army![307]
On the other hand, when explaining the co-optation of 
the supposedly politicized leaders of social democracy,
Trotsky emphasized the long history and effects of immersion 
in reformist politics. The revisionists wished "to perpet­
uate reformism theoretically," and although they were de­
feated in the realm of theory during the Bernstein debates,
revisionism "continued to live, drawing sustenance from the
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actual conduct and the psychology of the whole movement." 
Trotsky elaborated (altered?) this argument later, when he 
wrote that German revisionism stemmed from a "contradiction" 
between the SPD's phraseology and its practice. The revi­
sionists did not see that this contradiction was "tempo­
rary," so they sought to make revisionism the permanent form
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of proletarian class struggle. Either way, it was therefore 
the practical experience of activists and agitators, an 
experience mired in many years of reformist politics, which 
conditioned their behavior in 1914.
According to Trotsky, the English working class move­
ment, which enjoyed the opportunities presented by a 'gen­
uine’ parliament, was nonetheless bound by the same histori­
cal limitations as the German. Despite the difference in
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organizational forms (the English workers had a parliament, 
the German workers had a 'real' Marxist party), the move­
ments in both countries "accomodated themselves" to the
existing power, i^ .e^ , , they were both limited to possibilist 
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aspirations.
Like Lenin, although somewhat later, Trotsky came to
see that "the immediate trade interests of various strata of
the proletariat proved to have a direct dependence upon the
success or failure of the foreign [imperialistic--N.K.]
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policies of the governments." Furthermore, agitation or 
persuasion alone could neither transform the International 
into a revolutionary organization, nor cure those large
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sections of the proletariat gripped by patriotic fervor.
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The International had to be split, and the revolutionizing
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of the proletariat required a great, historical upheaval.
Unlike Lenin, however, Trotsky at this time lacked 
membership in an organization where his views could struc­
turally influence events— since 1904 his standing with the 
Mensheviks had been ambivalent at best, and he joined the 
Bolsheviks only in the late summer of 1917. Contrary to his 
own advice, therefore, Trotsky was forced to rely on his 
individual persuasive skills and agitational talents. Isaac 
Deutscher chronicles Trotsky's juggling tactics on the 
emigre paper Nashe Slovo:
Broadly speaking, three groups tried to influence Nashe 
Slovo. Martov exerted himself to reconcile his loyalties 
to Socialist internationalism and to Menshevism; and 
gradually he transferred his old distrust of Bolshevism 
to the single-minded 'angular' internationalism which 
Lenin preached. At the other extreme were the prodigal
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sons of Bolshevism, Manuilsky and Lozovsky.... Trotsky 
held an intermediate position; he tried to curb the pro- 
Bolshevik group and also to persuade Martov that he 
should disassociate himself from Menshevik social- 
patriots. ’The editorial conferences', Lunacharsky re­
lates, ’dragged on in long debates, in the course of 
which Martov evaded with amazing elasticity of mind and 
almost sophistic slyness a clear answer.... Trotsky often 
attacked him very angrily*. In the first issue of the 
paper Martov had, in fact, denounced some of his fol­
lowers; but after a few weeks he argued that it was wrong 
to charge the social-patriots with treason to socialism. 
The pro-Bolshevik group then indignantly turned against 
Martov; but Trotsky, for all his anger in debate, still 
shrank from a break with him.[315]
With regard to the decisive historical crisis which he 
believed was in the making, Trotsky sought Its genesis in a 
transformation of the "psychology" of the working class. He 
pointed to the irony of the moment: the bourgeois govern­
ments of Europe were dependent for their survival on a mass 
of armed workers. "Is it not clear," reasoned Trotsky, that 
the workers must begin to see a contradiction between their 
heretofore willingness to remain merely a parliamentary 
opposition and the ease with which imperialism resorted to 
armed force in order to decide questions of ’bourgeois 
right*? Trotsky’s political recommendation was a rather 
vague exhortation to "agitate for peace" (note the seeming 
incongruity with his earlier claim regarding the futility of 
agitation alone), and he issued the well-known slogan:
No annexations!
No reparations!
The right of all nations to self-determination!
A United States of Europe 
--without monarchies,
--without standing armies,




Rosa Luxemburg, in her famous analysis of the outbreak 
of war (The Junius Pamphlet), provided a brilliant material­
ist account of the parallel forces leading Europe to war in 
the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The 
first "line of development" which culminated in war began 
with the constitution of the modern European nation-state. 
Luxemburg dates this from the time of Bismarck’s war against 
France (1870), which "threw the French Republic into the
arms of Russia, [and] split Europe into two opposing 
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camps...." The second "line of development" consisted in
the imperialist expansion into non-capitalist regions; in
the case of Germany, this largely meant the exploitation of
Turkey and the subordination of the latter's government to
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German financial interests.
Responding to those within the SPD who urged "suspen­
sion" of the class struggle for the duration of the war, 
Luxemburg forcefully argued that the
class struggle is known not to be a social-democratic 
invention that can be arbitrarily set aside.... The mod­
ern proletariat was not led by the social-democracy into 
the class struggle. On the contrary, the international 
social democratic movement was called into being by the 
class struggle....[319]
Moreover, Luxemburg maintained that in "capitalist society, 
invasion and class struggle are not opposites," i_.e^ . , inva­
sion by a foreign power "is a measure to which the bour­
geoisie has frequently and gladly resorted as an effective
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weapon against the enemy within." And
[j]ust as invasion is the true and tried weapon in the 
hands of capital against the class struggle, so on the 
other hand the fearless pursuit of the class struggle has 




None of this however, amounted to an argument for the
right of national self-determination couched in fradical*
phraseology. On the contrary, in ’'the present imperialistic
milieu there can be no wars of national self-defense,"
because in the imperialist era national self-determination
implied the maintenance of colonial empires— a glaring con- 
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tradiction. Genuine national self-defense required the
formation of a people's militia, "but above all, popular
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decision making in all questions of peace and war."
As regards the failure of the European proletariat and
its political parties to oppose the war, Luxemburg could
only offer the explanation that the workers were not aware
"of their own interests," i^.e., they were victims of a false
consciousness, and that working class leaders were either
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traitorous opportunists or naive dupes. This conclusion is 
clearly linked to her analysis of capitalism, in which a 
teleological orientation is coupled with the theorization of 
the "concrete conditions" of capitalism. When combined, 
these twin pitfalls brought the result that working class 
allegiance to nationality could not but seem aberrant (in­
sofar as there was no basis for such a phenomenon in the 
general theory of capitalism), while at the same time the 
concrete forms of the appropriate revolutionary response 
could only be left open for further capitalist development 
itself to determine.
Consequently, the political task carried a bold name 
("revolutionary action"), but was quite modest in its actual
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content: whereas the "great historical hour itself creates 
the forms that will carry the revolutionary movement to a 
successful outcome," the function of revolutionary social- 
democracy consists in combating the false consciousness of 
the working class by providing "a political slogan, clear­
ness concerning the political problems and interests of the
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proletariat in times of war."
* * *
Lenin, living in exile near Cracow at the outbreak of
the war, quickly provided an analysis of the war which
formed the basis of the political tactics he would espouse
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over the course of the conflict. In fact, Lenin*s response 
can be seen as the logical culmination of his attitude on 
the question of war over the course of the debates in the 
Second International. Although Lenin did not present the 
precise political implications of imperialist war at the 
Stuttgart congress (1907) of the International, he was al­
ready drawing preliminary conclusions in his analysis of the 
congress. In his critique, Lenin naturally opposed the bla­
tant chauvinism of rightists such as von Vollmar, but also 
remarked on the purely abstract "opposition to war" of the 
centrists Bebel and Guesde, and the semi-anarchistic views 
of Herve. While von Vollmar spoke of a need for the "defense 
of the fatherland," Herve responded with the slogan that 
"the proletarian has no fatherland," and demanded that the 
proletarian response to all wars must be an immediate mili­
tary strike and insurrection. Lenin characterized this posi-
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tion as
blind faith in the miracle-working power of all direct 
action; the wrenching of this 'direct action' out of its 
general social and political context without the 
slightest analysis of the latter: in short, the 'arbi­
trarily mechanical interpretation of social phenomena'
(as Karl Liebknecht put it).[327]
While the slogan "the proletarian has no fatherland" is 
a principle (to be struggled for) of international social­
ism, it cannot be understood to mean that working class 
internationalism is a foregone conclusion, or that it can be 
realized with the mere issuance of a slogan.
Although his attitude toward the war was not yet con­
cretized in 1907 (the particular conditions of the coming 
conflict were not yet visible), Lenin's refusal to adhere to 
inflexible or abstract formulas is fully consistent with a 
post-war (1922) declaration:
[l]t is impossible to 'retaliate' to war by a strike, 
just as it is impossible to 'retaliate* to war by a 
revolution in the simple and literal sense of these 
terms.
We must explain the real situation to the people, show 
them...that the ordinary worker's organizations, even if 
they call themselves revolutionary organizations, are 
utterly helpless in the face of a really impending 
war.[328]
In 1914, an approach such as Lenin's meant first and 
foremost the recognition of the Imperialist nature of the 
war, A.*®* j a- war between nations in the advanced era of 
capitalist development. This war had to be distinguished 
from wars which the bourgeoisie waged against feudalism, in 
order to constitute the modern bourgeois nation-state. The 
opportunists, in Lenin's view, uncritically transferred the 
"defense of the fatherland" slogan from an earlier epoch
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(when it displayed a progressive aspect), to the imperialist
period. In 1914, the socialist movement "cannot triumph
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within the old framework of the fatherland."
Since it was not merely a question of betrayal by the 
leadership, since opportunism had a mass base, "refusal to 
serve with the forces, anti-war strikes, etc., are sheer 
nonsense." Revolutionary socialists above all had to recog­
nize that the class struggle is not suspended at the out- 
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break of war, and that consequently
it is the duty of every socialist to conduct proaganda of 
the class struggle, in the army as well; work directed 
towards turning of a war of the nations into civil war is 
the only socialist activity in the era of an imperialist 
armed conflict...."[331]
This task could no longer be undertaken within the framework
of the International, which meant that the labor movement
had to be split. In this regard,
the worst possible service Is being rendered to the 
proletariat by those who vacillate between opportunism 
and revolutionary Social Democracy (like the 'Center* in 
the SPD), by those who are trying to hush up the collapse 
of the Second International or to disguise it with diplo­
matic phrases.[332]
An effort to convert the world war Into civil war, an
effort intended to facilitate the defeat of "one's own"
bourgeoisie, led to the startling formula of "revolutionary
defeatism," or the struggle for the defeat of "one’s own"
country. This concept proved rather too shocking even for
such revolutionaries as Trotsky. Indeed, in the initial
period of the war, Lenin was virtually alone in advocating
333
defeatism, even within the Bolshevik Party (this fact, 
incidentally, should contribute to dispelling the myth,
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widely held among the left as well as in bourgeois circles,
that Lenin's will inexorably guided the Bolsheviks at every
twist and turn). At the outset, Trotsky strongly opposed
Lenin's thesis of revolutionary defeatism as
a connivance for which there is no reason or .justifica­
tion and which substitutes an orientation (extremely 
arbitrary under present conditions) along the line of a 
'lesser evil' for the revolutionary struggle against 
war.[334]
Lenin’s response demanded that Trotsky concretize the mean­
ing of 'struggle against war':
A 'revolutionary struggle against war* is merely an 
empty and meaningless exclamation,...unless it means 
revolutionary action against one's own government even in 
wartime.[335]
Trotsky hesitated, but eventually moved toward Lenin's posi­
tion. He later wrote in his autobiography that "the es­
sentially unimportant differences that still separated me
from Lenin...dwindled into nothing during the next few 
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months."
Even more clearly than in the case of Trotsky, Bu­
kharin's analysis of the material basis of working class 
patriotism led to political conclusions perfectly similar to 
Lenin's. The crisis unleashed by the outbreak of war
severs the last chain that binds the workers to the 
masters, their slavish submission to the imperialist 
state. The last limitation of the proletariat's philoso­
phy is being overcome: its clinging to the narrowness of 
the national state, its patriotism.[337]
Steeled in battles forced upon them from above, accus­
tomed to looking into the face of death every minute,
[the workers]' begin to break the front of the imperialist 
war with the same fearlessness by turning it into civil 
war against the bourgeoisie.[338]
Revolutionary defeatism, as Lenin and those who even­
tually followed recognized, did not turn on the whim of a
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party (it was not a voluntarist position). Likewise, the 
strategy of defeatism very concretely specified the form of 
conscious intervention to be taken in the context of the 
objectively determined crisis. Good intentions or impeccable 
revolutionary credentials were not enough to provide a co­
herent, concrete, and feasible guide to action; the matter 
actually hinged on the implicit method behind ’’the concrete 
analysis of a concrete situation.”
Perhaps even more clearly than in the period immediate­
ly following the outbreak of war, the manner in which Lenin 
linked the objective context to the prospects of interven­
tion can be seen during April 1917. The well-known "April 
Theses" of this period are of course frequently pointed to 
as a manifestation of the audacious Lenin, returning from 
exile, goading those Bolsheviks still inclined to caution.
It is true that the "Theses” insist on a republic of so­
viets, not a parliament, as "the only possible form of a
339
revolutionary government,” but the contemporaneous analysis 
in "The Dual Power” shows how the apparently almost un­
limited voluntarism of the "Theses” in fact only urged 
particular forms of action in a situation where a multiplic­
ity of outcomes existed, where victory or defeat for the 
socialist revolution were equally possible.
Did the Provisional Government need to be overthrown?
Yes, ultimately, because it was a bourgeois regime. But this 
was not possible in April, it was not a question of 'simply* 
overthrowing the Provisional Government because the alterna-
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tive, the "second government" or the Soviets of Workers' 
Deputies, at that time constituted the principal support of 
the bourgeois Provisional Government. The truly revolution­
ary outcome would be the transfer of power to the Soviets,
_i , only the Soviets had a genuinely revolutionary poten­
tial, but as yet this potential was merely a possibility.
The Soviets themselves needed to be revolutionized, and 
hence the party of the class conscious proletariat needed to
win the constituents of the Soviets over to their side— and
340
then overthrow the Provisional Government.
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CHAPTER III
REVOLUTION, THE 'STABILIZATION* OF CAPITALISM,
AND THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL
A. Introduction 
Following the collapse of the Second International in 
August 1914, several efforts to salvage the organization 
came to naught. French and Belgian socialists refused to 
meet with German socialists, as the latter had not (with few 
exceptions) opposed the invasion of Belgium. Both blocs, the 
French, Belgians, and British on the one hand, and the 
Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians on the other, continued 
to issue resolutions which claimed that each was struggling 
only for the 'right of all peoples to self-determination'; 
in practice, this of course meant simply that each socialist 
party would continue to support 'its* country's war effort.
In this setting, it was only a matter of time before 
those tendencies which had not renounced internationalism 
would begin the work of restoring a revolutionary Interna­
tional. While Lenin (shortly followed by Trotsky) issued the 
call for the Third International in November 1914, most 
other internationalists had much vaguer notions of the ap­
propriate line of march, and still clung to hopes that 
something would come of the old organization, A small, 
dispirited group of revolutionary Marxists and left-wing
pacifists met in Zimmerwald and Kienthal (both in Switzer-
1
land) during September 1915 and April 1916 respectively.
181
Although at both conferences the majorities would not sup­
port the formation of a new international, the decisive 
first step of operating outside the Second International had 
been taken. The particulars of the process by which the 
Zimmerwald movement haltingly stumbled toward the founding 
of the Third or Communist International are primarily of 
historical interest and will not be reviewed here. Compre­
hensive accounts from a variety of perspectives are else-
2
where availiable.
The founding congress of the Communist International
took place in early March 1919, and was followed by six more
3
congresses over the next sixteen years. Initially convening 
every year, a full congress of the Third International began 
meeting less and less frequently after the fourth congress 
(1922). A full seven years elapsed between the important 
sixth congress (1928) and the final seventh congress (1935). 
Established at the first congress, the Executive Committee 
of the Communist International (henceforth ECCI) was vested 
with the official authority of the organization between 
congresses. It was the ECCI which ultimately dissolved the 
Comintern on 10. June, 1943.
Before proceeding further, however, it might be pointed 
out that the various histories of the socialist movement 
most clearly reveal their partisanship when they turn to 
address the question of the Third International. On the 
right, one finds that the portrayal of pre-Comintern social­
ists as vaguely well-meaning but hopelessly naive and inef­
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fectual dreamers is replaced by the image of the Communist 
as a ruthless and calculating conspirator. On the other 
hand, writers like Julius Braunthal, who claim to profess a 
general sympathy for socialist ideals, nevertheless also 
undergo a transformation of style when they commence to 
relate the history of the Comintern. Braunthal*s change of 
expression becomes evident when, by contrast with his ear­
lier ambivalent (at best) attitude towards Marxism, he in­




Partisanship, of course, is no bad thing per se, 
particularly if it is clearly stated and revealed--in such 
cases it is easy for the reader to make allowances. For 
example, in the preface to his book, the stridently anti­
communist writer James Hulse claims to present the first 
"balanced, authoritative history" of the Comintern; a page 
later, still in the preface, he has already concluded that
the International was no more than "a clumsy attempt to
6
build a far-flung club of like minded fanatics." Well and
good— one knows what to expect, and reads accordingly. At
the other extreme, some extraordinarily apologetic Soviet
accounts are able, with the judicious use of hindsight, to
7
cast embarassing blunders in a favorable light. Once again, 
the political relationship of the analyst(s) to the topic is 
clear and unambiguous.
A rather different and more difficult interrogation of 
texts is called for in the case of writers like Braunthal or 
the Spanish ex-Communist Fernando Claudin. Their ideological
183
relationship to the communist movement (narrowly defined) is 
manifestly more complex than that of either someone like 
Hulse or a coterie of writers at the Institute of Marxism- 
Leninism in Moscow; their sympathetic yet obviously critical 
perspective may appear at first sight to offer hope of a 
middle ground which will bear more objective results. As 
will be seen below, however, such is not the case.
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B. Missing the Mark 
The multiformity of theoretical currents within the 
pre-war Second International prevented the ready identifica­
tion of any single unifying principle or theme. By contrast, 
the development of the Third International’s theoretical 
orientation was marked by the centrality of Lenin’s writings 
on the national question and his theory of the imperialist 
stage of capitalism. This is not to say that there existed a 
uniform or homogeneous Third International theory; indeed, 
at least through the 1920s, theoretical disputes were con­
siderable and there was no shortage of debate. The point is 
that the terrain of the debate was so shaped by Lenin’s 
theory of imperialism (especially after his death) that the 
participants defined their own positions largely in terms of 
their (implicit or explicit) relationship with Lenin. At 
present it is not necessary to dwell on the reasons for this 
state of affairs beyond pointing to Lenin’s stature as a 
revolutionary leader and to the weight (both quantitative 
and qualitative) of the Russian Communist Party (b) in the 
Comintern.
While it might appear that the presence of such a
ready-made organizing principle would facilitate the task of
sifting through the development of Comintern theory, this
has not been the case. For example, some analysts (Anthony
Brewer, Bill Warren) insist that Lenin was an undercon-
8
sumptionist (a "crude" one at that), while others (Roman
Rosdolsky, Richard Day) are equally adamant that he was a
9
disproportionist. Adding further to the confusion, Day
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maintains that it was precisely Lenin's adherence to a
disproportionality theory of capital accumulation which
10
constituted the salvation of revolutionary Marxism, while
Rosdolsky feels that Lenin's disproportionality approach led
him perilously close to a reformism of the Austro-Marxist
11
("harmonist") variety.
It should be admitted, as seen in the previous chapter, 
that Lenin himself is at least in part to blame for this 
confusion, as the theory in Imperialism is indeed marked by 
inconsistencies and incompletely formulated propositions 
(none of them necessarily fatal). It should also be clear 
from the previous chapter that a careful critique of his 
theory would not warrant characterizing Lenin as an under- 
consumptionist. This does not, however, imply agreement with 
either Rosdolsky or Day. The grounds for rejecting the 
former’s views have already been chronicled; the following 
critique of Day will turn on his proposed schema for organ­
izing discussion of the theoretical tendencies in the 
Comintern.
At the outset, Day distinguishes two camps in Marxism,
"one associated with Rudolf Hilferding, the other with Rosa 
12
Luxemburg." The reader is subsequently informed that the
'Hilferding tradition’ was "faithful" to Marx, and numbered
among its adherents Lenin, Bukharin, Trotsky, and Evgeny
13
Preobrazhensky. By contrast, the 'Luxemburg tradition', 
which included Kautsky and ultimately Eugen Yarga and Joseph 
Stalin, was misled (Day speaks of a "fundamental reorienta-
186
tion" and a "departure") by certain of Engels' statements
14
made after Marx's death. The Hilferding tradition's ortho­
doxy, in Day's view, consisted in its acceptance of a dis­
proportionality theory of the business cycle, while the 
Luxemburg tradition's error lay in its adoption of a theory 
of secular crises of overproduction-underconsumption. (It 
might immediately be noted that precious little besides some 
very vague shared perspectives on capitalist crisis unites 
the individuals who Day rather too easily groups into the 
respective 'traditions’). Day then proceeds to argue that 
the evolution of the Comintern's (and "Soviet Marxism's" 
generally) outlook was shaped by the conflict between the 
two traditions. In June 1930, with Stalin's "intervention”
at the sixteenth congress of the All-Russian Communist Party
15
(b), the victory of the Luxemburgist line was complete.
To be sure, Day is correct to note that with the pas­
sage of time, the theory of capitalism prevalent in Comin­
tern circles increasingly stressed supposed problems of 
underconsumption, i_.e^  , inadequate aggregate demand— this 
will be discussed below. Indeed, with minor modifications, 
the same view continues to dominate the Soviet understanding 
of the workings of capitalism. Day's two-fold explanation of 
this outcome, however, is mystifying. First, Day notes how 
the effects of the political campaign against Bukharin led 
to the interpretation of the latter's arguments on "capital­
ist stabilization" as suggesting that an "organized" (i,.£. ,
16
without disproportions) capitalism could be crisis-free.
In the highly charged political atmosphere of the Comintern,
1 8 7
such a view stood no chance of survival, and in Day's opin­
ion Bukharin's writing contributed to the demise of the 
Hilferding tradition as soon as the two were linked. Himself 
in full agreement with the attack on Bukharin, Day must 
therefore hasten to absolve the disproportionality position
in general (and Lenin in particular, who Day seems to regard
17
as infallible) from any association with reformism. As the 
second piece of supporting evidence for his thesis, Day
suggests that the timely arrival of the 1930 economic crisis
18
clinched the case for the underconsumptionist view. Beyond
these two items, Day has little to offer except a standard
Trotskyist interpretation of Stalin's rise to power.
What Day's ’explanation* lacks is any account of how
the Luxemburg tradition could possibly emerge victorious in
a political climate where the 'Luxemburgist deviation* was
19
regarded as a monumental transgression. Day seemingly 
recognizes this when he notes that "[a]n overt rehabilita­
tion of Luxemburg was politically problematic," and yet he
maintains that Varga was successful in "refurbishing Luxera-
20
burg's thesis and presenting it as 'Varga's Law1." The
question begs asking, naturally, just how was Varga able to
accomplish this feat? It does no good to say that the
Luxemburg-underconsumption link had been successfully denied
21
(by Varga) or merely overlooked, since the connection 
between Luxemburg and underconsumption had by then become so 
firmly established (for good reason) that such a maneuver 
would have been impossible.
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Simply put, Day's account of the emergent Comintern 
theory as a product of struggle between the Hilferding and 
Luxemburg 'lines* is sutainable only through his remarkably 
selective reading of Lenin's Imperialism. At least implicit­
ly, Day treats Imperialism as a fully consistent work, 
although such an approach is arguably misplaced (recall 
Chapter II above). Even more significantly, Day merely a- 
voids mention of a pervasive theme in Imperialism which in 
fact represents the basis of subsequent interpretations of 
Lenin as an underconsumptionist and explains how 'Varga's 
Law' was able to dodge the charge of Luxemburgism. This 
theme is Lenin's characterization of imperialism as the
"moribund" (or "overripe," "decaying," or "stagnating")
22
stage of capitalism. It is necessary to stress that 
Lenin's assessment of imperialism as "moribund" capitalism 
is neither passing nor incidental, as it runs like a red 
thread through the pamphlet. In fact, an entire chapter 
deals with the "Parasitism and Decay of Capitalism."
Day flatly ignores all of this. In his book, there are 
only two passing indications of the fact that "Lenin had
23
described monopoly capitalism as moribund and parasitic."
In neither of these two instances is the issue developed or
explored, and in one case its mention merely serves as a
lead-in to a totally gratuitous attack on Bukharin around an
unrelated matter. By closing his eyes to this problem from
the beginning, Day is later able to identify Stalin, Varga,
and others as Luxenburgist-underconsumptionists by deriding
24
their references to "monopolistic rottenness" without even
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hinting that the imagery of "rottenness" unequivocally 
traces its origins to Lenin.
It is easy to agree with Day that over the course of 
the 1920s the disproportionality position became increasing­
ly likely to be rejected in part for political reasons 
(although it surely seems more reasonable, as suggested 
earlier, to put the bulk of the blame for this development 
on the political behavior of Hilferding, Austro-Marxists 
such as Otto Bauer, etc., rather than on any pronouncements 
of Bukharin). Contrary to Day's principal argument, however, 
the eclipse of the disproportionality view and the subse­
quent consolidation of underconsumption as the centerpiece 
of Comintern theory did not represent a 'victory' of the 
'Luxemburg tradition’. Rather, the underconsumption approach 
of the Comintern is rooted far less in the classical Luxem- 
burgist problem (i_.e., the supposed impossibility, under 
conditions of expanded reproduction, of realizing the entire 
surplus value produced in a fully capitalist society) than 
in a realization problem which was seen to be specific to,
or at least increasingly made manifest in, capitalism's
25
monopoly phase ('Varga's Law'). Lenin's thesis of "mori­
bund" monopoly was neatly adaptable to the latter view, and 
a selective (although arguably incorrect) assimilation of 
Lenin's utterances with a decidedly non-Luxemburgist version 
of underconsumption eventually became the dominant theoreti­
cal perspective within the Comintern. Day had claimed that 
”[b]y denouncing Rudolf Hilferding Soviet Marxists would in
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fact cut their final ties with Lenin'* and the disproportion- 
26
ality view, but this is inaccurate. Correctly put: by 
retaining their ties to Lenin's statements on 'rottenness', 
the Soviet Marxists were able to rationalize both their 
abandonment of the disproportionality approach and their 
development of a 'new' (.i.e. , non-Luxemburgist) undercon­
sumption theory as introduced by Varga. A survey and analy­
sis of the relevant theoretical and historical material will 
be presented below, after a brief critical appraisal of 
Lenin's conception of imperialism as the "moribund" stage of 
capitalism.
In the 1920 Preface to Imperialism, Lenin mentions the
"parasitism and decay of capitalism, characteristic of its
highest historical stage of development" in connection with
27
the split in the working class movement. Both here and in 
the "Notebooks on Imperialism" John Hobson is favorably 
mentioned (at least viz-a-vlz "the ex-1 Marxist *" Hilferding) 
for pointing out that "the first habit of parasitism" con­
sists in the "bribery" of a stratum of the working class—
for Lenin, this bribery constitutes the "economic basis" of
28
social chauvinism and working class support for the war.
At the same time, however, "parasitism and decay" are also 
linked to the emergence of 'coupon clippers'. Later in the 
pamphlet, this connection is repeated with the claim that 
the "rentier state is a state of parasitic, decaying capi­
talism", and Hobson is again quoted on the possibility of 
29
bribery.
The imagery of "rottenness" acquires a pseudo-theoreti-
191
cal content in Imperialism when it is used to support the
thesis of a "surplus of capital" in the advanced countries:
The need to export capital arises from the fact that in 
a few countries capitalism has become ’overripe* and 
(owing to the backward state of agriculture and the 
poverty of the masses) capital cannot find a field for 
'profitable* investment.[30]
The export of capital, Lenin proceeds to argue, "may tend to
arrest development** in the exporting countries, but only by
"accelerat[ing]" the development of capitalism in the recip- 
31
ient nations.
Yet a third aspect of "rottenness" for Lenin involves
the supposed retardation of technological progress under
monopoly capitalism (which, "like all monopoly,...inevitably
32
engenders a tendency to stagnation and decay"). The argu­
ment that capitalist monopoly has "begun to retard progress’* 
is repeated at a more general level with respect to capital­
ist development per se, and no longer appears confined to 
the technoogical aspect, although somewhat paradoxically 
Lenin also maintains that during "the epoch of imperial­
ism,... [o]n the whole, capitalism is growing far more rapid-
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ly than before." Rather vaguely, Lenin seems to suggest
that this "far more rapid" growth at some (unspecified)
point leads to "parasitism" and to "the decay of the coun-
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tries which are richest in capital (Britain)."
As with other arguments in Imperialism, the lack of 
specificity on the "stagnation and decay" issue makes a 
definitive assessment unlikely. Somewhat charitably, it 
could be argued that Lenin's use of the imagery of "rotten­
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ness" was primarily confined to the status of a metaphor, 
and was generally used to describe types of political behav­
ior. More realistically, however, it must be admitted that 
Lenin seemed to presume (granted, not in a very rigorous 
manner) that "stagnation and decay" was a necessary feature 
of capitalist economic development in its advanced phase. It 
will be argued in what follows that precisely these ill- 
defined (and yet evocative) supposed features of capitalist 
economy during the 'monopoly stage’ made their way into the 
theoretical framework of the Comintern.
1 9 3
C. The Theoretical Metamorphosis 
It is appropriate (in fact, necessary) to speak of a 
metamorphosis in the Comintern’s theory of capitalism: the 
documents, theses, etc. to be reviewed in the next section 
will clearly indicate that a change (from disproportionality 
to underconsumption) in outlook took place, yet there was no 
explicit theoretical criticism of the disproportionality 
approach and no frank avowal of the underconsumption posi­
tion. Disproportionality was de facto rejected for a complex 
combination of political and economic reasons; the contra­
diction of 'unlimited production vs^ . restricted consumption* 
under capitalism came to be regarded as the root of the 
problem, but with precious little forthright discussion of 
what exactly this meant or how it stood in relation to the 
existing body of Marxian theory. Richard Day noted these 
symptoms but, as argued above, his analysis of the trans­
formation remains superficial and therefore stands silent 
when asked to explain how Varga was able to prevent the 
charge of 'Luxenburgism* from sticking. The following dis­
cussion aims to uncover the links which Day is unable or 
unwilling to provide.
Lenin's influence on the Comintern was both more con­
siderable and less direct than that of his colleague 
Bukharin— considerable because of Lenin's enormous prestige, 
less direct because Bukharin rather than Lenin held execu­
tive positions in the Comintern, drafted resolutions and 
3 5
programs, etc. Bukharin's Imperialism and Vforld Economy 
was the antecessor to Lenin's Imperialism by a year. The
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essential theoretical perspective of Bukharin's book (and 
other of his contemporaneous works) will seem familiar in 
the course of a review of the early Comintern line in the 
next section of this text. Indeed, Bukharin's direct organi­
zational ties to the International are evidenced by the not 
infrequent word-for-word similarity between early Comintern 
resolutions and Bukharin publications. The further evolution 
of the Third International's outlook, however, will reveal 
how the unelaborated (Leninist) notion of capitalist 'rot­
tenness' first came to be integrated into the Comintern 
theory, and ultimately allowed the substitution of an under- 
consuraptionist for a disproportionality perspective. The 
following analysis of Bukharin's theory of capitalism will 
show that the notion of 'rottenness* is absent in his work, 
and that its eventual appearance in the Comintern's stated 
view must be attributed to its transposition from Lenin's 
theory.
The general thrust of Bukharin’s theory of imperialism 
was identical to Lenin's: imperialism is the 'necessary' 
(rather than merely 'preferred') policy of finance capital 
because imperialism is a definite stage in the development 
of capitalism. In a few respects, however, Bukharin's analy­
sis was more coherent and developed than Lenin's.
Bukharin began with the claim that the phenomenon of 
imperialism must be conceptualized at the level of world 
economy, aa an aspect of international production relations. 
The international exchange of commodities is not the deter­
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minant, but the outward expression or indication of these 
relations:
The example of the commodity market shows that behind 
the market relations are hidden production relations. Any 
connection between producers who meet in the process of 
exchange presupposes the individual labors of the produc­
ers having already become elements of the combined labor 
of the social whole. Thus production is hidden behind 
exchange, production relations are hidden behind exchange 
relations.... [W]e may define world economy as a_ system 
of production relations and, correspondingly, of exchange 
relations on a world scale. [36~]
In a rather modern sounding discussion, Bukharin goes on to
detail the effects of the international movement of labor
power (both permanent migration and the gastarbeiter phenom­
enon) "as one of the poles of capitalist relations," and the
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international flow of capital as the other "pole."
At the "national" level, the processes of centraliza­
tion and concentration cause the average unit of capital to 
grow larger. Ultimately, colossal corporations are increas­
ingly able to gauge demand, ’plan* production through the 
vertical integration of their operations, and at times even 
restrict output in order to maintain selling prices above 
prices of production (the latter strategy becomes all the 
more viable with the formation of trusts and cartels). In 
turn, however, these immense units of industrial capital 
ever more regularly require equally immense injections of 
finance to carry on their activities (not only production 
activities of course— access to finance is the principal 
lever in the process of centralization). The transformation 
"of banking capital... into industrial capital (by financing 
industrial enterprises)...thus forms a special category:
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finance capital." At the national level, therefore, pro­
duction exhibits increasing "rationality" in the sense of
being somewhat ’planned’, and less and less resembles cora-
39
modity production.
The entire process... tends to turn the entire 'nation­
al' economy into a single combined enterprise with an 
organization connection between all the branches of pro­
duction. [403
Increased rationality at the "national" level, however, 
could not eliminate capitalism’s recurring crises. Indeed, 
economic disruptions would assume even more enlarged dimen­
sions as the anarchy inherent in capitalist economy became
41
"reproduced" on the world level.
At this juncture, it is important to sort out Lenin's 
and Bukharin's arguments, since they not only appear to be 
similar, but also similarly ambiguous. In particular, they 
both suggest that the (at least partial) regulatory poten­
tial of the monopolies in actuality intensifies crises. The 
ambiguity: if planlessness is the chief cause of crises, why 
does 'a little planning' make the crises worse?
Naturally, this is not at all, in and of itself, an 
untenable position, but it does require some explanation. 
Lenin's two suggestive indications, as argued above, were 
inadequate at best and for that reason the ambiguity in his 
work remains. Bukharin's discussion is rendered more co­
herent than Lenin's by his systematic integration of the
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role of the capitalist state into the analysis.
Bukharin's work has been frequently, and appropriately, 
criticized for its "tendency to absolutise state power and
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treat the state as an all-embracing, omnipotent organization
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which embodies the collective will of capital." Anthony
Brewer is one of the few writers, however, to point out also
the virtue of Bukharin's efforts: in an era which perhaps
heralded the view (or at least the implication) that the
nation-state had been transcended (Kautsky), Bukharin was
one of the few who steadfastly posed the theoretical problem
of the strengthening of the bourgeois national state and its
'economic* role during a time of pronounced internationali-
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zation of capital. The passage of more than half a century 
has not diminished the validity of this insight, despite 
ongoing proclamations that the 'end of sovereignty* is at 
hand.
For Bukharin, the corollary of ever larger units of 
capital at the national level was a mutation in the 'econom­
ic* functions of the bourgeois state. Insofar as individual 
capitals become major actors at the national level, they 
seek to use the executive, legislative, and judicial appara­
tus of 'their' government to advantage in the struggle 
against other domestic capitals. This was of course nothing 
so terribly new, but as individual capitals (or blocs of 
capitals) more and more conducted their operations "with a 
view towards world economy," they also increasingly felt an
imperative to cultivate an alliance with the state in its
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foreign economic policy.
The processes of concentration and centralization, for 
Bukharin, imply a narrowing of the class of 'large' capital­
ists. Combined with the new forms of industrial organiza­
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tion, the trend becomes one of an increasing monolithicity, 
with the coalescence of the various fractions of the bour­
geoisie into a tight bloc of finance capital. All of this, 
together with the growing economic significance of the state 
power, heralds a change in the "inner structure” of the
state, which "becomes more than ever before an 'executive
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committee of the ruling classes'." In 1920, Bukharin ex­
pressed similar ideas in the following way:
The capitalist 'national economy* has changed from an 
Irrational system into a rational organization, from a 
non-subject economy into an economic subject. This trans­
formation has been made posible by the growth of finance 
capitalism and the cohesion between the economic and 
political organizations of the bourgeoisie.[47]
The result, according to Bukharin, is that "a growing
discord" appears between the
world-wide... basis of social economy and the peculiar 
class structure of society, a structure where the ruling 
class (the bourgeoisie) itself is split into 'national* 
groups with contradictory economic interests... competing 
among themselves for the division of the surplus value 
created on a world scale.[48]
This form of the 'forces-relations' contradiction, 
coupled with the new economic significance of the state, 
means that
competition reaches the highest, last conceivable state 
of development.... Competition is reduced to a minimum 
within the boundaries of 'national* economies, only to 
flare up in colossal proportions [at the global 
level].[49]
The competitive struggle is 'settled*, and at the same time
the conditions for its resumption (relations of inequality




Like Lenin, Bukharin could be interpreted as an under-
consumptionist because he explains the export of capital by
reference to a relative ’'overproduction" of capital. The
first mention of overproduction in Bukharin's book, however,
refers not to an excess of ’capital’ (means of production),
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but to the overproduction of commodities of all types. A 
true overproduction/underconsumption theory is one which 
regards the system as incapable of generating (or 'releas­
ing') sufficient buying power, in the aggregate, to realize 
the entire output at its full value. Since Bukharin does not 
restrict himself to a particular type of commodity, it is 
tempting to interpret his argument as suggestive of general 
overproduction and to reject his own oft-repeated affirma­
tions of adherence to a disproportionality theory of crisis.
This, however, would be an incorrect assessment. Rather 
than proceeding from an argument couched at the level of the 
social capital (i_.e. , the only level at which, as Rosa 
Luxemburg correctly saw, an overproduction/underconsumption 
theory can be coherently constructed), Bukharin quite unam­
biguously derives his 'overproduction' scenario from an 
analysis of the behavior of individual capitals in the 
process of self-expansion.
In its struggle to amass surplus value, says Bukharin, 
each capital seeks to drive its individual unit costs of 
production below those of its rivals (the struggle for 
surplus or 'super' profits) and to increase the number of 
units sold as rapidly as is feasible (both by securing new 
markets and by conquering a larger market share). Naturally,
200
cost reduction is also the iuost powerful weapon in the 
struggle for markets, as it allows the cost-cutting capital 
to undersell its adversaries. Fully in line with Marxian 
theory, Bukharin explains the declining unit costs of pro­
duction in terms of a falling labor content stemming from 
mechanization and innovation. New and more mechanized pro­
duction techniques, according to Bukharin, typically involve
an expanded scale of operations and correspondingly high(er)
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levels of output. The ’overproduction* which appears as a 
result of the pell-mell expansion of capacity in the various 
branches of production is a relative overproduction, i_.«5. , 
the unplanned, anarchic character of the expansion means 
that the output of some branches outruns the prevailing 
social demand for their output. True enough, this is 'over­
production', but it is overproduction stemming from dispro­
portionali ty , not from a lack of purchasing power in the 
aggregate.
This interpretation of Bukharin's argument is bolstered 
by context: Bukharin produced the discussion not as part of 
a theory of crisis, but as the explanation of capital's 
constant striving to expand into new regions and nations in 
order to capture new markets at the expense of rivals. Any 
individual capital benefits from international expansion 
first by being able to maintain a higher volume of sales 
than on the domestic market alone, and apart from any in­
trinsic advantages of growth in the course of the competi­
tive struggle, a high level of sales also allows the suc­
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cessful capital to reap the full benefits of the 'economies
of scale' that the most advanced (high organic composition)
production techniques possess. Second, expansion abroad
allows a capital to capture surplus profits in countries
where methods of production are less advanced (where the
individual value of a unit of output produced by a domestic
capital exceeds the individual value of the importing capi-
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tal's production).
The export of capital (as distinguished from merely 
foreign trade) is explained by Bukharin later in the book as 
the further, more developed, outcome of the same inherent 
tendencies of capital. As national capitals secure the as­
sistance of ’their* governments by obtaining tariff and 
other protection against the import of commodities produced 
by competing capitals in other nations, the process of 
international expansion detailed above encounters 
impediments.
[H]igh tariffs put tremendous obstacles in the way of 
commodities seeking to enter a foreign country. Mass 
production and mass overproduction make foreign trade 
necessary, but foreign trade meets with a barrier in the 
form of high tariffs.[54]
Hence the export of capital, which permits capitals to jump 
over protectionist barriers to trade by directly establish­
ing production facilities in foreign countries.
Nonetheless, although both the export of commodities 
and the export of capital necessarily arise from the self­
expansion of capital, neither is the result of an impos­
sibility of realizing the product domestically, as Luxemburg 
maintained. "[N]ot the impossibility of doing business at
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home, but the race for higher rates of profit is the motive
power of world capitalism. Even present day ’capitalist
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plethora’ is no absolute limit." An even more clearcut
distance from Luxemburg was taken by Bukharin in 1924. At
that time he wrote that "a conflict between production and
consumption...is nothing other than a crisis," but that
these "[c]rises stem from the disproportion of social pro- 
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duction." And further: "Rosa Luxemburg’s theory of col­
lapse is simply false.... The whole ’collapse* clearly rests
on the impossibility of realization within the framework of
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a ’pure capitalism', i_ ,e. , on a false theory."
In short, Bukharin is no more an underconsuraptionist 
than Lenin. Moreover, Bukharin provided a more coherent and 
logical disproportionality theory of crisis and imperialism 
than Lenin's. Most significantly from the standpoint of an 
analysis of the development of Comintern theory, however, 
Bukharin's conceptual framework could not be metamorphosed 
into an underconsuraption-based view of a ’moribund’ capital­
ism because Bukharin’s work lacked the incohesive yet vivid 
imagery of 'decay' so strikingly evident in Lenin's writing.
* * *
Perhaps the best representative of the underconsump- 
tionist strand in Comintern thinking, as Richard Day has 
correctly argued, was Eugen Varga. An extremely prolific 
writer, Varga continued to be intellectually active up to 
his death in 1964 at the age of eighty-five. The question 
(or rather, the problem) of "purchasing power" was central
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to Varga's analysis of capitalism from the start. In the 
early post-war years he argued that even though capitalism 
in the United States was extraordinarily productive, it had 
managed to avoid an economic crisis in the years 1918-1919 
only by virtue of exports to Europe. As a consequence of the 
war, however, the European nations had been "...economically 
weakened and deprived of purchasing power," with the result 
that European markets for U.S. goods dried up quickly, by 
the spring of 1920. It was this "...decrease of the purchas­
ing capacities of [the European] countries in respect to the
United States [that] called forth an overproduction crisis
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which had been looming even some time before...."
In a contemporaneous article, Varga stated that "[d]ur- 
ing the war, expenditures on goods far exceeded new produc­
tion." This real expenditure (in both senses of the word) on 
arms, etc., was "veiled" by the creation of vast sums of 
"fictitious capital" (whose origins were government spending
and unbacked issues of paper currency, according to 
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Varga). Illusory wealth masked a deepening real "impover­
ishment" insofar as the war effort soaked up not only exist­
ing stocks of goods but also dealt a "setback to the mate­
rial basis of productivity," through the neglect of agricul­
ture, transport, and the maintenance of means of production. 
This became simultaneously the explanation of inflation 
(higher nominal incomes, reduced quantity of real non- 
military output), and the irresolvable difficulty of post­
war capitalism: the impoverished working class requires at 
minimum a return to pre-war living standards, but the di­
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minished productive capacity of Europe makes this impossible 
without a prior "real accumulation" of new means of produc­
tion. The latter is itself impossible, even in the unlikely 
event that capitalists would for a time be willing to forego 
profits: despite the very low real wages, productivity is
itself so low that there is no basis for a real surplus
60
("keinen realen Ueberschuss").
For Varga, this analysis appeared to demonstrate the
"disintegration of capitalist economy" in central Europe,
and allowed three conclusions: (i) the European economies
will become ever more dependent on the English and American,
(ii) within Europe, victorious France and Italy will seek to
"exploit" the defeated nations through capital export, and
(ill) the agrarian nations of eastern Europe will experience
a windfall due to the inflated prices of foodstuffs. The
upshot is that the proletariat will increasingly come to
realize that a resolution of the crisis "is impossible on a
capitalist basis" and will therefore "throng the revolution- 
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ary path."
The strands of thought in these two early articles were
soon joined by Varga to form the judgement that the "direct
economic consequences of the war were the separation of the
world into spheres of relative over-production and absolute
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under-production." But this ad hoc synthesis was merely 
the short-lived prelude to Varga's adoption of a classic 
underconsumption position. Having argued ca. 1921 that the 
European economies suffered primarily from a low productive
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capacity and an inability to generate a significant surplus 
(which was reasonable, and perfectly compatible with the 
view that Europe also did not constitute a viable market for 
U.S. products), by 1925 Varga was saying something rather 
different, and claimed to see "a gaping contradiction be­
tween the production and realization possibilities of West 
European industries" which has been exacerbated by the proc­
ess of centralization, specifically by the productivity 
enhancing potential of such "re-organization." The potential 
output of industry is very high,
[bjut there are no possibilities of disposing of its 
products. As a result of the proceeding centralization 
process, the low wages and the severe unemployment, the 
inner market has little absorption power for mass con­
sumption commodities.... Hence a large part of the indus­
trial productive apparatus stands idle and there is wide­
spread unemployment— not only as a crisis phase but as a 
permanent phenomenon.[63]
In other words, by 1925 the European productive apparatus 
was capable (in 1921 it was not) of producing a considerable 
amount, but this capacity was not being put to use because 
there was no evident demand for the output. In 1921 low real 
wages were, for Varga, the consequence of industrial disar­
ray, but by 1925 they had become the cause of an "idle 
productive apparatus."
Varga himself does not specifically invoke any develop­
ments in European economy that account for the transition to 
his new outlook, which sugests the possibility that he was 
not particularly aware of it (the transition), but none of 
this has been presented as necessary evidence of some sort 
of lapse or contradiction in his reasoning. A consistent
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underconsumption!st view could certainly allow for wartime 
devastation as a cause of diminished productive capacity, 
and then conjure an injection of products and demand from 
’outside' as the explanation for reconstruction. Varga's 
article on the U.S.-English inspired Dawes Plan for resched­
uling German war reparations payments (more on the Plan in 
the following section) came close to providing such a ra­
tionale. Varga wrote:
Since the acceptance of the Dawes Plan Germany has 
obtained considerable foreign credits.... This means, 
therefore, that the market possibilities of the other 
part of the world in Germany were increased to the same 
amount....
[This has resulted in] a pulling of the German economy 
and increased purchase of foreign goods by Germany. It 
goes without saying that this cannot last. The turning 
point must inevitably come in the near future. When 
Germany will have spent the first credits it will have to 
pay interest on the credits which it obtains and to remit 
the reparation payments provided for in the Dawes 
Plan.... When the time for this turning point will have 
come,...[iInstead of absorbing a surplus of goods from 
the world market, Germany will throw a surplus of goods 
on to the world market and will thereby make the crisis 
of the West European industrial countries and the unem­
ployment connected with it more acute.[64]
As just noted, the aim up to now was not so much to 
assess the strengths or weaknesses of Varga's thinking in 
particular or underconsumption theories generally. Rather, 
the point has been to demonstrate Varga's clear adoption of 
the underconsumption perspective in order to now proceed 
with a discussion of the manner in which the two preeminent 
Comintern economic theoreticians--Bukharin and Varga—  
employed their respective theoretical systems to comprehend 
the phenomenon of the "stabilization of capitalism" during 
the mid 1920s. In this discussion, it will be argued that
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the underconsuraption approach provided a theoretically less 
satisfactory (at least from the standpoint of Marxism) ex­
planation of capitalist stabilization, although in many 
respects it possessed an intuitive appeal due to its ap­
parent correspondence with several highly visible economic 
* facts T .
* * *
The slow and painful restoration of the European econo­
mies in the early 1920s naturally made its impression on 
Comintern theoreticians. At the third congress (June 1921) 
Trotsky delivered a speech on the economic situation which 
departed somewhat from his earlier assessments of capital­
ism’s immediate prospects. Rather than "disintegration and 
collapse" (1919), Trotsky now held out the possibility of a 
cyclical upturn and linked the brief postwar boom to the 
growth in the "self-assurance" of the bourgeoisie. Nonethe­
less, Trotsky considered it premature to see in this the
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restoration of a capitalist "equilibrium.11 The war had 
impoverished Europe, even Great Britain, and had shifted to 
the United States the role of leader of the capitalist 
world. Still, the 1920 economic crisis which followed the 
speculative postwar boom had its origins in the U.S. (and
Japan), "precisely in those countries which were on the
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upgrade and not in decline in the recent period."
The symptoms of the crisis were considered by Trotsky 
to be its causes as well: "America's productive capacity has 
grown extraordinarily, but her market has vanished because 
Europe is impoverished and can no longer buy American
208
67
goods." Trotsky integrated this explanation of the proxi­
mate causes of the crisis with what would soon become his 
trademark— the theory of the supposed 'long waves' in capi­
talist development. According to this view, the developed 
capitalist economies had recently entered a downward phase 
of the 'long wave', which meant that while cyclical upturns 
were not ruled out, it could be expected that they would be
"fleeting, superficial and speculative," whereas downturns
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would be of a "prolonged character." The conclusion is
that the bourgeoisie will not find it possible to restore
"equilibrium," that "both the world situation and the future
perspectives are profoundly revolutionary in character,"
that "a new upswing...can by no means act as a check upon
the revolutionary development," although "full guarantees
can be given only by our expert tactics, by our strong 
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organization."
Approximately a year and a half later, speaking to a
Moscow party meeting in October 1922, Trotsky was less
ambivalent. Rather than possibility, the upturn was now
fact. Trotsky recalled a "chance remark" he uttered at the
third congress "to the effect that this [i,.£. , 1920— N.K.]
crisis, like every other crisis, is bound to be superseded
by a revival" and then, characteristically, chided those who
failed to perceive the significance of the prognostica- 
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tion. The upturn was, however, cyclical and temporary,
"not some kind of blossoming of capitalism, of which, as­
suredly, there cannot even be talk" because the general
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"epoch" was one of "capitalist decline."
The characterization of the economic revival as a "sta­
bilization of capitalism" was first provided by Bukharin at 
the thirteenth congress of the RCP(b) in Hay 1924. He deliv­
ered a wide-ranging report on recent changes in the world 
economy, the international political situation and, as an 
official liaison, developments in the Comintern. Contrasting 
the levelling off in the brief economic upturn which had 
followed the postwar recession in the United States with a 
"relative" (but nonetheless "clearly defined") improvement 
in European economic activity, Bukharin claimed that
the present crisis is a general crisis of the capitalist 
system, but not a conventional commercial crisis charac­
teristic of the normal course of capitalism. It reveals 
itself quite frequently, and at times unevenly, from 
different sides. Undeniably, in a whole host of countries 
a rise in the economic conjuncture is underway, but this 
creeping crisis is penetrating into the pores of their 
political organisms.[72]
Note that while he correctly ascribes to Bukharin use of the 
expression "a certain stabilization" to describe the Euro­
pean conjuncture, Richard Day cannot resist this misleading 
elaboration: "Generalizing his analysis, Bukharin argued
that capitalism had entered an equilibrium phase, which most
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Marxists had hitherto thought of as stagnation." Now, it 
should hardly be surprising that Bukharin, comparing 1919- 
1920 (even 1923) with 1924, should refer to "a certain 
stabilization" of the economic situation in Europe— mere 
"stagnation" was an improvement. Bukharin, however, never 
referred to an "equilibrium," and in fact the passage quoted 
above suggests something altogether different. Day's inter­
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pretation actually rests on a subtle but crucial distortion. 
Consider the quite different impressions conveyed by Bukha- 
rin's own words, quoted above, and the paraphrased rendi­
tion offered by Day: "Bukharin had proclaimed that the
'general crisis of the capitalist system', although con-
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tinuing, had become a 'creeping crisis’." In any event, 
the ability of capitalism to survive would entail, said 
Bukharin, defeat of and/or concessions by the working class 
(although Bukharin at this time also favorably cited Varga, 
whose own explanation of the stabilization suggested an 
illusory accumulation of wealth accomplished through specu­
lative forms of centralization). Nota bene: under these 
conditions of "stabilization," Bukharin foresaw an "inevi­
table ... sharpening of the class struggle," not 'equilibrium'
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or a harmonization of relations.
At the fifth congress of the Comintern In June 1924 
Varga delivered the report on the economic situation, and 
made no reference to capitalist stabilization. Having de­
fined "crisis" as a period characterized by intensified (but 
unspecified) "contradictions of capitalist society," stag­
nating or declining production, stagnating or declining 
working class living standards and therefore "the objective 
possibility of successful struggle for power," Varga went on 
to argue that the capitalist world was in crisis, and that a 
yet further deterioration could be expected. The economic 
improvements in the United States and France were character­
ized by Varga as "isolated" and "special," since the general 
trend was that of "the decay of capitalist world economy."
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And finally, Varga expressed skepticism concerning the via­
bility of the Dawes Plan in terns similar to those already
7G
encountered above.
Even so, delegates from the left (.e.g, . Dengel of 
Germany) objected that Varga's prognosis was overly favor­
able for capitalism, and that "Varga adopts the opinions of
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the English press...." Responding to the discussion, Varga 
did speak of "a tendency towards strengthening capital­
ism,..." all the while insisting that "I do not mean to say 
that such a prospect of capitalism recovering exists; but
what we must fight is the attitude that if such a prospect
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does exist, it is dangerous to speak of it." Zinoviev, 
without adopting any explicit theoretical orientation, de­
fended Varga's remarks by saying
that we must handle the term 'collapse of capitalism* 
very carefully.... We must remember that even in Germany, 
notwithstanding the many symptoms of the decline and 
disruption of capitalism, we have also certain symptoms 
of its consolidation....
The situation is very complicated, and it is not 
Varga's fault that certain symptoms of the strengthening 
of capitalism exist.[793
Zinoviev equivocated by concluding that either "capitalism
may vegetate for a comparatively long period, [or]...that a
more rapid development of events are speeding up the col-
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lapse of capitalism...."
Bukharin was quite visible at the congress, but prima­
rily confined himself to reporting on and discussing the 
drawing up of a Comintern Programme. He did, however, make a 
few passing comments on crisis theory, in one place noting 
that "the creation of trusts does not prevent crises," and
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in another offering this observation:
As you know, a theoretical discussion on the theory of 
crises is going on in Marxist circles. There are two 
formulas which are fundamentally different (dispropor- 
tionality and underconsumption). We must have a formula 
which will express the contradiction between production 
and consumption a£ a component part of the anarchy of 
production. I will deal with this more fully on another 
occasion.[81]
Although Bukharin provided the first mention of "stabi­
lization," he had done so at the thirteenth Russian party 
congress— the first Comintern reference to a "stabilization 
of capitalism" was apparently by Varga at the fifth enlarged 
plenum of the ECCI in March 1925 (almost a year after both
the Russian party congress and the fifth Comintern cong- 
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ress). Only a few months later, however, Varga was already 
changing his mind, and in a presentation to a meeting of 
Gosplan workers at the end of May he suggested that stabili­
zation is "neither a Marxist nor a Leninist term; in addi-
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tion I consider it to be a poorly chosen term." Beginning 
with the claim that the centralization of capital was not 
’really' accumulation because surplus value was employed to 
expropriate weaker capitalists rather than enlarge produc­
tion, Varga asked how it might be possible to establish 
empirically whether 'genuine' accumulation or merely para­
sitic centralization was taking place. He immediately re­
jected value analysis (bourgeois statistics were inade­
quate); next, Varga considered the use of data on the in­
stallation of new means of production, but found that this 
might not count as accumulation either in the event that the 
subsequent output "cannot find a market." Varga finally
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settled on growth of output in physical terms as the most
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adequate index of accumulation. He presented series for 
several important commodities for the years 1900, 1913, and
1924 which, with few exceptions (petroleum and rubber), 
showed stagnant levels of output in 1924 relative to 1913, 
by contrast with rapid increases in all series between 1900 
and 1913. "All my research points to the impossibility of 
showing a definitive rise in output," concluded Varga, and 
while he left open the possibility that the 1923-1924 con­
juncture was merely a cyclical downturn, he immediately
added that the situation in 1925 had deteriorated even
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further. Finally, Varga suggested that "permanent unem­
ployment" was a new feature of capitalism, and concluded 
that "Lenin, ten years ago, considered imperialism decaying.
I see no reason to offer a brighter prognosis for capi-
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talism."
So having introduced the notion of "stabilization" to 
the Comintern, Varga almost immediately abandoned it. 
Bukharin, however, maintained and continued to develop the 
argument that a conjunctural stabilization of capitalism was 
at hand. For most commentators, this appears as the logical 
analog of Bukharin's supposed role as the spokesperson of 
the 'right* in the Russian party, .e., moderation in domes­
tic politics coupled with a repudiation of the cataclysmic 
vision of capitalist collapse. In most such interpretations 
(a comprehensive listing follows shortly), it is generally 
presumed that "[w]hile Bukharin pondered the achievements of
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'organized capitalism', Stalin predicted that '"recovery"
contains within itself the germs of its inherent weakness
87
and disintegration'." Supposedly, Stalin issued Varga
”[a]n implicit directive... to demonstrate that the 'problem
of markets’ [i_.<9., purchasing power— N.K.] would lead to the
third period" characterized by "wars, revolutions, and eco-
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nomic collapse."
The two principal contentions in this judgement are
simply wrong. First, the notion that it was necessary for
Stalin to urge on Varga, much less to issue an "implicit
directive," in predicting the economic demise of capitalism
is not convincing. Long before anyone began to take notice
of Stalin, Varga had already been publishing books and
articles "all of which could have carried the same title as
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his first book, The Decline of Capitalism." (Moreover, 
Varga's resort to underconsumptionist explanations of capi­
talism's decline long predates any hint of similar thinking
90
on Stalin's part). Even at the fifth Comintern congress,
with Varga at his most cautious, there was no indication
that he regarded a 'real' recovery as possible, or that he
saw the upturns then underway in a few countries as anything
91
other than "special" or exceptional. E.H. Carr surmises 
that at the time of the fifth congress Varga may not have 
genuinely believed that the capitalist world was in such 
dire straights as his own report suggested, and that the 
report may have been "a compromise between Varga's profes­
sional conscience and the need for a revolutionary platform
92
which would satisfy the Left." This may, of course, be
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true. I will not venture to speculate on Varga's state of 
mind, although I have no objection to Carr's doing so. The 
point remains that this 'Left* pressure had been brought to 
bear on Varga long before any conceivable "implicit direc­
tives" b£ Stalin, supposedly decreeing the third period, 
could have made themselves felt.
Secondly, the supposition that contradictions internal
to the process of stabilization operate to undermine it does
not originate with Stalin, but with Bukharin. In his first
tentative mention of stabilization (see above), Bukharin had
noted primarily political contradictions of stabilization—
capitalism could not be stabilized without a defeat of or
concessions by the working class, so that the consequence of
developing stabilization would be, as already noted, an
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"inevitable... sharpening of the class struggle." Subse­
quent analyses of stabilization refer to the economic as­
pects of contradictions as well. The common element in 
failures to understand Bukharin's notion of stabilization 
(and I do not deny that Bukharin's continued use of the 
poorly chosen term contributed to clouding the issues) is 
the refusal or inability to see that Bukharin was almost 
certainly using 'stabilization' to refer only to the resump­
tion of expanded reproduction in some of the capitalist 
countries after the chaos of the war and the immediate 
postwar period. There is no specific evidence in Bukharin's 
own writings or speeches that he imagined the process of 
stabilization to imply either a slackening of the contradic-
2 1 3
tions of capitalism or a new era of unbridled prosperity as 
envisioned by social democratic thinkers.
Now, it _i£5 true that for Stalin as well capitalist 
stabilization was being undermined, but he expressed this 
primarily in terms of the development of the ’other' stabi­
lization, i . , that taking place in the Soviet Union. In 
May 1925, shortly after the fifth enlarged plenum of the 
ECCI and Varga's introduction of stabilization to the Comin­
tern, Stalin delivered a report to the Moscow party organi­
zation on the work of the fourteenth conference of the 
RCP(b). Stalin opened the discussion of the international 
situation by noting first a "lull" and then an "ebb" in the 
revolutionary process. This development did not at all sig­
nify, said Stalin, that the revolution has been "cancelled," 
because
we have not only the stabilization of capitalism; we also 
have the stabilization of the Soviet system. Thus, we 
have two stabilizations....
Who will win? That is the essence of the question. Why 
are there two stabilizations, one parallel with the 
other? Why are there two poles?.... Because the world has 
split into two camps.... Because the international situa­
tion will be to an increasing degree determined by the 
relation of forces between these two camps.[94]
These are not just different modes of expression, but re­
flections of quite divergent theoretical approaches. In the 
next section, a review of the concrete political and econom­
ic material will reveal that in the 1920s Stalin advocated a 
politics that was both 'traditional' (international give- 
and-take diplomacy 'from above' rather than mass mobiliza­
tion) and cautious. Pressure from the left was building in 
the middle part of the decade, and Stalin ultimately acqui­
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esced, but the turn to the left cane despite Stalin, not 
because of him. This conclusion does not, of course, imply 
that the particular forms assumed by the politics of the 
third period owed nothing to Stalin. Moreover, the intent 
here is neither to absolve Stalin of any errors nor to 
suggest that no errors were made. At the same time, however, 
it might be interjected that from the theory that class 
struggle is the motive force of history it does not neces­
sarily follow that proletarian political objectives (at 
least tactical ones) are only attainable through a poltics 
which is directly class (mass) based. Stalin's resort to 
'traditional* international diplomacy, therefore, did not by 
definition preclude (as frequently seems to be assumed) 
internationalist outcomes.
From the outset, Bukharin was careful to distinguish 
his understanding of stabilization from that of the Second 
International. In June 1925, speaking to a Komsomol (the 
Russian communist youth organization) conference, Bukharin 
attributed to the *Hilferding-Menshevik* conception of sta­
bilization the view that
a new cycle of sounder capitalist development is begin­
ning. In the most important capitalist countries, things 
are again running on smooth lines,...the curve of capi­
talist development is ascending and capitalism is as­
suming new forms.[95]
By contrast, according to Bukharin, the Marxist understand­
ing of stabilization meant "only...that in the course of 
this epoch [the epoch of general capitalist decline— N.K.] 
there will be periods of ebb and flow, periods of decay and
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periods of expansion of capitalism." The general thrust of 
Bukharin's discussion incorporated the views that capitalist 
development will be cyclical even in the "epoch" of its 
demise (similar to Trotsky’s contemporaneous opinions), that 
any upturns would be of a temporary nature, and that the 
cyclical expansions would be "variegated," _i.e., neither 
universal nor uniform across regions or countries. One other 
basic difference between the social democratic and the Marx­
ist conceptions of stabilization was stressed by Bukharin: 
in the Marxist view, stabilization did not imply the waning 
of inter-imperialist rivalries (indeed, the likelihood of 
inter-imperialist war was on the rise) and did not mitigate 
the imperialist threat facing the Soviet Union.
Sounding similar themes in his opening speech at the
fifteenth conference of the Russian party in October 1926,
Bukharin noted that pre-war levels of output had been by and
large restored in the capitalist world as a whole, but that
within this average striking imbalances (<3 .g., as between
Europe and the U.S.A., or within Europe itself) remained.
Such unequal development had "already existed during the
normal period of capitalist development, but it has now...
increased to an extent entirely unknown before the war."
This implied that rather than abstract formulas regarding a
'stabilization in general', a "differentiated definition" of
stabilization was required, one that analyzed the particu-
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larities and concrete differences between regions.
It was an error to believe, continued Bukharin, that 
the restoration of pre-war levels of production signalled
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the resumption of "normal” capitalist development with its 
"usual" cycles and crises— rather, a special analysis was 
called for to understand the "unique crisis" of postwar 
capitalism. Specifically, relatively slow rates of accumula­
tion (coupled with grossly depressed working class living 
standards) meant that market creation was not proceeding 
apace, and that consequently "the problem of finding markets 
has become the main question for the capitalist world of 
today." The struggle for markets in turn implied even more 
intense pressures to reduce costs of production— hence the 
"process of capitalist rationalization." Rationalization 
would entail efforts to cudgel the working class into fur­
ther submission, the development of new (more intensive) 
forms of labor organization, and the introduction of new 
productive technologies. Bukharin particularly lamented the 
reluctance of many comrades to acknowledge that technologi­
cal change was taking place— as opposed to merely the a la. 
Taylor reorganization or more intensive use of existing
technologies--and catalogued a list of innovations in coal,
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steel, potash, and chemical production.
Bukharin's associates were kept busy turning out ar­
ticles to buttress the case. C.H. Wurm depicted 1926 as "The 
Year of Rationalization in Germany," and like Bukharin con­
tended that the "working class is beginning to understand
that the struggle against the effects of capitalist ration-
99
alization is necessary and inevitable." V. Demar likewise 
interpreted the Comintern line as urging intensification and
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radicalization of political activity, but expressed concern
100
over the apparent political lethargy of the unemployed.
Heckert, by contrast, took note of a spate of strikes at the
Hamburg docks and thought he detected in this a rising tide
101
of working class activism.
A critical juncture in the development of the analysis 
of stabilization and the deduction of political conclusions 
took place in November 1926 at the seventh enlarged plenum 
of the ECCI. Bukharin delivered keynote written and spoken 
reports which, besides repeating his now familiar injunc­
tions on the need for a differentiated, concrete analysis of 
stabilization, ridiculed the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition for 
their confusion. Leaving aside whatever shortcomings or 
strengths the already defeated opposition’s arguments may 
have revealed, and taking note of Bukharin's more comprehen­
sive and organized discourse as compared to his earlier 
somewhat casual presentations, the (in retrospect) most 
striking aspect of the report is Bukharin’s extraordinary 
failure or inability to clearly demarcate his views from 
those of the underconsumptionist approach.
Bukharin began with the well-founded proposition that 
the distended unproductive consumption of the war effort, 
while producing ’growth' for a period of time, ultimately 
acted as a "brake" on the process of accumulation, and in 
turn, market creation. As Bukharin pointed out, this was 
essentially a reiteration of his opposition to the "incor­
rect theoretical conceptions of Rosa Luxemburg, who...re­
garded militarism as a form of capitalistic accumula-
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tion...." At the same time, however, this framework pro­
vided a plausible explanation of the economic relations 
within Europe ("Balkanization") and between Europe and the 
U.S.A (the former suffering a considerable setback relative 
to the latter).
Bukharin moved on to specify the "unique" nature of the 
European situation in the mid-1920s. In the course of the 
"'normal1 crises of capitalist over-production....which 
Marx, it will be remembered, connected with the investment 
of basic capital" [_i , disproportionality— N.K.], the
unfolding of the "disproportion between production and con­
sumption" took place "on the basis of the upward curve of 
capitalist development." The disproportion of the 1920s, 
which likewise found its expression in 'overproduction', was 
nonetheless fundamentally different In that its roots ex­
tended to "the shortage crises of under-production and un­
derconsumption of the war epoch," _i.e. , to the breakdown of
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accumulation engendered by the war. (Bukharin's 1920
references to war-induced "expanded negative reproduction"
and its effects in his The Economics of the Transition
Period therefore very clearly and consistently prefigure the
104
1926 analysis). Empirically, the "unique" character of 
the crisis was expressed by "the absence of a regular peri­
odical trend of the...economic situation [and by] the fever­
ish curve on the economic chart...." The conclusion follows




The contrast between Bukharin's approach and the under- 
consumptionist perspective of Varga was rarely more apparent 
or nore overlooked than in Varga’s comments at the plenum. 
Varga, like Bukharin, specified a crisis of "overproduc­
tion," but added for good measure "a chronic mass unemploy­
ment, a chronic shutting down of the means of production." 
Although Varga listed several postwar "structural changes" 
(the emergence of the Soviet Union, the intensification of 
colonial struggles for national liberation, and the economic 
decline of Western Europe) which led the 1920s overproduc­
tion crisis to display some specific features, its ultimate 
causes stemmed from a tendency to underconsumption "always" 
present under capitalism, one which "results from two basic 
facts that are inseparably bound up with capitalism." These 
"facts" were (i) the continual 'striving* of the capitalist 
class to increase the rate of surplus value, "whereby the 
purchasing power of the proletariat is weakened," and which 
comes into conflict with (ii), the tendency (forced by
"competition") to increase "productive capacity" without 
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limit.
The presentation of Bukharin, said Varga, had provided 
"explanations which are inadequate because they establish 
only the fact [of overproduction— N.K.] without providing a 
class-based explanation of the narrowing of the domestic 
market." Such a "class-based explanation" would center, 
continued Varga, on the two facts listed above while at the 
same time incorporating the 'special features' of the post­
war situation, these being the reduction of effective demand
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stemming from the expropriation of the petty bourgeoisie and 
small capitalists due to inflation, and the virtual disap­
pearance of the rentier from the European scene. It was this 
argument, according to Varga, which distinguished the Marx­
ist from the social democratic analysis of overproduction. 
The social democrats "stupidly" suggested that the problem 
be resolved by raising wages, which the capitalists would 
never agree to; even if they did, and the "wage increase was 
linked to an increase in productivity of the work force [why
this would necessarily be so was not explained--!!.K.], one
107
would not escape the vicious circle."
As noted, it is remarkable that Bukharin either kept 
silent or took no notice of the gulf separating these con­
ceptions. In his reply to the discussion of his speech, 
Bukharin did not address Varga's remarks, and indeed men­
tioned Varga's name only once (as someone familiar with the 
difficulties of compiling data on international trade).
Apart from a rather inconclusive digression on the need to 
distinguish the value of the means of production from their 
material-technical aspect, and a reply to V. Lominadze, who 
had suggested the logical impossibility of overproduction 
becuse idled machinery was tantamount to no machinery at all 
(i^«3., it should not be counted as part of the "productive
apparatus"), Bukharin had little to say on the theoretical
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aspects of the stabilization question.
It was also at the seventh enlarged plenum that another 
fated expression entered Comintern discourse for the first
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time— the "third period" was at hand, it was said, in antic­
ipation of which the task of the communist parties was "to
mobilize the proletariat in preparation for the impending 
109
battles." The term appeared at the plenum in Bukharin1s
spoken report. At the fifteenth congress of the Russian
party in December 1927 Bukharin again described the class
struggle as having entered "a new period...on the basis of
the development of internal contradictions arising from
110
stabilization." Virtually the entire extant literature on
the Communist International overlooks these first indica-
111
tions of the third period.
The predilection to see Stalin as the founder of the 
third period, and to regard the left turn as merely a tactic 
in his coming campaign against the right deviation, is so 
pervasive that it has become virtually impossible to discern 
the origins of the new line as stemming from the Comintern 
analysis of capitalism. Even Theodore Draper, who so thor­
oughly chronicles the accumulation of errors in histories of 
the period, in the final instance mistakenly roots the 
explanation of the turn to the left in the struggle within 
the Russian party. Draper suggests that Bukharin, by speak­
ing of "stabilization [as] forming the basis of acuter class 
antagonisms....was able to have his cake (capitalist stabi­
lization) and eat it too (sharper class struggles)." This 
conclusion by Bukharin, in Draper’s view, was drawn only as 
a consequence of the campaign against the left (Trotsky - 
Zinoviev) opposition and Bukharin’s reluctance "to be put in 
the position of backing a right-wing line against a left-
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wing one." In other words, Draper insists that Bukharin did
not really believe that the growth of stabilization entailed
also the growth of its internal contradictions, but only
1 1 2
said so in order "to have his cake and eat it too."
This claim, however, is not sustained by the historical 
record. First, Bukharin’s analysis of stabilization incor­
porated an analysis of its internal contradictions from the 
start (i^ .e,. , the first mention of stabilization by Bukharin 
at the Russian party’s 1924 congress). Second, Bukharin 
expanded and developed the analysis of the contradictions of 
stabilization long after the defeat of the opposition (which 
can be quite conservatively dated with Trotsky's formal 
expulsion from the party in December 1927). And finally, on 
the basis of his own analysis, Bukharin explicitly insisted
on the existence of a "change in the situation," calling for
113
a "new tactical line."
This conclusion originated with Bukharin as well: the 
most successful and comprehensive "accomplishments" of capi­
talist stabilization were to be found together with the most 
acute expressions of the contradictions of stabilization.
The empirical material for these views was obtained from
Bukharin’s observation of (primarily) Germany, the 'case
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study' of stabilization. Perhaps even more significant 
than the coining of the term itself, the 'catastrophist1 
outlook so often associated with the third period, and so 
seemingly impossible to attribute to the eminently reason­
able and respectable Bukharin, in truth emerged for the
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first time in Bukharin1s comments at the seventh enlarged
plenum on the culpability of social democracy in the "prepa-
115
ration of even more horrible, even more grandiose wars." 
Bukharin similarly depicted the contradictions of stabiliza­
tion as "leading inevitably to a c a t a s t r o p h e t h e  'second
round of war'," at the Russian party's fifteenth 
1 16
congress.
At the same party congress, in his political report, 
Stalin was pointing to "production in the capitalist coun­
tries [which] has transcended the pre-war level," in some 
cases "leaping forward," and "to technical progress, ration­
alization of capitalist industry, creation of new indus­
tries...." Such advances were being undermined, however, "by 
the fact that production is growing, that technical progress 
and production potentialities are increasing, whereas the
world market, the limits of that market... remain more or
117
less stable...." Stalin also remarked on the "preparation 
of new imperialist wars," but this and other similar com­
ments neither prefigured nor went further than Bukharin’s 
118
assessment.
The recognition of "a rapid increase in production" in 
some capitalist countries came to Varga rather belatedly, 
only in 1928. The growth of output, admitted Varga, stemmed 
from higher intensity and productivity of labor, but he was 
not greatly impressed by technological progress other than 
that taking place in the generation of electricity and in 
the chemicals industry. Aside from the latter two cases, 
Varga claimed not to see much in the way of "fundamentally
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new processe[s]" and maintained that most "innovations are
on old lines.... The great changes have not taken place in
machinery, but in the organization of labor within the 
119
factory." The upshot of this was an aggravation of the
"contradiction between possibilities of production and sale"
stemming from the "reduced number of productive 
120
workers ..."
This was among the earliest appearances of * Varga*s 
Law' , i_.£. , the notion that under conditions of advanced 
capitalism accumulation entails an absolute decline in the 
number of productive workers and thereby exacerbates the 
market problem (by reducing working class purchasing power). 
Note that Varga does not mention the possibility of increas­
ing employment of unproductive workers, whose wages are paid 
out of surplus value (rather than variable capital). Rather, 
the prospect for displaced workers, according to Varga, was 
no employment at all: "[W]e today see the development of a
structural unemployment, a growing army of unemployed, espe-
121
cially in the most advanced capitalist countries."
Varga could point to high (and/or rising) unemployment 
rates in certain countries to bolster his arguments. Unem­
ployment in Great Britain was of course high throughout the 
1920s (due at least in some measure to deliberate deflation­
ary policies intended to restore the prewar gold parity of
the English currency). Implicitly, Varga treated the British
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situation as confirmation of his arguments. Likewise, 
rising unemployment In Germany, the ’showcase' of capitalist
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rationalization, squared nicely with ’Varga's Law'.
At the sixth congress of the Comintern (July 1928), 
Bukharin was the preponderant personality: he delivered the 
opening report of the ECCI, responded to the discussion of 
the report, chronicled the work of the commission drawing up 
a Comintern Programme, and delivered a major commentary on 
the ensuing debate. In his opening report, Bukharin de­
scribed the third period as "the period of capitalist recon­
struction," characterized by a "growth of the productive 
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forces." Richard Day siezes on these remarks to imply 
that Bukharin thereby envisioned "capitalism's longevity," 
but Day stops short of quoting the remainder of the para­
graph, in which Bukharin links the "progress" of capitalism 
in the third period to "the growth of forces hostile to
capitalism and [to] the extremely rapid development of its
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inherent contradictions." The leitmotiv of the report, 
contrary to Day's needlessly sarcastic intimation, is that 
the
new lines [of capitalist development] in their turn cause 
all the contradictions of capitalism to become more in­
tensified. This intensification of contradictions in turn 
leads to the great collapse, to the final catastro­
phe . [ 126]
Bukharin did argue against the view that the necessary 
expression of the contradictions of stabilization was a 
univocal collapse (or "decay") of capitalism in all nations 
along the lines of the underconsumptionist scenario. He 
maintained that the undermining of stabilization was ap­
parent
not because capitalism in every country is declining, but
because the structural changes that have occured in world 
economy are creating a new situation and are inexorably 
leading to the collapse of the whole system.[127]
These contradictions were not only ’external' ones, Bukharin
was not implying (as many of his present-day critics charge)
that the contradictions exist only as between States and 
that the contradictions in each given imperialist country 
are not becoming sharper.... Partial stabilization is a 
two-sided process. On the one hand there is a certain 
technico-economical consolidation of capitalism, and on 
the other— which must not be left out of sight—  
contradictions grow, the class struggle becomes more 
acute, unemployment increases.[128]
Perhaps this theme was most clearly expressed by 
Bukharin in his reply to the discussion of the initial 
report. In a somewhat exasperated response to Kostrjeva 
(Poland), who argued that the appropriate "line of demarca­
tion that is drawn between the second and third period is 
not the line of technical progress, [but]....the contradic­
tions which accumulated on the basis of the stabilization 
process....," Bukharin asked: "Not technical development,
but contradictions! But where do these contradictions come 
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from?"
Varga also participated in the discussion of Bukharin's
report, and made the more extreme claim that any increases
in output in the capitalist countries stemmed exclusively
from an intensification of labor; "the productivity of
labor— or what is the same thing, the productivity of the
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equipment set in motion by labor— remains unchanged." 
Additionally, Varga took this opportunity to deny that he 
maintained the "theoretical" impossibility of realization in 
a fully capitalist economy as argued by Luxemburg. His
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concern, said Varga, was with a specific "historical proc­
ess," namely the transformation of "independent producers 
into elements of capitalist economy," which had almost ex­
hausted itself in the United States and had exhausted itself 
in England. The "impulse” for the expansion of the market 
which this process provided was obviously non-recurring, and 
so henceforth the market would only grow very slowly, if at 
all, whereas output would continue to increase with the 
continually rising intensity of labor. The final result, as 
Varga had argued before, would necessarily be the emergence 
of a "structural unemployment" that was independent of the 
"conjuncture" (stage of the business cycle). The level of
unemployment "increasingly ceases to be an indication of the 
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conjuncture."
It is certainly true that Luxemburg's posing of the 
problem differed from Varga's. For Luxemburg, the process of 
drawing 'third parties' into the capitalist sphere, precise­
ly by eliminating the 'external' source of demand, would 
aggravate the realization problem. By contrast, Varga argued 
that it was this very same "historical process" which was 
responsible for a rapid but non-recurring expansion of ef­
fective demand. Both arguments are nonetheless varieties of 
underconsumption theories insofar as both maintained that a 
'developed' or 'pure' capitalist system must experience a 
chronic crisis of realization ultimately causing the system 
to literally 'collapse' (Luxemburg) or remain mired in a 
state of permanent stagnation until it was overthrown 
(Varga). It is thus no accident that Varga, as he became
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increasingly concerned to avoid being linked with Luxemburg, 
fastened onto the notion of 'decay* and the argument that an 
advanced capitalism must be 'moribund*, despite the fact 
that these ideas played no necessary theoretical role in his 
system.
From a theoretical standpoint, Bukharin’s reply to the 
discussion was notable for his assessment of 'Varga's Law'. 
Although he defended (against Lominadze) Varga’s empirical 
claim3of an absolute decline in the number of industrial 
workers in the United States, Bukharin maintained that Varga 
was "wrong to advance a new ’natural law* of capitalism at 
this time." Rather, it was necessary to distinguish the 
"various processes giving rise to unemployment," viz., cy­
clical factors in addition to the effects of rationalization 
and technical progress. It was premature, there was Inade­
quate "empirical material," to provide "generalizations"
such as Varga's, although to speak merely of certain con-
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crete "facts" was another matter.
More to the point, Bukharin disputed Varga's grounding 
of his ’Law* in the proposition "that the internal possibil­
ities of American imperialism have been ’exhausted'," a 
proposition that Bukharin claimed was "wrong," it was "the 
Luxemburg theory." An unidentified "Voice" from the floor 
here interjected: "This is what Varga said!" Bukharin re­
sponded that "Yes, Varga said it but I disagree with Varga
on this point. It is wrong, it is a reiteration of Rosa
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Luxemburg's theory." Note the ambiguity of the interjec-
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tion. It is not obvious whether the 'this* that Varga was 
supposed to have said referred to the depletion of the 
"internal possibilities'* of U.S. capitalism, or to his fre­
quent repudiations of Luxemburg!sm. Bukharin's response 
clearly indicates that he understood the interjection as 
referring to Varga's underconsumption argument, and as such 
Bukharin merely reiterated his belief that accumulation did 
not depend on 'external* sources of demand. Varga had an­
other opportunity to speak after this incident, but made no 
mention of it and only repeated his claim that the expansion
of the market as a result of proletarianization was a one- 
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time event.
'Rottenness*, as already argued, was imagery without 
theory. Varga succeeded in implanting this imagery in a 
highly receptive Comintern, where the absence of a coherent 
and explicit theoretical framework allowed the pseudo­
concept to acquire an apparent profundity. Decay, by its 
nature, is an irreversible process, without 'contradic­
tions' . As such, Bukharin's conceptualization of stabiliza­
tion as self-limiting growth (this was precisely the strong 
point of his approach) was no longer sustainable. Once 
accepted, the logic of decay would allow of nothing else 
(except decay). Bukharin intuitively understood this, and
suggested that there was "a tendency in our ranks to overes-
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timate the so-called parasitic aspect of capitalism." But 
his objections were not strenuous, and in any case Bukha­
rin's increasingly precarious position in the Russian party 
and the Comintern made his views suspect.
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By the time of the July 1929 tenth enlarged plenum of
the ECCI, which relieved Bukharin of all Comintern posts,
the principal report delivered by 0. Kuusinen warned of the
"overestination of the technical development of capital- 
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ism." In the epoch of decay, said Kuusinen, technical
progress is not necessarily what it appears to be:
Big technical inventions are made which do not prove of 
special economic value at once, or even at all. For 
instance, radio, aircraft and some (not all) chemical 
discoveries, important in themselves, are for the time 
being of relatively small economic importance. Only the 
viewpoint of the development of the productive power of 
labor can be a decisive criterion.[137]
Of the latter, Kuusinen claimed to see no evidence— the 
"true sense" of capitalist rationalization was the intensi­
fication of labor, not the increase in labor productivi- 
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ty. This was not among Kuusinen's more acute insights.
Ironically, Varga's theory for a time ran afoul of 
'decay' as well. Rationalization, declared Kuusinen, neces­
sarily "brings with it an absolute worsening of the position
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of the working class." Varga had allowed for the possi­
bility that intensification of labor could be accompanied by 
a rising real wage (this was evidently the conclusion he 
drew from his observation of Fordism), but Kuusinen argued 
that this conception of the standard of living was too 
"narrow." The correct conception was that the detrimental 
effects of intensification so greatly outweighed the bene­
fits afforded by a higher real wage that "the standard of 
living is not rising in reality."
The full-blown 'theory of decay' also provided its own 
version of the necessity of capitalist collapse. Kuusinen
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said:
I do not know if I an mistaken when I assume that 'the 
tendency of the decreasing number of workers’ brought 
forward by Comrade Varga contains the germ of a new 
theory of the gradual decay of capitalism. The desire to 
find a consistent, unequivocal and terse economic motivi- 
sation [sic] of the economic collapse of capitalism is a 
perfectly legitimate desire.[140]
But 'Varga's Law', continued Kuusinen, was unnecessary for
such a purpose, as Marx himself had already provided "the
general law which applies to the capitalist as well as to
the older modes of production." All that needed to be said
was that the existing (capitalist) relations of production
had become a fetter on the development of the forces of
production (!_.©,. » capitalism had become 'rotten'). "Now is
the time that Marx has predicted. The monopoly of capital
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has 'become a fetter upon the mode of production....'"
In the setting of the third period and the correspond­
ing turn to the left, acceptance of the 'theory of decay' 
naturally produced effects on the forms adopted by the 
Comintern's political practice--these will be more fully 
explored in the following subheading. But in order to accom­
plish this exploration in a rational manner, it has first 
been necessary to distinguish the claim (advanced here) that 
the 'theory of decay' influenced the forms of political 
practice, from the claim (e.g., by Claudin) that the 'theory
of decay' caused or led to the notion of the third pe- 
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riod. The latter conception is no more correct than the 
widely held view, already discussed, which attributes the 
origins of the third period to Stalin or to the Soviet 
domestic situation.
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P. The Communist International:
Theses, Resolutions, and Conjunctures
Bourgeois writers frequently launch their crusades
against communism by (quite suddenly) adopting a rather
positive view of the Socialist International, and favorably
comparing the congresses of the pre-war organization to the
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unrepresentative founding congress of the Comintern. No 
doubt it is easy for hostile critics to complain of the 
haste in convening the Communist International, but the 
situation was undeniably urgent:
1. Allied military intervention against Soviet Russia 
began in April 1918 and expanded throughout June and August.
2. In Germany, after the resignation of dictator Gener­
al Erich Ludendorff (September 1918) and the collapse of the 
subsequent effort to establish a parliamentary monarchy, 
state power was in the grasp of German socialists. From 10. 
November 1918 until 19. January 1919, a coalition of SPD and 
USPD People's Commissars (Karl Liebknecht at first refused
to be seated as representative of the Spartakus League)
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proclaimed socialism to be on the agenda. This changed 
quickly when a falling out between the SPD and USPD led to a 
confrontation and the establishment of a Revolutionary Com­
mittee (this time including Liebknecht, and representatives 
of the USPD and the Revolutionary Shop Stewards) ostensibly 
committed to the overthrow of the SPD Commissars. Masses of 
armed workers were in the streets, but the Committee de­
layed. After several days, the revolutionary energy of the 
workers dissipated, at which point the Committee inexplica­
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bly ’acted' by decreeing the SPD government to be "over­
thrown." Seeing its opportunity, the regime instructed SPD 
stalwart Gustav Hoske to "restore order", which Noske under­
took by calling on a the-called Free Corps led by former
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imperial officers. As might be expected, these latter took 
to their task with relish— among many others, Rosa Luxemburg 
and Karl Liebknecht were killed. On 19. January the 'social­
ist* Commissars relenquished power to a constituent assem­
bly, the elections for which were boycotted (over Luxem­
burg's objections) by the recently formed ICommunistische
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Partei Deutschlands, the KPD. The assembly quickly moved 
to establish a bourgeois parliamentary regime.
3. Even as the first congress of the Comintern was in 
session, revolution was breaking out in Hungary and Bavaria. 
By 21. March 1919, a Hungarian Soviet government came to 
power following the resignation of provisional President 
Count Michael Karolyi in favor of a communist/social demo­
cratic workers' coalition. This revolutionary government 
collapsed on 1. August 1919, following an ultimatum by the 
Allied Powers and military intervention by Czech, Serbian, 
and Rumanian troops. In Bavaria, following strikes and 
street battles since late February, a Soviet Republic was 
proclaimed on 7. April 1919 by a group of social democrats. 
Communists joined the government after the mutiny of the 
Muenich military garrison, but the regime was militarily 
overthrown on 1. May 1919.
2 3 7
First Congress of the Communist International
March 1919
The invitation to the first congress (drafted by 
Trotsky) emphasized the need to distinguish the revolution­
ary parties and tendencies of the working class movement 
front reformist ones. It declared that the "present epoch is 
the epoch of the disintegration and collapse of the entire 
capitalist world system," and that the tasks of the revolu­
tionary proletariat were immediate "seizure of State power" 
and the replacement of the bourgeois state with the dicta­
torship of the working class. The proletarian dictatorship 
was defined as consisting of the "destruction of the state 
apparatus of the bourgeoisie," the replacement of this appa­
ratus by specifically proletarian organs of self-government 
(i. .e* , the soviets— simultaneously legislative and execu­
tive), and the abolition of private property in the means of 
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production.
As to the "right-wing" (social-chauvinist) and "center"
(e.g., Kautsky) tendencies of the working class movement, it
was said that the correct attitude toward the former was
"unrelenting struggle," while the latter should be subjected
to "the tactics of splitting off the revolutionary elements,
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and unsparing criticism and exposure of the leaders." The 
invitation was issued specifically to some thirty-nine "par­
ties, groups, and trends," and generally to any party which 
accepted the propositions outlined in the document.
The platform (drafted by Bukharin) ultimately adopted 
by the congress essentially repeated the major points of the
2 3 8
invitation with regard to tactics and objectives. Two novel
items, however, merit attention. First, in a preamble to the
platform, the "epoch of the dissolution of capitalism" was
conceived as the culmination of a historical process in
which (i) "[c]apitalism tried to overcome its own anarchy by
organizing production" at the national level; (ii) although
"[m]onopoly took the place of free competition [and i]nsane
anarchy was replaced by organization" within each of the
leading capitalist countries, "the anarchy in world economy
grew ever sharper" in the form of the "struggle between the
largest organized robber states...."; (iii) the proletariat
in the advanced countries was "corrupted" by the bourgeoisie
"[a]t the expense of the plundered colonial peoples...,";
and finally, (iv)
the same method of steady corruption which created the 
patriotism of the working class and its moral submission 
was changed by the war into its opposite. Physical anni­
hilation, the complete enslavement of the proletariat, 
tremendous oppression, impoverishment and deterioration, 
world famine— these were the final fruits of civil peace. 
It broke down. The imperialist war changed into civil 
war.[149]
In his greeting to the first congress, and in his 
concluding statement, Lenin was as optimistic as the others 
regarding the prospect of revolution in Europe. Nonetheless, 
he generally avoided, without explicitly criticizing or com­
menting on, the language of Trotsky ("disintegration and
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collapse") and Bukharin ("chaos"). It is tempting to 
emphasize these divergent modes of expression, and to as­
cribe great import to the difference in semantics. For some, 
the temptation becomes all the stronger when they examine
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the accounts of the second Comintern congress, where Lenin 
did indeed comment unfavorably on the imagery of the osten­
sibly 'insoluble’ crisis of capitalism. For now, it is 
sufficient to note that at the first congress, Lenin did not 
mention the choice of terminology. Furthermore, it will be 
argued shortly that it is all too easy to fasten onto 
Lenin's later comments, and to provide them an interpreta­
tion which is quite mistaken.
Another aspect of the program worth mentioning concern­
ed the anticipated pace of the nationalization and sociali­
zation of production under the proletarian dictatorship. The 
program envisioned fairly rapid nationalization "of the big 
banks,...[the] syndicates and trusts, and of those branches 
of industry in which the concentration and centralization of 
capital makes this technically feasible." As regards smaller 
industrial concerns, "the proletariat must gradually amal­
gamate them by ways appropriate to their size"; the smallest 
properties "will not be expropriated" at all, and will be 
"gradually drawn into socialist organization by example, by
the practical demonstration of the advantages following from
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the new regime...."
These relatively moderate and pragmatic proposals stand
in sharp contrast to much of the prevailing wisdom which
views the period as one of unbridled 'radicalism’ (all the
more so because it coincides with the onset of war communism
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in Soviet Russia). Granted, the 'ultra-left' first cong­
ress of the Comintern may have overestimated the prospects 
for revolution in Europe (in truth, they merely underesti­
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mated the lengths to which social-democracy would go to 
thwart the revolution), but this 'ultra-leftism' most cer­
tainly did not extend to utopian visions of the immediate 
post-revolutionary period. Insofar as heroic illusions e- 
merged over the course of the war communist epoch, these are 
properly regarded not as an antecedently formulated 'High 
Road to Communism', but as after-the-fact theorizations of
desperate ad hoc measures in response to desperate (civil
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war and foreign intervention) circumstances.
Apart from the above, one other natter of substance 
emerged at the first congress, and this concerned the argu­
ment of the KPD that the founding of the Comintern was 
premature. Basing itself on the late Rosa Luxemburg's organ­
izational directives, the KPD mandated its delegates (Eugen 
Levine and Hugo Eberlein) to vote against forming an Inter­
national on the grounds that the communist movement (at
least outside the Soviet republic) lacked any national par-
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ties with a mass base. As it happened, Levine was arrested 
at the German border and never reached Moscow, while Eber­
lein was swayed by an Austrian delegate and abstained (rath­
er than casting a negative ballot) on the vote founding the 
Comintern.
* * *
Despite the setbacks and defeats suffered by revolu­
tionary uprisings outside Russia, optimism regarding the 
prospects of world revolution continued to prevail.
1. Hopes for a revolutionary resurgence in Germany had
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been heightened by the rapid defeat of the Kapp putsch 
(March 1920). Troops under the command of General von 
Luttwitz had driven the Y/eimar government out of Berlin (an 
easy task, insofar as the Reichswehr refused to come to the 
aid of 'its* government), and installed a reactionary regime 
under Wolfgang Kapp. This government, however, quickly col­
lapsed under pressure of a massive general strike called by 
the trade union federation and supported by communist rank 
and file. The KPD leadership opposed the strike on the 
grounds that it was not the proletariat’s task to defend a 
bourgeois republic (also, they were still likely inclined to 
caution after the disaster of January 1919); the ECCI, 
however, was enthusiastic about the developments because the
"German workers have got arms, that is the chief 
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thing....” The Kapp coup d' etat lasted only five days, 
and once again, given the disarray into which the Weimar 
coalition had fallen, a worker’s government in Germany was a 
real possibility. Karl Legien, a trade union leader, called 
for the formation of a labor government (as opposed to 
either a coalition with bourgeois parties or a revolutionary 
soviet republic). Since this would not have been a bourgeois 
government, the KPD agreed to participate as a loyal opposi­
tion, but bickering within USPD ranks allowed the Weimar
regime, in spite of itself, to maintain a tenuous hold on 
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power. The chance for a non-capitalist, much less revolu­
tionary socialist, government once again slipped from the 
very grasp of those who professed to be struggling for the 
transformation of bourgeois society.
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2. In April 1920, nationalist Polish forces under the 
reactionary-masquerading-as-socialist Marshal Josef 
Pilsudski invaded Soviet Russia with an army of half a 
million, and succeeded in capturing Kiev by May. Within only 
a few weeks, the Red Army under General Mikhail Tukhachevsky 
liberated Kiev, drove Pilsudski out of the Ukraine, and 
entered Poland. Pilsudski's request for armistice negotia­
tions was rejected, and the Red Army approached the gates of 
Warsaw by July.
3. The civil war in Soviet Russia was essentially over, 
soviet power was being consolidated, and the allied military 
blockade against the regime had been lifted.
Second Congress of the Communist International
July-August 1920
As if to appease subsequent critics, representation at 
the second congress was considerably broader than at the 
first, and this change found reflection in the fact that the 
serious organizational work of the Comintern only began with 
the 1920 congress. Over 200 delegates from 41 countries were 
in attendance, either as full member delegates or observers 
with consultative status. The SFIO and USPD found themselves 
in the latter category, although within a few months of the 
Congress, the majority of both the French socialists and 
German independents voted to formally affiliate with the 
Third International, causing splits in both parties. With 
the affiliation of the revolutionary sections of German and 
French socialism, the Comintern’s membership came to include
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several mass political parties: the Russian, of course, also
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the Italian Socialist Party, the Norwegian Labor Party, 
and now the French and German Communist Parties.
On the opening day of the second congress, Lenin pres­
ented a draft document which was ultimately adopted as the
"Theses on the Basic Tasks of the Communist Internation- 
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al." Lenin introduced the draft theses in his "Report on
the International Situation," and explicitly noted that they
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contained "nothing that is materially new." After elabo­
rating on the notions of proletarian dictatorship and soviet 
power, Lenin turned to a brief discussion of the problem of 
internationalism.
As in the concurrent preface to the 1920 edition of 
Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, in his speech 
Lenin tied the existence of an opportunist and national-
chauvinist "labor aristocracy" to the "sop" obtained from
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the exploitation of the colonies. In his comments to the 
congress, however, the theme was further developed and began 
to incorporate the notions (i) that revolutionary European 
and American socialists will find It more difficult "to get 
rid of this disease" than Russian socialists did, on account 
of the much more weakly developed material basis of oppor­
tunism in backward Russia; (il) that the "treatment of this
disease" will require deeper, more profound splits in the
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working class movement than previously thought; (iii) and 
perhaps most interestingly, that the smashing of imperialism 
(and, presumably, the final defeat of the opportunist labor 
aristocracy) may hinge on
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a union between revolutionary proletarians of the capi­
talist, advanced countries, and the revolutionary masses 
[i..£., not necesarily proletarian— N.K.] of ... colonial, 
Eastern countries.... World imperialism shall fall when 
the revolutionary onslaught of the exploited workers in 
each country...merges with the revolutionary onslaught of 
hundreds of millions [of exploited persons in the 
colonies].[162]
This is a striking statement, interesting for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, it reflects what in 1920 represented 
for Lenin a novel political position--revolutionary interna­
tionalism was becoming as much identified, in Lenin’s new 
thinking, with the political solidarity of workers in the 
developed countries and the oppresed masses of the colonies, 
as it was previously (during World War I) identified with 
proletarian attitudes to the imperialist war, i_.e.. , as an 
aspect of the politics internal to the advanced social 
formation. The passage quoted above serves as one of the 
earliest indications of this theme, which would take on 
increasing importance during Lenin’s few remaining years. 
Despite this change of outlook, note what remains the same 
as before: merely the shared experience of being oppressed 
by imperialism and threatened by inter-imperialist war did 
not provide assurances that the ’’union" between colonial 
toilers and European workers would simply be a condition 
which they found imposed upon themselves by ’blind’ forces.
Rather, ”[i]t is on ourselves that the consolidation of
163
unity depends.” Once again, the concrete situation is 
regarded as the particular set of constraints within which 
political intervention takes place, and hence the analysis 
reveals both the possibilities and the limits of what polit-
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ical intervention can accomplish.
Secondly, Lenin’s emergent 'third worldisn' raises the 
question of the relationship between his and Luxemburg’s 
theoretical views. For the latter, of course, the colonies 
were the ’non-capitalist areas’ without which capitalism 
ostensibly could not exist, and her The Accumulation of 
Capital consequently accorded them explicit theoretical and 
empirical consideration. As already noted in the previous 
chapter, given the theoretical centrality of the colonial 
regions to her analysis, Luxemburg’s subsequent discussion 
of their place in the revolutionary process was disappoint­
ingly brief and vague. But the real difficulty in Luxem­
burg's analysis had been that the socialist revolution in 
the developed nations was simply ’there’, erected by the 
analysis itself as its own result. Luxemburg was not a 
fatalist, naturally she Icnew that revolutions did not just 
'happen', and this was central to her life and thought as an 
activist. But she had failed to pose the question of the 
revolution as a theoretical problem for investigation in the 
sense that its failure to occur had to and could only be 
ascribed to betrayal by the leaders— there was literally no 
room in the analysis for anything else.
Lenin, upon first reading Luxemburg's Accumulation,
thought that her graphic accounts of the brutal conditions
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in the colonies were "noisy, colorful and meaningless." 
Naturally, Lenin knew that the colonies were an intrinsic 
and important aspect of the question of imperialism, and
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indeed the colonies were where the capital went when it was 
exported and where the ’super-profits* cane from when they 
were brought back. But he had failed to pose the theoretical 
problem of the colonies in the sense that for hin they were 
merely ’there’, being partitioned and re-partitioned. At 
that time, the (re-)partitioning of the world was interest­
ing for Lenin neither because of the implications for rela­
tions between colonial masses and European workers, nor 
because of what the 'non-capitalist areas’ spelled for the 
existence of capitalism per se (Luxemburg’s problem). The 
latter two topics were ruled out as areas of inquiry in the 
course of posing the main question, viz., the significance 
of the (re-)partitioning of the world for the contradictions 
which it continually created between the ruling classes and 
the proletariats of the imperialist nations. However well or 
poorly, the question of the European revolution was being 
posed as a theoretical as well as a concrete, practical 
problem. The political conclusions which flowed from the 
analysis included the well-known 'weakest link* hypothesis, 
the strategy of defeatism, etc.
Nonetheless, as evidenced by the passage on the coming 
revolutionary "union," by 1920 Lenin was beginning to think 
seriously about political relations between classes in the 
developed capitalist countries and the 'periphery'. This 
'third worldism* did not stem from any convergence of 
Lenin's theoretical approach with that of Luxemburg, as 
there is not a shred of evidence that late in his life Lenin 
appreciated the underconsumption argument any more than he
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had earlier (recall the discussion on pp. 120-136 above).
Neither was Lenin's interest in the colonies merely the
expression of a political ploy "by Marxists, especially the
Bolsheviks, for allies against the powerful centres of capi-
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talist state power." That explanation might be plausible 
if Lenin (and the Bolsheviks generally) had waited until 
1922 or later, by which time it was fairly clear that the 
moment for the European revolution had passed, before ex­
pressing an interest in the revolutionary possibilities in 
the colonies. But Lenin was speaking of the "union" with 
colonial revolutionaries in July 1920, and in September of 
that year the Comintern organized the Baku Conference of the 
Peoples of the East, an effort to aid in the organization of 
revolutionary movements in Asia. Both of these events came 
long before there was any sign of a 'turn to the right' in 
Third International politics. The point is that an apprecia­
tion of revolutionary prospects in colonial areas was not 
simply an ad hoc tactic which "Marxists, especially the 
Bolsheviks," cast about for once the hopes for revolution in 
Europe dissipated.
There is a sense, however, in which the treatment of 
the colonial question was indeed ad hoc, and this has al­
ready been hinted at above. The 'colonial areas* were pres­
ent in Lenin's Imperialism, but they were never objects of 
systematic theoretical scrutiny. At best, passing references 
to higher rates of profit, without further explanation, 
sufficed to establish the relevance of the colonles--they
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were merely the destination of capital exports and the 
sources of 'super profits'. In many respects, this treatment 
was adequate; more precisely, given Lenin's primary concerns 
during the conjuncture of World War I, this poor theoretical 
grounding was not so inadequate as to prevent serviceable 
political deductions on matters of greatest urgency.
A failure to rigorously conceptualize the nature of the 
links between social classes in developed and developing 
regions did not prevent Imperialism from being a suitable 
guide to action during World War I and the onset of the 
revolutionary struggle. However, such an analytical gap 
could not but make its presence felt when Lenin and the 
others began to employ the framework of Imperialism to 
understand the politics and economics of the 'periphery'. To 
compound the difficulty, this theoretical gap was not per­
ceived , and work proceeded as i the gap was not there. Such 
an oversight is not surprising, since the colonies did 
appear throughout the discussion. But it is one thing to
'appear', or to be 'discussed', and quite another to be an
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object of scientific investigation. Pointing these things 
out is not Intended to suggest that Lenin or anyone else was 
a theoretical ignoramus, for they were not. Rather, the 
object is to allow the benefits of hindsight to be of as­
sistance in coming to grips with the very difficult task of 
understanding the theoretical conditions of the "concrete 
analysis of a concrete situation."
Among the effects of the failure to take note of the 
theoretical void in Imperialism and to fully rectify matters
249
has been the continual reproduction of the weakest aspect of
the book--the empirical dimension of capital export and 
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finance. Perhaps even more serious consequences followed 
upon the effort (by Lenin to a certain extent, but especial­
ly by his followers) to grasp at concepts in order to fill 
this theoretical gap, either because the dearth was intui­
tively felt or because it simply came to be filled by de­
fault. In this regard, the ill-developed notion of a "mori­
bund" capitalism performed a real disservice. Given the lack 
of an adequate theoretical grounding of the social and 
economic links between the imperialist nations and the colo­
nies, the empty space came to be occupied by the pseudo­
theory of an "overripe" capitalism, which seemed suitable 
(and continues to seem so) precisely because it apparently 
had something to say (e.g., capital export and its effects) 
about both developed countries and the developing regions.
It is much easier to add two poorly developed concepts 
together and arrive at a third, and to be deluded into 
thinking that thereby progress has been made, than it is to 
force vague notions, little more than metaphors or unsorted 
observations, to ’fit' within a coherent, well-developed 
theoretical system.
The political effect of grafting the idea of an "over­
ripe" capitalism onto a fledgling theory of imperialism 
became the tendency to overestimate the revolutionary poten­
tialities of 'anti-imperialist* movements in the colonies, 
specifically the movements of the national or colonial bour-
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geoisie. Although the overzealous pursuit of alliances with
’anti-imperialist* national bourgeoisies led to disastrous
results only after the mid-1920s, the origins of these
efforts can be traced back at least in part to Lenin's
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initiatives at the second Comintern congress.
Lenin arrived at the congress with a set of "Prelimi­
nary Draft Theses on the National and Colonial Questions" to 
be submitted for discussion. The text called for "the 
closest alliance, with Soviet Russia, of all the national 
and colonial liberation movements" with the aim of fighting
for a worldwide federation to be followed by "the complete
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unity of the working people of different nations." In 
"the more backward states and nations," Lenin first of all 
pressed the need to "assist the bourgeois-democratic libera­
tion movement," and only secondarily to carry on a struggle
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against religious and/or medieval elements. Although 
vague enough to be (subsequently) interpreted in a fairly 
'nationalist* manner, these arguments were strongly quali­
fied by Lenin. Specifically, he warned against giving a 
"communist coloring to bourgeois-democratic liberation 
trends," and argued that while it was necessary for the 
Comintern to enter into "temporary alliance with bourgeois 
democracy," communist forces "should not merge with it, and 
should under all circumstances uphold the independence of
the proletarian movement even if it is in its most embryonic 
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form."
Even with the qualifications listed by Lenin, the 
theses as written raised objections from some Asian dele-
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gates to the congress. Sultan Zadeh of Persia, and especial­
ly the Indian delegate I.Ianabendra Nath Roy, warned against 
the danger of allowing proletarian movements in the colo­
nies, however tenuous they might be, to fall under the sway 
of the national bourgeoisie through the expedient of a 
’temporary' alliance. As a member, along with Lenin, of the 
Comintern's Commission on the National and the Colonial 
Questions, Roy countered with a set of "Supplementary 
Theses." In general terms, Roy argued that rather than 
socialism in the less developed areas being dependent on the 
'aid1 which might be extended by revolutions in Europe, it 
was closer to the truth that "English imperialism has suc­
ceeded in keeping the British proletariat under the domina­
tion of the bourgeoisie." Not revolution in Europe first and 
then the liberation of the colonies, but these two develop­
ments "together...will overthrow the capitalist system in 
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Europe."
Lenin was ambivalent: in the "revolutionary union" 
quote, there is very much a sense of the complementarity yet 
autonomy of the colonial and European revolutionary proces­
ses, which puts Lenin close to Roy. In the meetings of the 
Commission on the National and Colonial Questions, however, 
Lenin still mentions the necessity of "aid" by the proletar­
iat in the advanced countries if the socialist revolution is
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to be accomplished in the developing regions. In any 
event, there was nothing entirely antithetical in Lenin's 
and Roy's views on this matter, particularly as the latter
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buttresed his case with the familiar argument (also advanced 
by Lenin) that colonial 'super-profits’ allowed the bribery 
of a European labor aristocracy. The real difference with 
Lenin came when Roy maintained that the bourgeois-democratic 
movement and "the mass struggle of the poor and ignorant 
workers and peasants...grow farther apart every day." Al­
though he did not completely eschew temporary co-operation 
with the national bourgeoisie, Roy emphatically argued that 
rather than scrambling to secure ’alliances’ with national­
ists, "the foremost and immediate task is to form communist 
parties" in the colonies, since in most cases the "revolu­
tionary strength of the liberation movements [there] is no 
longer confined to the bourgeois-democratic nationalists."
Not only must the colonial masses maintain their "independ­
ence" and avoid "merging" with the nationalists (as Lenin 
had put it), but they must furthermore not abdicate "the
leadership of the revolution...to the bourgeois 
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democrats.”
Roy's amendments failed to make a major impression, and
succeeded only in Lenin’s agreeing to a largely rhetorical
modification of his own theses by substituting
the term 'national-revolutionary* for the term 'bourgeois- 
democratic'. The significance of this change is that we, 
as Communists, should and will support bourgeois- 
liberation movements in the colonies only when they are 
genuinely revolutionary....[175]
Unfortunately for revolutionary socialism, history would
come to show that bourgeois 'anti-imperialists' were also
quite capable of making expedient alliances, and that indeed
they were often more adept at the practice than the parties
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of the Comintern.
It is not difficult to find evidence of the confusion 
sown by the (often implicit) injection of the "decaying 
capitalism" notion into the field of political debate. If 
imperialism was capitalism which had developed to the point 
of being "overripe," then it could readily be concluded that 
to oppose imperialism, to be 'anti-imperialist', was to be 
'progressive'. Political action based on this interpreta­
tion, however, ran the risk of supporting capitalism in the 
colonies by urging workers' parties, for 'practical* rea­
sons, to co-operate with bourgeois nationalists in ways such 
that the latter defined strategies and objectives. Natural­
ly, it was this danger to which Roy so assiduously sought to 
draw attention. On the other hand, by taking this risk 'too 
far' and issuing concrete warnings about alliances with 
colonial bourgeois nationalists, one ran the opposite risk 
of appearing insufficiently commited to the overthrow of 
colonial rule. That this confusion could arise is amply 
demonstrated by the following exchange on the floor of the 
second congress. Note how close an indignant Roy comes to 
arguing against himself:
[M.N.] Roy: Serrati has referred to my theses and to 
those of Comrade Lenin as being counterrevolutionary.
[G.M.] Serrati: Oh, no!
Roy: I am sure that no proletarian can regard the 
assistance rendered to the oppressed peoples in their 
struggle against foreign oppression as being reactionary. 
Every national revolution in a backward country is a step 
in advance. It is unscientific to distinguish the various 
forms of revolution. Every revolution is one of the 
varieties of the social revolution. The peoples of the 
exploited countries, whose economic and political evolu­
tion has been hampered, must pass through the stages
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which the European peoples have passed long ago. One who 
regards it as reactionary to aid these people in their 
national struggle is himself reactionary and the advocate 
of imperialism.[176]
The second congress had, however, explicitly rejected
the notion that all societies must pass through necessary,
sequential stages of development, and affirmed the view that
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the capitalist 'stage* could in fact be 'skipped*. Never­
theless, a tension (and therefore, at times, confusion) 
developed between this stated position and the evolu­
tionist/stages conception of history which the "moribund 
capitalism" theory of imperialism certainly encouraged in a 
tacit way. Interestingly, rejecting the "moribund capital­
ism" view can still be compatible with thinking of history
in terms of necessary stages, although of course the politi-
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cal conclusions in that case will be quite different.
It will be recalled that at the first Comintern cong­
ress, Lenin expressed no objection to comrades (e.g.,
Trotsky and Bukharin) who spoke in terms of ’'collapse" and 
"chaos." At the second congress, however, Lenin chided 
(without naming) those revolutionaries who
sometimes try to prove that the [capitalist] crisis is 
absolutely insoluble.
This is a mistake. There is no such thing as an abso­
lutely hopeless situation.... [Njoboby can 'prove' that 
it is absolutely impossible for [the bourgeoisie] to 
pacify a minority of the exploited with some petty con­
cessions, and suppress some movement or uprising of some 
section of the oppressed and exploited. To try to ’prove' 
in advance that there is 'absolutely' no way out of the 
situation would be sheer pedantry, or playing with con­
cepts and catchwords.[179]
Having made this point, Lenin immediately explained the
constrained determinacy of political intervention in the
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concrete situation:
All over the world, the bourgeois system is experi­
encing a tremendous revolutionary crisis. The revolution­
ary parties must noiv 'prove' in practice that they have 
sufficient understanding and organization, contact with 
the exploited masses, and determination and skill to 
utilize this crisis for a successful, for a victorious 
revolution.[180]
Richard Day takes note of Lenin's admonitions, throws
in some other scattered remarks made by Lenin at various
times in various places, and presents the lot as further
evidence of the supposed dramatic divergence between Lenin
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and Day's favorite scapegoat, Bukharin. Aside from the 
fact that Day’s representations of Bukharin are generally 
transparently jaundiced, there are good substantive reasons 
for doubting Day's appraisal of these comments by Lenin.
Firstly, having thrown out his barb Lenin immediately 
blunted it by declaring that "[i]t is mainly to prepare this 
•proof [_i. £., of the necessity of the demise of capital­
ism— N.K.] that we have gathered at this Congress of the
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Communist International." Day creates the impression that 
the 'left' which Lenin subjected to such "harsh... criticism" 
represented some sort of 'left-in-general1 and therefore 
included anyone, as for example Bukharin (or Trotsky), who 
was employing 'left' sounding catchwords such as "chaos” or 
"collapse." But the full context of Lenin's comments sug­
gests something different, because immediately after the 
critical observation just quoted, Lenin spends two and one- 
half pages of manuscript belaboring not 'leftists', but 
reformists; next, a passing comment that the defeat of 
opportunism will be much more difficult in Europe and the
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United States than in Russia; and finally, the conclusion
that in comparison with the task of combatting reformism and
opportunism, "the rectification of the errors of the 'Left'
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will be an easy one." And the characteristics of this
’left* deviation? Lenin specifically lists only dogmatic
anti-parliamentarianism, which makes it clear that just as
in his contemporaneous 'Left Wing’ Connunisn— An Infantile 
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Disorder, Lenin was singling out for criticism the an­
archist and syndicalist elements within the International, 
not figures like Bukharin or Trotsky. Neither of the latter 
two had ever rejected in principle the notion that revolu­
tionaries should make use of the bourgeois parliament in 
order to overthrow capitalism. Secondly, in order for his 
argument to hold, Day would seemingly have to explain 
Lenin's failure to take note of and criticize the terminolo­
gy of 'collapse' at the first congress, over a year earlier, 
when it was if anything even more pronounced. It is diffi­
cult to believe that this was the result of simple oversight 
on Lenin's part, since he was not one to overlook "shades of 
meaning" which could congeal into principled differences at 
critical moments.
The reason that Lenin had failed to raise the issue at 
all during the first congress, and only pursued it so mildly 
at the second, is very simply that the theoretical terrain 
on which the capital accumulation debates of the Second 
International were conducted was now irrelevant— neither the 
Bolsheviks nor, for that matter, any other significant ad-
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herents of the Third International thought that capitalism
would 'collapse* in the sense that Luxemburg or Kautsky
believed, or the sense in which Bernstein thought Marxists
by and large believed. Talk of 'collapse' was conjunctural,
collapse was not (especially not its concrete forms) deduced
as a necessity from abstract premises and, as such, when
Lenin at this time made references to a capitalism which was 
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"doomed" and to the victory of the socialist revolution as 
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"assured", he was not saying anything so different from 
what Bukharin or Trotsky said. At_ this time, the real issue 
that Lenin regarded as the line of demarcation between 
Bolshevism and the ultra-left was not around the terminology 
(or, for that matter, the immediacy) of capitalist 'col­
lapse'— the real difference lay in the choice of tactics to 
spur the coming European revolution. The feeling in the 
party and in the Comintern generally was that capitalism in 
at least some of the leading European countries was finish­
ed. While It is true enough that in a few years it would be 
necessary for all (including Lenin) to speak of "illusions," 
it is a far different thing to claim that at this time a 
significant voice in the party was deducing the necessity of 
'collapse' from a study of the reproduction schemes in 
Capital volume two. Had there been such persons, it would 
have made little sense for them to have become Bolsheviks in 
the first place.
Lenin's efforts to restrain the anarchist and 'ultra- 
left* inclinations, both before and during the second cong­
ress, brought some results. The "Theses on Communist Parties
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and Parliament" adopted by the second congress, despite some 
objections from the left, instructed Comintern affiliated 
organizations not to forego as a matter of course partici­
pation in bourgeois parliaments. The guidelines were quite 
clearly spelled out:
The communist party does not enter this institution to 
function there as an organic part of parliament, [but to 
carry out] activity inside parliament which consists 
chiefly in revolutionary agitation from the parliamentary 
tribune, in exposing enemies, in the ideological mobili­
zation of the masses....[188]
While it was of course never suggested that parliamentary 
activity be anything but "wholly and completely subordinate 
to the aims and tasks of the mass struggle outside parlia­
ment," the directive stated that any "absolute and categori­
cal rejection of participation in elections" was a "naive
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and childish doctrine... beneath criticism."
Perhaps even more significantly, Comintern cadre were 
ordered not to reject work within reformist trade unions.
The "Theses on the Trade Union Movement, Factory Councils, 
and the Communist International" adopted at the second cong­
ress instructed communist trade unionists to utilize the 
♦economic* struggle to overcome the "indecision of the work­
ing masses...[and] their susceptibility to the specious 
arguments of the opportunist leaders." The objective of 
trade union work must be to convince the workers of the need 
"to get rid of the opportunist union leaders," and for
"communists to get at the head of the trade union movement
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ana make of it an organ of revolutionary struggle...."
Again, the theses on trade unions were not adopted
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without misgivings, voiced particularly by the U.S. and
British delegations. The Americans and British argued that
the existing reformist trade unions could never be won over
to communism, and that new revolutionary unions must be
formed. The theses, however, strongly inveighed against such
views, and condemned any
voluntary abstention from the unions, all artificial 
attempts to create separate trade unions, unless compel­
led thereto either by extraordinary acts of violence on 
the part of the trade union bureaucracy, or by their 
narrow policy of serving only the labor aristocracy which 
makes it impossible for the less skilled workers to 
join....[191]
At the same time, however, communists
should not shrink from a split in the union organizations 
if the refusal to split would be tantamount to abandoning 
revolutionary work in the unions.... But even if such a 
split should prove to be necessary, it should be effected 
only if the communists succeed in convincing the broad 
working masses... that the split is to be made not for the 
sake of distant revolutionary aims which they do not yet 
understand, but for the sake of the most immediate prac­
tical interests of the working class....[192]
Finally, for most histories of the Communist Interna­
tional, all the happenings at the second congress pale in 
comparison to the adoption of the infamous "21 Conditions 
of Admission" to the organization. The essential provisions 
of the "21 Conditions" required the immediate (and periodi­
cally repeated) purging of centrist elements from adherent 
parties; mandated the creation of parallel illegal organiza­
tions which would enable revolutionary work to be carried on 
in the event of the suspension of bourgeois 'democracy'; 
obligated the member organizations to conduct agitation 
within the military, in the countryside, and in reformist
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trade unions; required an open disavowal of social- 
patriotisn and social-pacifism; ordered each "party which 
wishes to join the Communist International... to give uncon­
ditional support to any Soviet republic in its struggle 
against counter-revolutionary forces"; stipulated that the 
organizational form of the Communist International and its 
member sections would be that of democratic centralism, with 
supreme authority vested in the regular world congresses of
the Comintern (the power to issue binding decisions resided
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with the ECCI in the interim periods between congresses).
In his discussion of the second congress, Fernando 
Claudin makes mention of "the new catechism" and "a sectar­
ian and dogmatic spirit." For a moment, he even finds it 
opportune to make an unusually favorable (for him) appraisal 
of the Russian Communist Party (b), so as to be able to 
contrast its genuinely revolutionary heritage and flexibili­
ty with the "verbalism" of the Comintern "[u]nder the in-
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fluence of the T21 Conditions'." Braunthal likewise notes
the "uneasiness" which the "21 Conditions" created among
Comintern moderates like Giacinto M. Serrati (who objected
to the demand for expulsion of rightists and centrists from
the communist parties) and Artur Crispien (who wished a
clearer distinction between the use of force, which he
claimed he did not oppose, and civil war and terrorism,
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which he felt social democracy must reject). In order to 
highlight their odious nature, Braunthal points out that not 
only the moderates raised objections to the "21 Conditions." 
He describes the opposition of the 'left-wing' trade un­
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ionists (already encountered above in the discussion of the
"Theses on the Trade Union Movenent") to working within
reformist trade unions, and their argument that since the
existing trade unions could not in any significant measure
be won over to the communist cause, new revolutionary trade
unions had to be formed. Braunthal quotes William Gallacher,
a Scottish trade union leader, who somewhat condescendingly
argued that "[w]e left-wingers have already been active in
the British trade unions for twenty-five years and we have
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not succeeded in revolutionizing them from within." This 
was true, no doubt, but the point was that neither had the 
"left-wingers" succeeded in building an independent, non­
reformist alternative. It is rarely mentioned, and Braunthal
is no exception, that in the actual vote the "21 Conditions"
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were carried with only two ballots opposed.
Braunthal hence arrives at an impasse, some version of 
which recurs throughout his work. Intimating that his so­
cialist vision is a revolutionary one, he begins by insist­
ing that the revolutionary outcome Is only compatible with
the support of the "great majority" of the masses (citing
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Luxemburg, who Braunthal professes to admire). From this,
Braunthal somewhat illogically concludes that the unity of
the working class must be maintained at all costs, even if
this means unity with unabashed reformists or outright anti- 
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socialists. The Bolsheviks, in Braunthal's estimation, 
erred by seeking to effect a Blanquist coup cl' etat, without 
mass support. But insofar as the Bolsheviks particularly,
and the Comintern generally, pursued support for the revolu­
tionary socialist project within the greater labor movement, 
Braunthal objects that any such activity threatened the 
sacrosanct unity of the proletariat. Leaving aside the fact 
that any claim as to the 'unity’ of the working class in the 
conjuncture of World War I Europe is an empty one, Braunthal 
constructs a sophism from which there is no escape, and then 
chides those who sought to break out of it.
* * *
The period following the second congress of the Comin­
tern saw a series of defeats and setbacks for the revolu­
tionary proletariat.
1. Following its early success in repelling the Polish 
invasion of March 1920, the Red Army was flung back from 
Warsaw in mid-August by the Polish counter-offensive under 
(French) General Weygand. The Riga armistice, on terras fa­
vorable to Pilsudski's regime, was finally signed in March 
1921.
2. The political situation in Italy became increasingly 
volatile over the summer and fall of 1920. Following the 
breakdown of wage negotiations between northern Italian 
workers and employers, a series of work slowdowns finally 
led to a lockout in early September, and several hundred 
factories in Milan, Genoa and Turin closed. The workers 
responded by breaking in and seizing the factories, and 
proceeded to operate them under workers' control. The move­
ment spread, the police and military avoided confronting the 
workers, but the process faltered when banks and raw mate-
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rials suppliers refused to deal with occupied factories. 
Representatives of the Italian Socialist Party and its trade 
union federation rather narrowly voted to linit demands to 
very modest, reformist objectives. The government of Premier 
Giovanni Giolitti agreed to wage increases and recognition 
of union participation in management— the workers' action 
was quickly defused.
By autumn, Italian fascism had become a mass movement, 
funded by capitalists and landowners and supported by the 
Vatican. Armed squads carried out attacks against trade- 
union offices, socialist publishing operations, municipal 
offices in the socialist controlled towns, and peasant 
organizations.
3. Having acquiesced in employers' efforts to provoke
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workers in Prussian Saxony in March 1921, the Social 
Democratic government there sent in security forces to oc­
cupy the area. The KPD responded by calling first for insur­
rection and later, in view of the very uneven and often 
tepid response to the signal for an uprising, a general 
strike. Apart from miners in the area around Mansfeld,
Saxony generally, Hamburg and the Ruhr, working class sup­
port for the infamous 'March action' was sparse, and indeed, 
much of the fighting was between striking workers and those 
who remained on the job. Many hundreds of people were 
killed, and the KPD suffered not only a major tactical 
defeat, but also a substantial decline In its membership 
over the next several months.
4. The 'March Action' had been preceded by internal
struggles and a split within the KPD. With a selective lapse
of memory, Braunthal forgets his previous admonitions on the
paramount importance of "the sticking together of all
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workers' tendencies," and warmly praises the moderate
leader "Paul Levi, an exceptionally capable and cultivated
intellectual who had been a close friend of Rosa Luxemburg,
[for having] expelled the 'putschists' and Anarchists from
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his [sic] party." The latter tendencies had formed the
Kommunistische Arbeiters Partei Deutschlands (KAPD), or
German Communist Workers' Party, and were admitted to the
Comintern as sympathizing members. Unfortunately for Levi,
he came into conflict with the Central Committee of the KPD
over his opposition to the "21 Conditions." Outvoted on the
CC, Levi resigned and the leadership of the party passed to
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August Thalheimer and Heinrich Brandler. After the failure 
of the 'March Action', Levi wrote slanderous pamphlets at­
tacking the leadership of both the KPD and the ECCI. Even­
tually, he and his supporters went on to join the USPD.
The 'March Action' had taken place with this volatile 
state of affairs inside the KPD for a backdrop. Historians 
continue to debate the extent of Comintern involvement in 
the decision to stage the uprising, and while there is no 
doubt that there were Comintern representatives in Germany, 
who "may have had [specific] instructions from Zinoviev," 
arguments that the KPD was simply manipulated from Moscow
for purely Russian ends do not appear to hold up in light of
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documentable evidence. It should not be overlooked that
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the sense of opportunities lost because of the KPD's inac­
tion during the Kapp putsch a year earlier had led to sig­
nificant support for a policy of action within the party. 
Indeed, although the leadership which replaced Levi was not 
from the left wing, it did subscribe to the notion that the 
time was ripe for a transition from revolutionary propaganda 
to revolutionary action, the so-called "theory of the
offensive." This view had already begun to conflict with the 
increasingly cautious Comintern policy.
5. In Soviet Russia, also during March 1921, the 
sailors of the Kronstadt naval garrison mutinied following a 
winter of rising discontent over the policies of war commun­
ism. Even as the Kronstadt rebellion was unfolding, the 
tenth congress of the Russian Communist Party (b) was in 
session, and acting to replace the mechanisms of war commun­
ism with those of the New Economic Policy. It must be re­
peated that while war communism, being a series of ad hoc 
responses to conditions of civil war and foreign interven­
tion, had certainly not been implemented as a consciously 
conceived vehicle for an heroic 'leap' Into pure communism 
by an act of will alone, "illusions" did emerge over the 
course of the period. Lenin and other leaders later fre­
quently made references to such "illusions"— consequently 
(particularly in its early stages), the N.E.P. was widely 
regarded as a 'retreat1.
The beginning of 1921 is for all these reasons fre­
quently seen as marking the apogee of revolutionary volunta­
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rism within the Comintern until the 'turn to the left' of
the late 1920s. Some historians suggest that during the
years 1919-1920 the communist parties had come to conflate
their optimism regarding the prospects and imminence of the
European revolution with their own capacity to determine the
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course and pace of events. There is no doubt that the
Comintern regarded the situation in the post-war years as
revolutionary, and that the member sections expected and
worked toward the overthrow of capitalism in one or several
countries of Europe. But this is not so strange, as many
members of the bourgeoisie and its ideologues, not least
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among these John Maynard Keynes, demonstrated by both 
rhetoric and action that they shared at least somewhat the 
assessment of the situation (if not the goals) provided by 
the Comintern.
While it is one thing to take note of the sense of 
revolutionary optimism within Comintern circles prior to the 
third congress, it is quite another to leap from this to the 
following 'analysis' by Braunthal:
The Third Congress of the Communist International, 
which met in July 1921, no longer called upon the Com­
munist Parties, as the Second Congress had done, to 
'hasten' the revolution; its slogan was: ’Go out to the
masses!’ The congress declared that Communist parties 
should avoid revolutionary action which had no prospect 
of succeeding [such action had of course never been 
encouraged— N.K.], but should try to capture the majority 
of the working class by pursuing a day-to-day struggle to 
win immediate benefits for the workers.[207]
Braunthal misleadingly implies that a concern with mass
politics was absent until the 'To the Masses!’ slogan. But a
year earlier, the second congress had also instructed the
2G7
member sections "to keep always in closest touch with the
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broadest masses of the proletariat." Jane Degras similar­
ly writes that "although Levi had been expelled for attack­
ing the policy of artificially creating revolutionary situa­
tions, it was his policy which was in fact adopted" at the
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third congress. But the "ECCI Statement on the Expulsion 
of Paul Levi" which Degras herself supplies reads:
In the name of the small bureau and the entire ECCI, 
comrade Zinoviev declared, 'It is an abominable lie that 
the ECCI or its representatives provoked the March 
rising. This fable was needed by the German counter­
revolution, on whose side Levi stood....* Even if Paul 
Levi were nine-tenths right in his views of the March 
offensive, he would still be liable to expulsion from the 
party because of his unprecedented violation of disci­
pline and because, by his action, ini the given circum­
stances , he dealt the party a blow in the back.L210J
One might also recall Lenin's comments on Levi, noted above,
which were once again cited by Degras herself without in any
apparent way affecting her conclusions regarding the Levi 
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affair.
Far from accurately reflecting either the state of mind 
or the issued proclamations of the second congress, opinions 
such as Braunthal*s or Degras' considerably and misleadingly 
overstate the extent to which voluntarist delusions came to 
be codified in Comintern instructions. Leaving aside the 
fact that communist action during this period was only 
intermittently and sporadically audacious, and that there 
was no talk of "revolutionary war" after Brest-Litovsk, it 
is necessary to point out again that the "Theses on the 
Basic Tasks of the Communist International" (already refer­
red to above) approved at the second congress was in fact a
rather pragmatic document. The idea that "to accelerate the
revolution" is an "immediate task" of the communist parties
appears embedded in the fifth thesis in the section on
preparatory work, and is not mentioned again in fourteen
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pages of manuscript. Note also that to call something an 
"immediate task" does not necessarily imply that it is the 
only or even most consequential one. When seen in the con­
text of the document, "to accelerate the revolution" does 
not leap out as a dominant ’slogan1 or theme, but rather as 
one "task" (among many others) which is "immediate" in the 
sense of proximate--the situation was a revolutionary or at 
least potentially revolutionary one. That politically active 
persons regarded the period as such should not seem so 
strange, except perhaps to those who have never been able
(then or since) to see anything but "a world that was either
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indifferent or hostile to Communist revolution." The di­
rective "to accelerate the revolution" is immediately quali­
fied by the warning that the communist parties must proceed 
by "taking care not to provoke [the revolution] artificially 
before adequate preparations have been made." The bulk of 
the document, indeed, consists precisely of a chronicling of 
the necessary tasks of preparation rather than acceleration:
[T]o attract not only the entire proletariat, or its 
overwhelming majority, but also the entire mass of work­
ing people.... [T]o rally the scattered communist forces, 
to create a united communist party in each country....
[To secure the support of] the overwhelming majority of 
the proletariat.... [To seek this support in] all organi­
zations, unions and associations of the working and ex­
ploited masses without exception.[214]
The third congress does mark a watershed in Comintern
2G9
politics, but it represents not as dramatic a reversal as 
Braunthal, Degras and others suggest. In this regard at 
least, the 'official' Comintern periodization of its own 
history, which speaks only of a "high point" in "direct 
revolutionary action" around the end of 1920 and the begin­
ning of 1921, is nearer the mark than the assessment offered
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by social-democratic writers. There was recognition of an 
"ebb in the revolutionary tide," but the sense of retreat 
was certainly not so general as to precipitate a complete 
and thorough break with extant tactics. The Communist Inter­
national's 'turn to the right' was a protracted manuever, it 
was not cleanly executed, it was not undertaken without 
vacillation and ambivalence. Moreover, as will be seen 
shortly, even before the 'turn to the right* was complete in 
any real sense, it already became possible to detect ele­
ments of the subsequent 'turn to the left'!
Third Congress of the Communist International
June-July 1921
At the congress, Lenin presented "Theses for a Report
on the Tactics of the RCP" which served as the bassis of his
spoken report. In both the document and the speech, Lenin
introduced the theme which he would develop in the coming
months, viz., that "the development of the international
revolution, which we predicted, is proceeding, but not along
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as straight a line as we had expected." The result was
"that a certain equilibrium has now undoubtedly set in
between the forces that have [until now been] waging an
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open, armed struggle." This did not mean a victory or
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defeat for either side, or even a decisive shift in the tide 
of battle. Rather, this "brief respite" did not rule out an 
upsurge in revolutionary action, even as it offered an 
opportunity to "thoroughly prepare for revolution and make 
a deep study of its concrete d e v e l o p m e n t a d a p t  our tac­
tics to this zigzag line of history;...[and win] over the
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majority of the proletariat."
The general "Theses on Tactics" (drafted by the Russian 
and German delegations) adopted at the third congress sound­
ed similar themes. "The world revolution... will require a 
fairly long period of revolutionary struggle," although "in 
the period of chronic capitalist decay, the continuous revo­
lutionary sapping comes at times to a head in an acute 
crisis." Moreover,
the world economic crisis which began in the middle of 
1920 and spread over the whole world, increasing unem­
ployment everywhere, proves to the international prole­
tariat that the bourgeoisie are unable to rebuild the 
world anew.... [T]he illusion that by renouncing the 
conquest of political power in revolutionary struggle 
[social-democracy] could gradually and peacefully achieve 
economic power and self-government, is fading away....
The most important question before the Communist Inter­
national is to win predominating influence over the ma­
jority of the working class.... For despite the objec­
tively revolutionary situation...the majority of the 
workers are not yet under communist influence....[219]
Contrary to Braunthal*s implication, the emphasis newly
placed on partial demands in the Comintern "Theses" was not
the result of a fundamental strategic re-orientation. The
"Theses** state:
Communist parties can develop only in struggle....
The entire agitation and propaganda, all the work of the 
communist parties, must be informed with the conscious­
ness that no lasting improvement in the position of the 
proletarian masses is possible on a capitalist basis....
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But this should not imply a renunciation of the struggle 
for the practical, urgent needs of the proletariat until 
it is ready to fight for the dictatorship....
The task of the communist parties is to extend, to 
deepen, and to unify this struggle for concrete demands. 
Every partial action undertaken by the working masses to 
achieve a partial demand, every serious strike, mobilizes 
the entire bourgeoisie, who...also bring into action 
their entire State machine.... The workers who fight for 
partial demands will be automatically forced into a 
struggle against the entire bourgeoisie and their State 
apparatus....
Any struggle may turn into a struggle for power....[220]
Fundamentally, the Comintern continued to regard the period
as belonging to ,fthe epoch of world revolution," in which
the communist party must be "by its very nature an attacking
party,...obliged, whenever a defensive struggle grows in
depth and extent, to turn it into an attack on capitalist 
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society."
G.D.H. Cole, like Braunthal, considers that "in 1921
and for the next two or three years, Comintern policy moved
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sharply rightwards." Insofar as Cole succeeds in making
good his case, he does so primarily by getting the dates all
wrong. Writes Cole, without citation: "Thus was born, in
June 1921 [ i^.£., at the third congress— N.K.] the notion of
223
the 'United Front'." In fact, however, the "Directives on
the United Front of the Workers" were only issued at a 
meeting of the ECCI In December 1921. They allowed for joint 
action by Comintern affiliated workers on the one hand, and 
sympathizers of the Second International and the Independ­
ents on the other. This was permissible insofar as "the 
influence of the mounting capitalist attack...has awakened 
among the workes a spontaneous striving toward unity" which 
could, through the use of united front tactics, win over
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workers to the revolutionary camp. It was stressed, of 
course, that this 'unity* could under no circumstances be 
allowed to lead to "tendencies which would in fact amount to 
the dissolution of communist parties and groups into the 
united but formless bloc." This meant among other things 
that "communists must retain the unconditional right and 
possibility of expressing their opinion... not only before 
and after action has been taken but also, if necessary, 
during its course." More significantly, several member sec­
tions objected to the tactics of a united front as present­
ed, with the result that they were not finally approved 
until the June 1922 meeting of the ECCI, almost a year after 
the third congress. Even so, there was sufficient continued 
objection to the united front that the question was added to 
the agenda of the fourth congress (November 1922). By that 
time, a 'left* distinction was already being drawn between a 
united front "from above" (collaboration of communist and 
socialist leaders in organizing joint action) and a united 
front "from below" (an "agitational and organizational ral­
lying of the working masses"). Only the latter, it was said,
could ever signify the "true realization" of the united 
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front tactic. Cole, however, Incorrectly (by about a year
too late) dates the united front "from above*' and "from
below" distinction only from late 1923, saying that with
225
this change "Comintern policy swung again leftwards." 
Stranger still is Cole's claim (again without reference) 
that "other slogans" such as "the cry for a ’Workers' Gov-
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eminent'" originated with the third congress. In fact,
however, the tactic of communist participation in "Workers'
Governments" was officially approved only at the fourth
Comintern congress, a year and a half later than Cole 
227
suggests.
Both the extent and decisiveness of the Communist In­
ternational's 'turn to the right' are thus greatly exagger­
ated by a writer like Braunthal, who overlooks all of the 
considerable elements of continuity between the second and 
third congresses, or Cole, who inaccurately ascribes all 
aspects of the rightward drift to the third congress. Cole's 
assessment therefore has a twofold effect: it makes the 
rightward turn seem much more decisive than it actually was, 
and it creates the false impression of a fairly well-defined 
period of several years duration in which 'right-wing' poli­
cies and tactics were in place. In fact, however, a slightly 
less cavalier attitude to the dating of events shows that 
even over the course of the drift to the right, counter­
tendencies of a leftward inclination were operative.
At one of the early sessions of the third congress, 
Trotsky delivered a speech on the "World Economic Crisis and 
the New Tasks of the Communist International," and together 
with Varga he drafted the "Theses on the World Situation and 
the Tasks of the Comintern," which were unanimously adopted 
by the congress. In the speech, Trotsky noted that the 
bourgeoisie had grown considerably in "self-assurance" be­
tween 1919 and 1921, but that it was too early to see in 
this the restoration of a capitalist "equilibrium." The
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general tenor of the speech certainly suggests neither that
Trotsky felt the revolutionary moment had passed by, nor
that he believed (any more than Lenin) that a full-scale
228
strategic re-orientation was in order.
Although Trotsky participated in drafting the "Theses,” 
the document also clearly bore the stamp of Varga's think­
ing. The "Theses" reiterated Trotsky's argument to the ef­
fect that the brief post-war recovery was but a fleeting 
"reaction to the fictitious prosperity of wartime. The "nor­
mal sequence of boom and crisis, [which] used to occur on a 
rising curve of industrial development," had been replaced 
by a long term downward trend in which cyclical upturns 
would be brief and "largely speculative in character
[whereas] crises will be prolonged and severe. The present
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crisis in Europe is a crisis of under-production...."
The European war, the "Theses" went on to declare, had 
produced contradictory effects on the development of capi­
talism in the United States. On the one hand, the annihila­
tion of European industrial capacity together with the con­
tinent's demand for materiel stimulated U.S. industrial 
output (reversing the traditional composition of U.S. ex­
ports from predominantly agricultural), and turned the 
United States into the world's largest holder of gold. On 
the other hand, the decline of Europe i-epresented the loss 
of markets for the United States: "Europe needs American 
products but has nothing to offer in return. Europe is 
suffering from anemia; America from plethora." Moreover, the
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depreciation or outright collapse of many European curren-
230
cies exacerbated the difficulties of resuming trade.
In a somewhat confused manner, the "Theses" maintained 
that the process of "proletarianization...[has] made enor­
mous progress...," despite the crisis of accumulation. The 
"Theses" failed to clearly distinguish proletarianization 
from "pauperization," and concluded only that impoverishment 
would provide "the class struggle a tense, bitter, and 
convulsive character." At the same time, it was argued that 
the only means by which European capitalism could be re­
stored would be an even more profound depression in working 
class living standards. "This is what the capitalists are 
asking and this is what the treacherous leaders of the 
Yellow International are recommending.... But the European 
proletariat is not ready to sacrifice itself." The conclu­
sion was by no means quiescent: "[T]he curve of capitalist 
development is downwards, with a few passing upward move­
ments, while the curve of revolution is rising although it
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shows a few falls."
Speaking several months after the third congress on the
(domestic) question of the transition to the New Economic
Policy, Lenin had recourse to a metaphor also applicable to
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the (international) question of the European revolution. 
During the Russo-Japanese war, Lenin recalled, the Russian 
fortress at Port Arthur was captured by the Japanese General 
Nogi in two distinct steps--a "first stage...of furious 
assaults," which was unsuccessful and entailed heavy losses 
for the Japanese, and a second step of protracted, "extreme­
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ly difficult and slow...siege," which eventually led to the 
surrender of Port Arthur. Lenin maintained that while unsuc­
cessful, the first step was necessary and in actuality 
represented "the only possible tactics that could have been 
adopted under the conditions then prevailing, i_.£. , the 
opening of hostilities," for two reasons. First, an attempt 
at direct assault was worth the (not unanticipated) heavy 
cost, in that had it been quickly successful "it would have 
released the Japanese army for operations in other theaters 
of war...." Secondly, "without testing the enemy's power of 
resistance, there would have been no grounds for adopting" 
the tactics of siege. The New Economic Policy on the domes­
tic front, and by extension the shift in Comintern tactics 
on the international front, did not (at least not yet) 
represent a retreat— the period of direct revolutionary 
action was not over, but a different approach was required
in the face of a renewed "general capitalist offensive"
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against the revolutionary proletariat. The Comintern had 
never countenanced ultra-leftism or putschism, but at this 
juncture it was all the more necessary to discourage think­
ing along the lines of the "theory of the offensive" so 
prevalent in, for example, the KPD.
* * *
1. Throughout the spring of 1922, efforts aiming to 
establish a basis for unity between the Second and Third 
Internationals were undertaken by the wizened Vienna (or 
Two-and-a-Half) International, but these came to naught. In
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June 1922 the Second International declared it would no 
longer engage in dialogue with the Comintern and that, in 
essence, the Vienna International could do as it wished. By 
May 1923 these ‘right* and 'center* tendencies in the inter­
national labor movement cane to be amalgamated "under the 
name 'Labor and Socialist International*. It laid down no 
conditions for admission and formulated no policy pro­
gramme." The statutes of the new International left the 
internal policies of the member parties to be formulated 
entirely at the national level although it was declared, 
recalling the ignominy of August 1914, that in the event of 
war the affiliated parties would be required to recognize 
the International as a higher authority. Even Braunthal 
obliquely recognizes the ingenuousness of the scheme, con­
ceding that this was the most that "could be done by 
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statutes. '*
2. With the resumption of diplomatic relations between 
Germany and Soviet Russia after the Rapallo agreement of 
April 1922, the uneasy ambivalence of Soviet attitudes to 
the European capitalist powers moved toward "a single coher­
ent foreign policy In which rapprochement with Germany pre-
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dominated over rapprochement with the western powers."
Under the terms of the agreement, the Russian republic would 
(secretly, of course) aid Germany in avoiding the extraordi­
nary Versailles prohibitions on armaments production, while 
Soviet Russia would share in German technological expertise. 
The treaty contained no secret clauses specifying political 
or military obligations; the principal binding agreement was
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to consult one another prior to commencing on an economic 
undertaking (with a third party) that could affect the 
partner.
3. Following the fascist march on Rome, ?Iussolini was
installed as prime minister of Italy on 30. October 1922,
with his party holding fewer than ten percent of the seats
in parliament and only four of fourteen cabinet positions.
Mussolini’s ascent to power did not cause much of a stir in
bourgeois circles. Indeed, insofar as the European elites at
this time did not merely ignore Mussolini and fascism, they
were actually rather positively disposed toward the develop-
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ments in Italy.
4. At the end of 1922, the Russian Socialist Federal 
Soviet Republic became the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub­
lics (U.S.S.R.), and a constitution formally establishing 
the Union was drawn up in 1923 to replace the earlier treaty 
which had linked the Russian, Ukrainian, White Russian, and 
Trans-Caucasian republics.
Fourth Congress of the Communist International 
November-early December 1922
It was in his report to the congress on "Five Years of 
the Russian Revolution and the Prospects of the World Revo­
lution" that Lenin made his oft-quoted comments on the 
importance of "the idea that we must prepare ourselves for 
the possibility of retreat," and "not only from the view­
point of a country whose economic system [is very back­
ward]...but also from the viewpoint of the Communist Inter­
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national and the advanced Vfest-European countries." Rather
than immediately drawing up a new program, Lenin suggested
that the "most important thing for all of us, Russian and
2 3 7
foreign comrades alike, is to sit down and study." With 
his familiar habit of utilizing the analysis of one problem 
to Illustrate or highlight the central features of another, 
Lenin employed a discussion of the New Economic Policy to 
designate the nature of the retreat underway inside Soviet 
Russia, seeking thereby to specify the characteristics of 
the retreat on the international front whose "possibility" 
had to be "prepared." Insofar as most commentators dwell on 
Lenin's words regarding the preparation for "retreat" (more 
precisely, its "possibility"), they tend to overlook a par­
allel theme in the speech, viz., the way in which the formu­
lation of a "possible line of retreat" could actually repre­
sent a "step forward." These two lines were undoubtedly 
present in Lenin's thinking at that time, and their appear­
ance was an indication of a strategic shift, albeit one of a
different sort than would be identified from an exclusive
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focus on the issue of retreat. Lenin had in fact regarded 
the N.E.P. purely in terms of retreat for only a rather 
brief period. At the time of the fourth Comintern congress, 
only a year and a half after the implementation of the 
N.E.P., Lenin already conceived of the strategy in the dual 
sense outlined above. And significantly, by early 1923,
Lenin would write of the N.E.P. as the vehicle which, admit­
tedly, "is still not the building of socialist society, but
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it is all that is necessary and sufficient for it."
2R0
Whether this was a correct or realistic outlook (it was 
neither) on the prospects of the New Econonic Policy is
entirely beside the point here. What matters is that the
N.E.P. on the domestic front, and the strategic re­
orientation on the international front, were not perceived 
as unequivocal retreats any more than backing out of a blind 
alley and proceeding along a different route would be per­
ceived as failing to arrive at one's destination (or chang­
ing the destination).
The united front tactic already referred to was not a
retreat per se, it was not synonymous with an embrace of
reformism, and finally, it was not "exactly what Levi had 
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fought for." The similarity between Levi's conception of 
the united front and the view of the Comintern extends 
little further than beyond the shared name. In the interests 
of a 'united front' Levi, in 1921, had campaigned to allow 
the Serrati faction of the Italian Socialist Party to remain 
in the Comintern despite its clearly evident refusal to 
apply in practice the "21 Conditions." As noted earlier, the 
party split over this issue, with the Serrati faction de­
parting from the Communist International. It is simply not 
true, as Ben Fowkes maintains, that the situation after the 
Comintern's adoption of united front tactics was somehow 
substantially altered and that the attitude toward Serrati 
would have been different. There is no indication that the 
Third International moved to dispense with or even weaken 
its organizational directives (indeed, a more thoroughgoing
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'bolshevization' was in the offing). More accurately, activ­
ity under the rubric of the united front was a refinement of 
the 'splitting' tactics encountered a few years previously, 
and so often regarded as an index of the 'leftist' Comin­
tern. "The reformists need a split," declared the "Theses on 
Tactics" adopted at the fourth congress, and the united
front was the vehicle by which this would be accomplish- 
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ed. Significantly, both Karl Radek and Zinoviev (re­
spectively, the ECCI spokespersons for the united front 
'from above' and 'from below') very emphatically declared 
that the united front was "but a first attempt to drive the 
social-democrats to the wall" and that an interpretation of
the united front as a unification of communism and social-
242
democracy "would be the biggest crisis we could commit."
At a June 1923 meeting of the ECCI, Zinoviev stated that the
united front was a "strategic manuever [which] consists in
our appealing constantly to people who, we know in advance,
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will not go along with us."
Similarly, the virtue of the struggle for a workers' 
government was seen to reside in the possibilities it of­
fered "for invigorating the revolutionary labor movement" 
and for "concentrating the proletariat and unleashing revo­
lutionary struggles." Communist support of social-democratic 
(and "liberal") workers' governments was specifically pro­
hibited ; "[o]n the contrary, [communists] must vigorously
expose to the masses the real character of these pseudo-
244
workers' governments."
In sum, the mood at the fourth congress was cautious,
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but not unequivocally so. Lenin's speech, with its enigmatic
appraisal of the "possibility of retreat," nonetheless held
245
to an outlook for "excellent" prospects. Trotsky at this
time was particularly adamant that following the political
defeats recently suffered by the revolutionary proletariat,
"the industrial revival will not come as a blow hurling us
back but as an impulse propelling us forward" because the
workers will "begin to feel more secure...and begin to press 
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forward." As always, Trotsky emphasized the subjective 
and organizational factor:
If we cancel out the revolutionary nature of the work­
ing class and its struggle and the work of the Communist 
Party and of the trade unions, that is, if we cancel out 
that for the sake of which we exist and act, and take 
instead the objective mechanics of capitalism, then we 
could say: '...capitalism will restore its own 
equilibrium*.[247]
The attitude of the Comintern sections was by no means 
quiescent, and substantial opposition to united front tac­
tics (including the 'from below' version) was voiced by the
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left. Finally, the earlier Comintern prognosis of the 
inevitability of capitalist collapse was not only left unal­
tered, it was strongly reaffirmed. The "Theses on Tactics" 
adopted by the congress, in the second heading titled "The 
Period of Capitalist Decline," stated:
The general picture of the decay of capitalist economy 
is not mitigated by those unavoidable fluctuations which 
are characteristic of the capitalist system both in its 
ascendancy and in its decline. The attempts of bourgeois 
and social-democratic economists to explain the improve­
ment which began in the second half of 1921...rest partly 
on the desire to falsify the facts, partly on the lack of 
insight of these lackeys of capital....
Capitalism will be subject to cyclical fluctuations 
till the hour of its death....
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What capitalism is passing through today is nothing but 
its death throes. The collapse of capitalism is inevi- 
table. [ 249~]
* * *
1. In January 1923, soon after the fourth congress, the 
French army occupied the Ruhr in response to Germany's 
failure to meet certain war reparations deliveries specified 
by the Versailles treaty. The Comintern, PCF and KPD quickly 
organized protests and issued denunciations, while at the 
same time opposing the German government’s advocacy of "pas­
sive resistance" (work slowdowns, etc.) on the grounds that 
the Ruhr conflict was a struggle between the French and 
German bourgeoisies. The initial popular response to the 
occupation was an upsurge of German nationalism and a wave 
of 'patriotic' strikes. At the Leipzig congress of the KPD 
(28. January - 2. February 1923) a vocal 'left' minority and 
the 'right* majority both distanced themselves from this 
nationalist tide, and KPD Reichstag deputies opposed the 
passive resistance tactic in January, declaring against a 
"national united front" and in favor of a "united front of 
the proletariat." Thalhelmer (of the KPD right wing) quickly 
softened his stand, however, and as early as February was 
warning of the greater danger posed by the French bourgeoi­
sie. But even Thalheimer did not go so far as withdrawing 
the demand for a simultaneous struggle against the German 
bourgeoisie. Although it did not endorse Thalheimer's views,
the ECCI (through Klara Zetkin) urged caution, by contrast
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with the KPD left and its "occupy the factories" slogan.
Over the spring and summer of 1923, in the face of
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continuing military occupation and the famous German hyper­
inflation, the political and economic crisis led to a 
strengthening of the KPD left and a radicalization of popu­
lar sentiment generally. In April the ECCI intervened to 
prevent a split in the KPD, calling members of the factions 
to Moscow for a conference. Four KPD leftists (including 
Ruth Fischer and Ernst Thaelmann) were added to the central 
committee, and the ECCI issued an opinion which tilted more 
to the left than had been the case previously: M[T]he strug­
gle against left tendencies can be carried on successfully 
only if the KPD Zentrale eliminates, primarily by a struggle
against the right-wing elements, the reasons for the revolu-
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tionary mistrust of the left." The ECCI also sided with
the left in rejecting the workers* government established in
Saxony as a clear example of the united front from above,
and as such a form of workers* government which the fourth
congress had prohibited the previous November.
These concessions to the growing influence of the KPD
left, however, belie the fact that the ECCI (along with the
KPD majority), failed to clearly perceive the developing
revolutionary situation in Germany. A series of strikes in
May, June and July was not interpreted as being of any great
significance, since they generally involved local, partial 
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demands. The SPD, losing ground to the KPD as more mili­
tant views found favor among social-democratic workers, came
to be increasingly polarized— some SPD parliamentary depu-
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ties called for the overthrow of the Cuno government. In
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the face of all this, however, the KPD majority was expect­
ing the need to organize only "defensive battles" against 
counter-revolution, and was therefore (along with the ECCI) 
caught unawares at the outbreak of a spontaneous and grass­
roots KPD led general strike of massive dimensions in mid- 
August. Only then did the KPD national leadership move to 
support the action; the social-democrats did not until, 
fearful of losing its remaining credibility, the SPD with­
drew parliamentary support of Cuno, thereby forcing him to 
resign. Only by late August did the ECCI begin to proclaim
that "conditions in Germany are becoming more and more 
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acute...."
Once again a socialist government was a real possibili­
ty in Germany, and once again the SPD drew back from the 
verge of decisive action. A new government was formed by 
Gustav Stresemann of the Volkspartel (German People’s Party, 
actually a party of the large bourgeoisie), and was joined 
by four SPD ministers, Hilferding among them. Dexterously 
blending a policy of police repression against the strike 
leaders and factory councils with wage increases to appease 
the rank and file, the Stresemann regime rode out the crisis 
as the strike movement subsided.
Throughout September, KPD representatives and ECCI 
officials met in Moscow, and the decision was made to stage 
an insurrection during October. Brandler, of the KPD right, 
hesitated but was overruled. The actual uprising was not 
only belated, but the preparatory work and logistical opera­
tions were botched as well, with most of the participants
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lacking weapons. At the last moment, as the Stresemann
regime ordered the keichswehr into Saxony and Thueringia in
order to disband working class militias and remove the
united front governments, the KPD central committee voted to
call off the insurrection. The decision to call off the
armed struggle was made on Brandler's recommendation, the
justification being the SPD's reluctance to join the call
for an uprising in defense of the united front governments.
News of these developments did not reach the Hamburg KPD
district in time, and some 1300 communists confronted 6000
soldiers and police. The uprising was put down after three
days, leaving 21 workers and 17 government troops dead. The
defeat of the working class extended far beyond the suppres-
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sion of the uprising. By mid-December, the Stresemann 
regime was replaced by an even more right-wing government 
under Wilhelm Marx (Centre Party), the KPD and its press 
were banned, and the workweek in industry was lengthened to 
59 hours.
Among the political effects of the October events in
Germany was a further strengthening of the leftward drift
already apparent in the communist movement. The right wing
leadership of the KPD (Brandler, Thalheimer, and Zetkin)
were replaced by the leftists Fischer, Thaelmann, and Arkady
Maslow. It must be emphasized that while the ECCI ratified
and abetted the leadership change, the impetus for this
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action originated within the KPD. Indeed, the waning 
influence of Brandler and the KPD right had begun in the
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spring of 1923, and reflected the growing strength of the
ascendent KPD left, as well as the increasing ECCI criticism
of the Brandler leadership's interpretation of the united 
257
front tactic. After the October defeat and the demise of 
the KPD right, Zetkin complained that any criticism of the 
KPD leadership (by implication, herself included) was inap­
propriate, or at least must equally apply to the ECCI, since 
the latter had supported and endorsed KPD policies. While it 
is true enough that the ECCI had underestimated the extent 
and depth of the crisis in Germany (the KPD leadership's 
assessment was even wider of the mark), it is likewise true
that the ECCI had been pushing the KPD to adopt a more
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leftward orientation. Part of the difficulty consisted in 
the scope of the ECCI's criticisms not being fully transmit­
ted to Berlin— the chief Comintern representative in Germany 
was Radek, whose compulsive caution and close personal rela­
tionship to the KPD right considerably dampened the effect 
of ECCI communications. Even assuming the ECCI liaison to be 
all-powerful (which was not the case, especially in Germa­
ny), the fact that this liaison was Radek sufficed to temper 
the influence that ECCI leftists such as Zinoviev exercised 
over German affairs.
2. Relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain 
continued to deteriorate in 1923. In May, the British For­
eign Secretary dispatched a threatening note (the 'Curzon 
ultimatum') complaining, among other things, of Comintern 
agitation in India and the Middle East as a violation of the 
Anglo-Soviet trade agreement of March 1921.
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3. The Ruhr intervention had further complicated the
"equivocal relation between German communism and German
nationalism," and throughout the summer of 1923 the KPD and
the Comintern pursued a confusing policy with regard to
259
emergent fascist sentiments. The third ECCI plenum (June
1923) issued a resolution which described fascism as "a
characteristic phenomenon of decay, a reflection of the
progressive dissolution of capitalist economy and of the
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disintegration of the bourgeois state." The resolution 
suggested that the social strata drawn to fascism consisted 
of petty bourgeois elements who had been radicalized by war 
and economic crisis, and whose "vague expectations... of a 
radical social Improvement, to be brought about by reformist 
socialism, have also been disappointed." The bankruptcy of 
the social-democratic leadership thus caused the radicalized 
petty bourgeoisie "to despair of socialism itself." On the 
basis of this analysis, the Comintern for a brief time 
adopted an ambivalent attitude to the radical German nation­
alists. Although the Comintern line called for a ruthless 
and relentless struggle against fascism, in his famous 
"Schlageter speech" Radek (who sided with the KPD right) 
implied a coincidence of interests between socialism and 
radical German nationalism against Entente capital (French 
in particular), and went so far as to martyr a German fas­
cist executed by the French occupation forces. On several 
occasions throughout the summer, fascist and communist 
speakers shared public platforms, but this practice was
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terminated (on fascist initiative) long before the October
events. Although there was no significant objection to the
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"Schlageter policy" from within the KPD, the notion of a 
"defense of the revolutionary fatherland by anticipation" 
not unexpectedly created acute discomfort in the French and 
central European parties.
4. The Bulgarian Communist Party, a powerful organiza­
tion with solid membership (40,000) and electoral support 
(about 20 percent of the total vote in April 1923, making it 
the second largest party), suffered a disastrous setback as 
a consequence of tactical errors. The ruling Peasant Union 
of Alexander Stambuliski was overthrown, and Stambuliski 
killed, in a June 1923 coup d ’ etat organized by military 
officers and elements of the large bourgeoisie. In accord­
ance with an earlier Internal resolution, the Bulgarian CP 
remained neutral on the grounds that coalition with or
support of the Stambuliski regime was outside the scope
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permitted by united front tactics. At the time of the 
coup, the third plenum of the ECCI was meeting in Moscow and 
issued orders for the BCP to resist the overthrow of 
Stambuliski. The latter was likened to Mikhail Kerensky, 
whose Provisional Government in Russia the Bolsheviks fought 
to support during General Kornilov’s coup attempt in July 
1917, even though the Kerensky regime was not sympathetic to 
the working class. "The putschists are now the enemy, and 
must be defeated. Unite for the fight against the white 
revolt not only with the broad masses of the peasantry, but 
with the leaders of the peasant party who are still
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alive." Even the cautious Radek found himself urging: on 
the Bulgarian Communists.
The central committee of the Bulgarian party met in 
July and rejected the ECCI directive, but by August a new 
leadership emerged (evidently on Bulgarian initiative) which 
favored an alliance with the remnants of the Peasant Union 
against the white dictatorship. An abortive uprising took 
place in September, was quickly defeated, and the Bulgarian 
CP was utterly decimated in the ensuing white terror.
Thirteenth Congress of the RCP(b)
May 1924
The October uprising in Germany and the associated 
controversy inside the KPD not surprisingly would loom large 
at the upcoming fifth Comintern congress in June 1924. Just 
prior to this the same issues were discussed at the thir­
teenth congress of the Russian party.
Bukharin delivered the report on the international 
political situation and developments in the Comintern. In 
his estimation, England's increasingly tenuous hold on her 
colonies (esp. India), the fiscal crisis of the French 
government, the lengthening of the workday throughout 
Europe, and the cooling of Anglo-French relations in the 
wake of the Ruhr occupation all pointed to a westward shift 
(i_.e. , away from Germany) of political opportunities for the 
communist movement. While the bourgeoisie was no longer 
facing a critical situation, it was in need of a "breathing 
spell." This would find expression in efforts by the bour-
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geoisie to seek its own united front, a tactic which not by 
accident would assume the form of fascism in the defeated 
countries, and "pacifism" (the "liberal bourgeoisie plus 
liberal workers' politics," _e.g., the MacDonald regime in
England and the 'Left Bloc' in France) in the victorious
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ones.
Recall that while this was the occasion on which Bukha­
rin first spoke of "a certain stabilization" of capitalism, 
he used the opportunity to speak primarily of instances of 
heightened class antagonisms, including those cases where 
the communist parties had suffered defeats (Germany, Bul­
garia, etc.). The political "crisis" which gripped the par­
ties of the International stemmed, in Bukharin's view, from 
the application of united front tactics (described as the 
tactics of splitting off "those layers of the working class 
infected by petty bourgeois ideology" from the social demo­
cratic movement) by communist parties which had not yet
proven themselves capable of shaking off the vestiges of
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opportunist, petty bourgeois political habits. The danger 
which this entailed was a "right danger," and one which 
perhaps the International had been somewhat slow to 
recognize:
The extreme left in the KPD...had for a long time 
signalled of a right danger. And with the full authority 
of the Communist International we supported, for a con­
siderable period, the right groupings in the party. But 
after remnants of social democratic ideology revealed 
themselves among the right over these two major questions 
[_i.e^  , the coalition government in Saxony and the inter­
pretation of united front tactics as "bloc politics" 
rather than an "agitational manuever"— N.K.]..., when it 
became absolutely apparent that a great deal of the 
unfavorable consequences of the October events were bound
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up with the right orientation, after this the question 
arose, in a preliminary way, that perhaps we should alter 
our party orientation.[266]
Indeed, Bukharin somewhat defensively continued, "we had 
continuously been saying, in opposition to a number of 
comrades, that much of what the left was saying was cor­
rect." A decisive "turn of the wheel to the left" was also
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necessary in the British party.
Trotsky had begun to oppose the policies of the Russian
party during 1923, and In October sent a letter to the
central committee outlining the economic and political spe-
268
cifics of his disagreements with the Politburo. Only a
week later, the so-called platform of the 46 was distributed
within the party, and echoed many of Trotsky's complaints.
Although "no definite evidence exists of collusion between
Trotsky and the authors of the program," the fact that many
of the 46 were associates and political allies of Trotsky’s
easily suggested that a formal opposition bloc was in the
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process of coalescing. In his report at the thirteenth
congress, Bukharin took note of these developments in his
observation that the right wing in member sections of the
Comintern was almost invariably supported by the right in
the Russian party (these tendencies being personified re-
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spectively by Radek-Brandler and Trotsky).
Fifth Congress of the Communist International 
Mid June-early July 1924
Zinoviev's opening speech, which as usual was a report
on the work of the ECCI since the previous congress, echoed
Bukharin’s address to the Russian party on the imperative of
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maintaining an implacable hostility to social democracy. By 
way of a criticism of Radek and Brandler, Zinoviev declared 
that the need for an attack on the reformists was particu­
larly acute now that social democracy was in power (England 
and France), so as to expose the true nature of the
"democratic-pacifist" phase and of social democracy as "the
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third bourgeois party." The SPD now had to be regarded as 
"a wing of fascism," rather than (as in the Radek-Brandler 
perspective) a party defeated by fascism. If social democra­
cy had intended to combat fascism, argued Zinoviev, the 
social democrats would have moved closer to the communists.
The fact that this did not happen proved the SPD had become
272
a wing of fascism.
One of the most widespread misconceptions is that this 
identification of social democracy and fascism ("social 
fascism") dates only from the supposedly ’Stalinist third 
period* (ca, 1928). It should therefore be noted that the 
notion of social fascism emerged earlier, its source was not 
Stalin, but the Zinoviev leadership of the Comintern. E.H. 
Carr documents the fusion of social democracy and fascism by 
Zinoviev from as early as 1922, and convincingly demon­
strates that the principal support for the notion of social 
fascism stemmed from the KPD, especially after the October
1923 debacle and the advent of the left, rather than from 
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Stalin. Bukharin was also at this time conspicuous in the 
Comintern leadership (a leading member of the presidium of 
the ECCI), and although his attacks on social democracy were
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as vituperative as Zinoviev's, Bukharin did not use the term 
social fascism. For Bukharin, social democracy and fascism 
were not exactly one and the same thing, although they were 
both "tactics" reflective of the "same objective require­
ment of the bourgeoisie," viz, to capture a measure of mass 
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support. In his 1928 "Draft Programme of the Communist
International" Bukharin said that "Social-Democracy not
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infrequently plays an openly fascist role."
Perhaps the most shocking episode in the documentation 
of the social fascism saga is recounted by Theodore Draper, 
and is worth quoting at length:
Until now, it has been widely believed that Bukharin 
was wholly opposed to the concept of social-fascism and 
that Stalin had forced it on him.... This belief was 
based on a passage in Professor Daniels* book: ’Behind 
the scenes, Bukharin expressed opinions which belied his 
official view of the right danger. To the Swiss Comintern 
Secretary, Humbert-Droz,...Bukharin wrote to express 
sympathy with the idea that the communists* best in­
terests lay in alliances with the Social Democrats 
against fascism. He apologized for not being able to 
support this position in public because of the critical 
situation which he faced within the Communist Party of 
Russia*. As his authority for this startling revelation, 
Professor Daniels gave 'Bukharin to J. Humbert-Droz, 
September 1928 (Humbert-Droz Archive)'....
I went through the Humbert-Droz Archive twice without 
being able to find such a letter. In puzzlement, I wrote 
to Professor Daniels, and he has informed me that it was 
all a 'mistake', based on hearsay.[276]
Draper, like E.H. Carr, correctly and assiduously 
traces the origins of the concept of social fascism, and he 
moreover chronicles the influential historians of the Com­
munist International and the years from which they mistaken­
ly date social fascism: Franz Borkenau (one of his books has 
it 1929-1930, the other 1929), Barrington Moore, Jr. (July 
1928), Hugh Seton-Watson (after July 1928), Isaac Deutscher
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(1929), and R. Paine Dutt (May 1929). Draper's list omits
Braunthal, who also perpetuates the myth that Zinoviev
"merely echoed Stalin, who d e c l a r e d S o c i a l  Democracy is,
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objectively, the moderate wing of fascism’." Zinoviev was
not 'echoing' anyone; in fact, precisely the reverse is true
because the passage attributed to Stalin appeared only in
September 1924, several months after Zinoviev's speech, in
one of Stalin's earliest discourses on international af- 
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fairs. Braunthal did not quote Stalin directly, choosing
instead to rely on Deutscher. The latter does refer to the 
original text, but steadfastly maintains, without explana­
tion, that the doctrine of social fascism stems from 
279
Stalin. Fernando Claudin also remarks on "Stalin’s thesis
of 'social Fascism'," and the "conceptions (such as that of
'social F a s c i s m ' . w h i c h  had been laid down by Stalin," but
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without any references at all. Bukharin's biographer
Stephen Cohen considers social fascism to be one of Stalin's
"Comintern initiatives," cites Stalin's 1924 remark, but
does not mention Zinoviev's earlier identification of social
281
democracy and fascism.
Hone of this is to suggest that Stalin did not sub­
sequently participate in the application of a distended 
concept of social fascism by his party (and Comintern) 
constituency over the unfolding of the 'third period'. But 
to say this carries very different implications than to 
claim that the 'third period' and its political conceptions 
were merely the international analog, conveyed by "automatic
296
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transmission" (Deutscher), of a Stalinist left turn in
Soviet domestic policy, or that these policies were "laid
down" (Claudin) by Stalin, or engineered "upon Stalin's
283
personal orders" (Borkenau).
In the discussion following Zinoviev's report, Radek 
and Brandler defended their actions before and during the 
October events, the former pointing out that (at the time) 
"Comrade Zinoviev did not hold our entry into the [Saxon 
coalition] government to have been a mistake," and the 
latter arguing that he (and the recently replaced KPD lead­
ership generally) had throughout 1923 merely been applying
the directives and slogans of the third and fourth cong-
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resses of the Comintern. Klara Zetkin supported Radek and
Brandler, arguing that if the ousted KPD leadership was
being accused of opportunism, the ECCI must be equally
blamed for not having earlier identified the nature and
285
sources of this opportunism.
Many historians, E.H. Carr among them, claim that these
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arguments left Zinoviev 'embarrased', but it is not the 
case that Zinoviev developed his criticisms of the right 
only ex post (as Zetkin maintained). Radek and Zinoviev had 
been at odds over the interpretation of the "workers' gov­
ernment" slogan since its inception— as the ECCI representa­
tive in Germany, Radek was in a position to ensure that 
practice corresponded more closely to his views. And while 
the "'workers' government' [had been] defined In Imprudent 
detail as including left coalitions of all kinds" (Carr), 
it must be recalled (as Carr does not) that communists were
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specifically prohibited from participating in reformist 
coalitions. That is, the "definition" of a "workers' govern­
ment" had been written as a list, "including left coalitions
of all kinds," but participation in these was specifically
287
ruled out by the original 1922 tactical thesis no. 11.
Also in the discussion of Zinoviev's report, Radek
adamantly claimed to be "in absolute agreement with comrade
Zinoviev that one cannot have an united front from above
unless one has it from below." And the united front from
below "we had not organized; our factory councils were
divided, they were nothing but separate atoms." After this
assessment, Radek was about to continue, and opened with:
"If the Saxon government had relied upon the congress of
factory councils...." when Ruth Fischer (of the KPD left)
exclaimed from her seat "Why was it not called together?"
Radek professed this to be "just the mistake which I admit,"
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to which Fischer replied "We asked for It six times!"
The point is that ambiguity and dispute did not sudden­
ly materialize only as a consequence of some 'rewriting' of 
history on the part of Zinoviev (however self-serving his 
remarks). There had been imprecision and contentiousness all 
along, on both sides. Zinoviev perhaps could be criticized 
for not being far-sighted enough in the spring of 1923 to 
recognize the developing revolutionary situation (this crit­
icism would apply even more strongly to the right, however); 
he should perhaps have acted sooner in a more decisive 
fashion, but his ambivalent maneuvering must be seen in
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light of the very real danger of a split in the KPD through­
out 1923. Radek had on numerous occasions clashed with the 
ECCI, as Zinoviev successfully pointed out, and in several 
cases prior to the October action the ECCI had sought to 
promote the aspirations of the KPD left, as the "Resolution
of the Fifth Comintern Congress on the Report of the ECCI” 
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pointed out.
It is likely true that the right's tactics precluded 
the possibility of a revolutionary outcome and that the left 
(especially in the Comintern) should have been more percep­
tive and militant in combatting the right's reluctance to 
pursue mass mobilization for revolutionary ends. Far too 
many commentators, however, seem to accept the illogical 
conclusion advanced by the KPD right and its supporters that 
the failure of the October uprising somehow provided a 
vindication of the right's thinking and tactics. While the 
castigation of the right at the fifth congress was therefore 
in many respects on the mark, there nonetheless was a fail­
ure to reconize that only symptoms were being addressed. 
'Bolshevization' was hardly as thorough as many Western 
commentators imagine, and helped serve the far too optimis­
tic opinion that a "Resolution" of the fifth congress was 
quite sufficient to effect a "determined solution" (an as­
sessment provided by the "Resolution" itself) to the prob-
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lems of the KPD.
The "Resolution" did take a distinctly leftward tilt, 
noting that "the danger of right deviations... turned out to 
be far greater In the execution of the united front tactics
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than could have been foreseen," that the united front could 
never be "more than a revolutionary method of agitation and 
of mobilizing the masses," and that any effort to use the 
workers’ government slogan "not for agitation for the prole­
tarian dictatorship, but as a means of coalition with bour­
geois democracy" must be rejected. The notion that social 
democracy was the right wing of the working class had also 
been proven false, and it was necessary to emphasize "the
true character of social democracy as the left wing of the 
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bourgeoisie."
Varga delivered the economic report to the congress, 
and his views were embodied in the "Theses on the World 
Economic Situation." The recent upturn in some of the capi­
talist economies was temporary; the overall situation was 
still one of crisis amidst a general downward trend. The 
"Theses" foresaw rising class conflict as a result of deep­
ening differentiation (caused by the "process of concentra­
tion and cartellization") and regarded as "inevitable" only 
the emergence of "mass movements of the proletariat... in the 
immediate future." Whether these movements would succeed in 
the revolutionary project would depend on "the ability of 
the communist parties to exploit, organizationally and po­
litically, the objectively revolutionary situations which 
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will develop." In a separate and fairly standard docximent 
(drafted by Trotsky) on the tenth anniversary of the out­
break of the war, an incidental comment predicted the demise 




The "Theses on Tactics" adopted at the congress were 
contained in a long document of fifteen sections. Among 
these was an elaboration of Bukharin’s views on the emer­
gence of a "democratic-pacifist phase" in some of the lead­
ing capitalist powers where liberal and social democratic 
governments had ascended to power. The significance of this 
development did not lie in "the beginning of the stabiliza­
tion of the capitalist ’order' on the basis of 'democracy'
and peace, but merely the concealment of its rule while
294
bourgeois world reaction is intensified...." As a corol­
lary, social democracy moved
from being the right wing of the labor movement [to] 
becoming one wing of the bourgeoisie, in places even a 
wing of fascism. That is why it is historically incorrect 
to talk of 'a victory of fascism over social-democracy'. 
So far as their leading strata are concerned, fascism and 
social-democracy are the right and left hands of modern 
capitalism.[295]
The fifth congress reaffirmed the directives issued at 
the two previous congresses concerning the need for commu­
nist parties to become mass organizations. This was one of 
the very few areas where a criticism of the 'ultra-left' was 
apparent: a warning was issued against excessively volun­
tarist attitudes and against the view "that communist par­
ties may be parties of a 'terrorist minority'." Even so, 
this was somewhat tempered (at the beginning of the section 
on organizational tactics) by an emphasis on the importance
of the "subjective factor" as the "cardinal question of the 
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entire epoch."
As regards the tempo of the revolutionary process, the
301
congress perceived "the rise of a new revolutionary wave"
based on the events in Germany and Bulgaria, and waves of
strikes in several of the industrial countries. The major
emphasis was on combatting "right-opportunist tendencies,"
and as such the tactics of the united front were clarified.
The united front from above together with from below were
approved, while the united front from above alone was cate-
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gorically rejected.
Among the more widely known aspects of the fifth cong­
ress was the tactical injunction to "bolshevize" the member 
sections, _i.e., to make the organizational structure of the 
Russian party the mold for the others. "Bolshevization of 
the parties means that our sections must take over for 
themselves everything in Russian bolshevism that has inter­
national significance." The five "basic features of a gen­
uine bolshevik party" were listed: (i) a mass party capable 
of operating under both legal and illegal conditions, (ii) 
the party must be flexible enough (i_.e. , to allow tactical 
maneuver, (iii) the party must be revolutionary and Marxist 
in orientation, (iv) the party must be centralized with no
factions, etc., (v) the party must carry on political activ-
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ity in the armed forces. There was no alteration of or
addendum to the original organizational directives of the
"21 Conditions," it was more the case that
[t]he fifth congress could hardly fail to reflect the 
widening gap between the one party which had a victorious 
revolution to its credit and the parties which had 
failed, or had not even made the attempt. What had hap­
pened inevitably strengthened still further Russian pres­
tige and predominance in Comintern, and popularized the
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view that other parties, in order to qualify themselves 
for the same success, must above all follow the Russian 
model and submit to Russian guidance.[299]
* * *
1. Soviet relations with the capitalist countries, 
apparently in an ambivalent equilibrium during most of 1924 
such that "each blow seemed to be tempered by some fresh 
gain" (Carr), soured considerably thereafter. The German 
tilt to the west (Dawes Plan), the fall of the Labour gov­
ernment in Britain, the election of Coolidge in the United 
States and especially the revolt in Soviet Georgia to which 
the western powers lent support all contributed to unease 
and the reappearance of fears that an immediate threat of 
military intervention against the U.S.S.R. existed.
A conference to discuss a proposed security pact was 
organized for October 1925 in Locarno, and excluded the 
U.S.S.R. The resulting agreements included an acceptance by 
France, Germany and Belgium of their mutual borders, and the 
de-militarlzation of the Rhineland. These aspects of the 
pact were to be guaranteed and enforced by Britain and 
Italy. There were no agreements on Germany's eastern borders 
(with Poland and Czechoslovakia) other than a pledge to 
resolve all disputes peacefully. France and Poland signed a 
treaty promising each other military support in the event of 
an attack.
In the Comintern, these developments were widely re­
garded as threatening to the Soviet Union and/or to peace 
generally. It was certainly the case that Locarno was a 
major victory for British foreign policy on several fronts,
303
not least that of dividing the U.S.S.R. and Germany. Al­
though several Soviet-German agreements (on trade, and prom­
ises of neutrality) followed in the months after Locarno, 
"the old sense of a common destiny as outcasts from the 
European community1' (Carr) was gone, and the increasing 
international isolation of the Soviet Union was unmistak­
able .
2. In 1925 for the first time the phrase "stabilization 
of capitalism" began to appear regularly in Comintern pro­
nouncements. Recall that Bukharin had made (one) reference 
to "a certain stabilization" at the thirteenth congress of 
the RCP(b) in May 1924, but the expression gained currency 
only around the time of the fifth enlarged plenum of the 
ECCI (March 1925), when separate preparatory articles by
Zinoviev and Stalin each remarked on "stabilization" and
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Varga used the term in his presentation. Although both 
Zinoviev and Stalin at this time spoke of "two stabiliza­
tions" (i.-e,-> of capitalism and the Soviet Union), Zinoviev 
was already drifting over to the opposition and Trotsky's 
hostility to the notion of 'socialism in one country'.
Indeed, by June 1925 Zinoviev appears to have changed his
mind on stabilization, and published an article entitled
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"The Epoch of Wars and Revolutions."
Cautious as ever about the prospects of promoting a 
European revolution, Stalin in early 1925 enumerated the 
four "allies of the Soviet power,” listing these as the 
proletariat in the advanced capitalist countries, the masses
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in the colonies, the "struggle, conflicts and wars" amongst 
the imperialist powers, and the peasantry. Stalin essential­
ly dismissed the first two "allies" as being of no palpable 
importance in the near future, conceded that while the 
peasantry was participating in economic relations with so­
cialist industry it was nevertheless not "reliable," which
left inter-imperialist contradictions as the principal ally
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of the Soviet Union. Coupled with a theoretical concep­
tion in which the central categories are the "two stabiliza­
tions," or the "two camps," and in which "the international
situation will to an increasing degree be determined by the
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relation of forces between these two camps," the quite 
logical implicit political conclusion is that Soviet (and 
presumably, international socialist) interests would be best 
promoted through exploiting inter-imperialist rivalries.
So even at this early juncture, the different under­
lying conceptions of stabilization and its contradictions 
discussed in the previous section came to be reflected in 
divergent programmatic emphases. Stalin gravitated toward 
the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel) 
and its view
that communist parties could profitably collaborate with 
other Left parties opposed to their bourgeois govern­
ments, especially those of a Fascist complexion, even 
with parties which did not accept the revolutionary pro­
gramme of communism.[304]
Bukharin, on the other hand, despite his support of
Stalin against Trotsky in the central committee at this
time, pushed for a "class against class" strategy in Europe.
Together with Jules Humbert-Droz, and against Stalin, Bukha­
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rin was successful in advocating that the French Communist
Party abandon its support of the ’Left Bloc' and that the
Communist Party of Great 3ritain cease collaboration with 
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Labour. Although arguably Stalin's approach of collabora­
tion 'from above' might have yielded more favorable results 
than the strategy actually adopted--there were no communist 
deputies chosen in the subsequent French (1928) or British 
(1929) general elections— the point is that the turn to the 
left originated with Bukharin and was linked to his theoret­
ical understanding of the contradictions of stabilization. 
The "class against class" slogan was coined (in this tacti­
cal conjuncture) by Bukharin's associate Humbert-Droz in 
March 1927, it "was not launched at the Sixth World Congress 
[1928].. ..[it] was certainly not introduced in connection
with Stalin's rise to power, and he surely did not bear
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'major responsibility* for it."
3. In May 1926, a protest by British mineworkers over 
wages developed into a massive general strike supported by 
the British Trade Union Congress (TUC), which jointly with 
the All-Russian Central Committee of Trade Unions had estab­
lished the Anglo-Russian Trade Union Committee in April 
1925. This action seemed to confirm the Third Interna­
tional's stated view that the center of gravity of revolu­
tion had shifted westward and that a turn to the left among 
European workers had become discernible. Although the strike 
and the international working class support It touched off 
provided glorious evidence of internationalist solidarity,
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the British government's strategy was effective:
With unerring precision, the Government and its sup­
porters concentrated from the start on the one issue 
which was, above all others, certain to unnerve the 
Labour leaders: the issue of revolution and unconstitu­
tionality. Concentration on that issue had another im­
mense advantage--it made it unnecessary to discuss the
miners' case at all....
Try though they night to persuade themselves and others
that they were engaged in a purely industrial dispute, 
almost a routine strike, [the leadership of the Labour 
Party] knew that it was more than that, and it was this 
which made them feel guilty, uneasy, insecure. In fact, 
they half shared, indeed more than half shared, the 
Government's view that the General Strike was a politi­
cally and morally reprehensible venture, undemocratic, 
anti-parliamentary, subversive.[307]
These same events were described in the following way by an
ECCI analysis of the strike: "If the labor leaders acted as
though they failed to understand the political character of
the strike, the Government and the bourgeoisie understood it
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very well, and acted accordingly...." The Baldwin govern­
ment so thoroughly disquieted the Labour leadership that on 
12. May the general strike was ended and all demands uncon­
ditionally withdrawn. The miners doggedly hung on for an­
other six months, but eventually resumed work under condi­
tions worse than before.
From an historical perspective, the significance of
this defeat for the miners consisted in
the transformation of the workers' movement into a tame, 
disciplined trade union and electoral interest.
This Is not only to say that never again would the 
trade unions and the Labour Party seek to exercise po­
litical influence against the Government of the day by 
the use of the industrial weapon. It also means that the 
trade unions would shun militancy over industrial 
issues.[309]
Within the Comintern, however, the Immediate effect of the 
defeat of the general strike was to further the acrimony
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between the majority and the Trotskyist opposition. Trotsky
tentatively advocated disbanding the Anglo-Russian Trade
Union Committee, but agreed "to waive his demand" in order
to entice Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev into joining the opposi- 
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tion, Stalin at this time, in a series of speeches, 
agreed that the British TUC had "doomed the strike to inevi­
table failure," and accused the TUC of "treachery" and "a
whole chain of betrayals," although he did not advocate
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forsaking the Anglo-Russian Committee. Against Trotsky,
Stalin depicted abandonment of the joint committee as an
ultra-left "theatrical gesture" since,
for all their reactionary character, the trade unions of 
the west are the most elementary organizations of prole­
tariat, those best understood by the most backward work­
ers, and therefore the most comprehensive organizations 
of the proletariat.[312]
In Bukharin's estimation, the turn to the left was
nowhere more apparent than in Britain, but he agreed with
Stalin (and the majority of the ECCI) that leaving the
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Anglo-Russian Committee at that juncture was undesirable. 
This seemingly perverse attitude (i,.£. , why remain in ca­
hoots with reformists at a time when revolutionary senti­
ments were on the rise?) reflected the success of the Na­
tional Left Wing Movement, organized by the Communist Party 
of Great Britain, in chipping local Labour constituencies 
away from the national party in order to form an organized 
left-wing faction within Labour.
The Comintern "Theses on the Lessons of the General 
Strike" interpreted the strike as confirmation of "the gen­
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eral move to the left of the workers...." The Anglo-Russian 
Trade Union Committee was a product of the united front 
tactics, designed to expose the reactionary British trade 
union leaders and win over the masses to the side of the 
revolution. In the official Comintern view, the betrayal of 
the strike by the Labour leadership partly accomplished this 
goal. As such, it would be folly to leave the Anglo-Russian 
Committee, declared the "Theses," because if the reformist 
leaders moved even further to the right--which was "highly
probable"--they would be utterly exposed to the remaining
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workers as traitors to the proletariat. As it happened,
the British TUC voted to disband the joint venture with the
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Russian trade union federation in 1927. In a further
setback, the British government severed diplomatic relations
with the Soviet Union in the spring of 1927.
4. As early as the spring of 1925 a revolutionary
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situation had begun to develop in China. A strike in the
Shanghai textile factories spread into a series of strikes 
which increasingly assumed an anti-imperialist and revolu­
tionary character throughout the major cities of China. The 
leading role played by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 
these events very rapidly transformed the party from a small 
group of intellectuals and university professors into a mass 
organization. Since January 1923 the CCP, by direction of 
the ECCI, had instructed its members to join Sun Yat-sen’s
Kuomintang (KMT) on an individual basis while the CCP would
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separately maintain its own organization. The KMT under 
Sun Yat-sen was, in the terminology of the Comintern, a
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"national-revolutionary" organization rooted in the liberal- 
democratic bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, intellegentsia 
and proletariat.
Sun Yat-sen died in March 1925, before the strike 
movement began, and leadership of the KMT passed to Chiang 
Kai-shek. So long as the May strike movement was centered in 
Japanese-owned textile factories, the KMT acquiesced; but as 
the actions spread to include Chinese-owned enterprises as 
well, relations between the CCP and KMT became tense. The 
ECCI urged the CCP not to press matters to the point of 
insurrection, deeming an uprising premature. Even as the May 
movement ebbed during the summer of 1925, however, troops 
under the comprador Chang Tso~lin suppressed striking work­
ers and students. Then, when some of Chang's supporters 
began to rebel against his leadership, a fresh impetus 
appeared for joint CCP-KMT anti-imperialist struggle, and a 
breach was averted.
The second congress of the KMT in January 1926 seemed 
to evidence a growing influence of the CCP (almost one- 
fourth of the newly elected KMT central committee were 
communists), but in May 1926 Chiang suddenly ordered the 
arrest of key leaders of the CCP, the removal of communist 
political commissars attached to the army (of whom there 
were many), and the confinement of Soviet military advisors. 
Chiang had evidently decided that his forces were adequately 
prepared "to launch the long-awaited 'northern expedition'" 
against the comprador warlords. Carr astutely describes the
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two principal reasons for the rift between the KMT and the 
Comintern. First, Chiang's Soviet military advisors, and the 
Comintern generally, considered the move reckless. The Com­
intern, having already been disappointed in the widely an­
ticipated European revolution, could not bring itself to 
believe in the imminence of an Asian revolution which had 
always seemed more remote than a European one, despite the 
admonitions of Lenin in his final years. Second, once revo­
lution had suddenly appeared on the agenda, "the hollowness 
of the verbal compromise" between the bourgeois-nationalist
and social revolutions became evident, and Chiang merely
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forced the issue.
In the Comintern, Chiang*s coup led Zinoviev to suggest
withdrawal of the CCP from the KMT. Trotsky, in a set of
extensive personal clarificatory notes on China penned five
days before the coup made no mention of a need for independ-
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ence of the CCP. Carr documents several different stories 
subsequently provided by Trotsky: an unpublished analysis 
(September 1926) written after the coup argued that "partic­
ipation of the CCP in the Kuomintang was perfectly correct 
in the period when the CCP was a propaganda society which 
was only preparing itself for future independent political 
activity...," but that the time had come for the CCP "to 
fight for direct independent leadership of the awakened 
working class...."; by 1930, after Chiang's massacre of 
communists in Shanghai (April 1927), Trotsky was claiming 
that "I personally was from the very beginning, that is, 




After some hesitation, the majority of the ECCI re­
frained from a break with Chiang at this time insofar as a 
split would leave the communists unable to influence the 
Impending northern campaign whatsoever. Nonetheless, the 
central committee of the Russian party in March 1927 con­
sidered it "necessary to adopt the course of arming the
workers and peasants" and expose "the treacherous and reac-
321
tionary policy of the Kuoraintang Rights." As it happened
(or "on the face of it," according to the Deutscher ver- 
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sion), this assessment was on the mark insofar as during 
the campaign communist troops were successful in organizing 
workers and peasants, and expropriated landlords in Hunan. 
Chiang*s betrayal of the CCP came in April 1927, when fol­
lowing a successful communist uprising in Shanghai (once 
more directed against Chang Tso-lin) ICuomintang troops en­
tered the city demanding that their erstwhile communist 
allies surrender all weapons. Compliance with this order led 
to a bloody massacre of communists by Chiang’s forces on 12. 
April. The ECCI majority assessment at this point became 
that the national bourgeoisie had deserted the revolution, 
and that the trajectory of development had shifted from that 
of a revolutionary national united front (including the
national bourgeoisie) to a working class and agrarian social 
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revolution.
It should be noted that Bukharin’s and Stalin's views 
on the question of the Chinese revolution closely coincided,
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and that at this stage there was no indication of Stalin 
forcing Bukharin to say things which were more ’radical* 
than Bukharin believed. On the contrary: although Bukharin 
and Stalin walked in tandem when it came to the Chinese 
question, on every other significant issue of international 
politics Bukharin had for quite some time, as seen above, 
occupied a position to the left of Stalin. China, moreover, 
was not merely the exception that proved the rule (of Bukha- 
rinisra as origin of the turn to the left)— China's semi­
colonial status meant that theories of capitalist stabiliza­
tion (or capitalist anything else) did not apply. Neither 
Bukharin's nor Stalin's analysis of the Chinese situation 
was particularly good, but their views on China could be 
similar precisely because their quite different theoretical 
outlooks on the 'contradictions of capitalist stabilization* 
were irrelevant in the Chinese case.
At the time of the fifteenth congress of the VKP(b) in
December 1927, which also marked the official expulsion of
the opposition from the party, Bukharin continued to be more
emphatic and concrete about the turn to the left than
Stalin, although the latter had finally begun to speak for
the first time of Europe on the "eve" of a "neriod” charac-
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terized by "a new revolutionary upsurge." Concretely,
however, the immediate tasks of the communist parties seemed
quite modest in Stalin's view: "to develop the Communist
Parties....; to strengthen the revolutionary trade unions
and the workers' united front....; to maintain peaceful
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relations with the capitalist countries...." Bukharin, by
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contrast, argued not only that the united front should be
strengthened, but that it had "become necessary to effect
[a] change of emphasis... in the direction of a more inten-
326
sive fight against the Social Democratic leaders." While 
Bukharin thus explicitly advocated "changing...the united 
front tactics" in a leftward direction, Stalin spoke only of 
"strengthening" the united front per se, and made no refer­
ence to a new orientation.
A practical outcome of the party congress was a 
strengthening of Stalin's position in the nine-member Polit­
buro, with the replacement of Zinoviev and Trotsky by Ya. 
Rudzutak and V. Kuibyshev. The falling out between Stalin 
and Bukharin became evident only in the spring of 1928, and 
then only in discussions within the Politburo; the disagree­
ment centered on Bukharin's growing unease over the extraor­
dinary measures for grain procurement, measures he had up
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until then supported. Within a very short period, even 
while the sixth congress of the Comintern was convening in 
July 1928, Bukharin's considerable (indeed, decisive) in­
fluence on the editorial boards of the crucially important 
Pravda (newspaper) and Bol'shevik (theoretical journal) was 
severely curtailed by additions and shake-ups.
Sixth Congress of the Communist International
July-August 1928
This account of the origins of the third period in 
Comintern history will end at the sixth congress, exactly 
where most other explanations of the left turn begin. Rather
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than a starting point, the sixth congress was the formal 
confirmation of tactical changes which had already been 
prepared under the guidance of the Bukharin leadership. 
Indeed, many of these changes had been ratified even prior 
to the congress at the ninth enlarged plenum of the ECCI 
(February 1928). Over the objections of the majority of the 
central committee of the Communist Party of Great Britain, 
the ECCI had instructed the CPGB to adopt "clearer and 
sharper tactics of opposition to the Labour Party" due to 
the growing "integration of [the] capitalist bourgeoisie and
reformism...." The Labour Party now had to be considered one
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of two "enemy camps." The French Communist Party had
already, in November 1927, adopted the "class against class"
tactics following instructions from the ECCI appearing over
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Bukharin's signature. The ninth plenum was careful to
characterize the Chinese revolution as still In its
bourgeois-democratic phase. The KMT had now been completely
exposed as reactionary, and the CCP had to "prepare itself
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for a violent surge forward of new revolutionary waves."
E.H. Carr suggests that after the ninth plenum a "tem­
porizing view of the prospects of capitalism" (by the Bukha­
rin leadership) prevailed, but that by the time of the sixth 
congress four months later this "could no longer be toler­
ated" (presumably by Stalin). The "temporizing view" was, in 
Carr's opinion, presented in a Bol* shevik article (March
1928) which argued that it would be '"crudely mistaken 
theoretically' to suppose that western capitalism was on the 
verge of a breakdown." The evidence presented by Carr to
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demonstrate that this view "could no longer be tolerated" 
consists only of (i) a speech by Stalin in July that sug­
gested "contradictions... have ripened...within the capital­
ist camp" since 1924, specifically the Anglo-American con­
tradiction ("the principal one"), the contradiction between 
imperialism and the colonies, and the contradiction between 
the capitalist world and the Soviet Union; (ii) an article 
in Koramunisticheskil Internatsional which "used the wave of 
strikes, as well as recent election figures, to demonstrate 
the growing power of communist parties in Europe"; and (iii)
an article in Pravda noting "'a sharpening of the struggle
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against social-democracy’." But there is a non sequitur 
here In that none of the items cited by Carr suggest the 
imminence of breakdown, and in fact only repeat the asses­
sments which the Bukharin leadership had been providing for 
quite some time.
Carr, as many other analysts, notes that Bukharin's 
draft theses on the international situation (to be presented 
at the sixth congress) were amended after being discussed in 
the Russian delegation. Neither Bukharin’s original nor the 
altered draft were ever made public (only the final version 
passed by the congress was published), and the only extended 
description of what transpired in the dicusslon was provided 
by Stalin in April 1929, almost a year later, when the 
campaign against Bukharin was in full swing. Carr appears to 
accept at face value Stalin's claim that in Bukharin's view 
capitalist stabilization was "becoming more secure," to
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which (said Stalin) the Russian delegation countered that
"capitalist stabilization is not and cannot be secure, that
it is being shaken and will continue to be shaken by the
march of events, owing to the crisis of world capital- 
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ism." Although it is not known specifically what Bukharin 
said about capitalist stabilization in his draft theses, 
enough is known (and has been reviewed above) about his 
assessments of stabilization between 1926 and 1928 to ques­
tion uncritical acceptance of Stalin's remarks. At the 
least, Stalin’s statements of April 1929 are more reasonably 
regarded as polemical tactics in a highly charged factional 
struggle rather than as a faithful account of events at the 
congress or an accurate rendition of Bukharin's views on 
stabilization. The three other major amendments to Bukha­
rin's theses noted by Stalin in 1929 were (i) that Bukharin 
confined himself to stressing the need to sharpen the strug­
gle against social-democracy generally, and not the struggle 
against left social-democracy particularly, (ii) that Bukha­
rin confined himself to merely the fight against the right 
deviation in the Comintern, and not the fight against con­
ciliatory attitudes toward the right deviation, and (iii)
that Bukharin did not sufficiently stress the need to main-
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tain iron discipline in the communist parties.
Richard Day's version of the events is even less plau­
sible. He regards the "real import of the amendment [to be
the] inclusion of Stalin's insistence on the inevitability 
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of war." Since, however, Day is in a position to know 
neither the content of the original draft nor the amendment,
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and since Stalin's own account of the amendment procedure 
makes no mention of the inevitability of war question, Day's 
revelation of what Stalin 'forced' Bukharin to say is pure 
conjecture. Day claims that Bukharin had been growing "des­
perate" to save the N.E.P. in Russia, and that this had led 
him (as early as the fifteenth congress of the Russian party 
in December 1927) to "retract... his forecast of hostili­
ties," but Day provides no citations or references to sup­
port this. In fact, at the fifteenth congress Bukharin
stated that the "danger of war was never so great as it is
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now. "
A much more convincing explanation of Stalin's insist­
ence on the amendments is indicated (but not pursued) by 
Carr himself. Bukharin had for the first time openly opposed 
the extraordinary grain procurement measures in the Soviet 
Union at the central committee meeting of the Russian party 
just prior to the sixth Comintern congress. Stalin's insist­
ence on modifying Bukharin's draft theses a few weeks later, 
no matter how trivial the content of the amendments, could
still embarass Bukharin and show that he "had forfeited the
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confidence of the party majority." Carr seeks to present 
the dispute on Comintern affairs in larger (substantive) 
terms by implicitly claiming to know (which he cannot) that 
Bukharin's draft theses were in fact decisively altered. No 
real evidence for this claim exists, and any attempt to 
conjecture such evidence requires the implicit assumption 
that Bukharin had suddenly and without any prior indications
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altered his conception of capitalist stabilization. Bukha­
rin’s own assessment of the changes, which admittedly should
not be given any more credence than Stalin's, was that the
337
alterations had only made his draft "more precise."
It is not necessary here to do more than note that the 
campaign against Bukharinism, begun In the spring of 1928, 
was successful. Moreover, while the campaign may have re­
sembled ’mere’ factional strife, real issues (collectiviza­
tion, industrialization) were at stake in the sense that 
Stalin, in the wake of the defeat of the Trotskyist opposi­
tion, was not simply taking over their agrarian program. 
Stalin's solution to the grain impasse of the late 1920s was 
rooted in a novel theoretical approach, one that owed noth­
ing to either the right or the left oppositions which in 
fact both proceeded from substantially similar theoretical
fundamentals that belied their different programmatic con- 
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elusions.
On the international front, however, the defeat of the 
Bukharinist opposition and the consequent consignment to 
oblivion of its "variegated" analysis of capitalist stabili­
zation meant that a theoretical vacuum inevitably appeared. 
The Varga perspective, which had been uneasily coexisting 
alongside the Bukharinist, stepped into the breach and be­
came virtually by default the prevailing Comintern theory of 
capitalism. Whereas the Bukharin approach had initiated the 
turn to the left, it fell to the underconsumptionist theory 
to complete the shift. This was accomplished by substituting 
for the Bukharinist conception of stabilization as self-
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limiting growth the only conception possible in a radical 
underconsumption milieu (moreover, one which emphasized the 
’rottenness’ of the imperialist phase): univocal collapse.
It was as much the logic of the underconsumptionist 
view as Stalin’s supposedly implacable radicalism that form­
ed the essentials of the Comintern's hard left line between 
the time of the sixth congress and the consolidation of 
fascist power in Germany during the mid 1930s. Although he 
had tilted toward the underconsumption theory and its con­
clusions earlier, Stalin came around to wholeheartedly ac­
cept it only at the time of the sixteenth congress of the 
Russian party in June 1930; even at this juncture, however, 
Draper notes that Stalin was saying only that ’’the stabili­
zation of capitalism is coming to an end," i..e^  , presumably
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it had not yet ended,
Stalin inherited the turn to the left, he did not 
initiate it in order to defeat Bukharin. Rather than stem­
ming from Stalin's personal traits— which I do not for a 
moment claim were inconsequential or irrelevant to sub­
sequent events— the political forms assumed by the third 
period owe at least as much to the Varga-underconsumption
thinking on capitalism, to conditions in the member parties
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(especially the German), and to the timely arrival of the 
economic crisis which seemingly vindicated Varga and the 
theory of decay once and for all.
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The foregoing has sought to provide some inductive 
support for the writing of theoretical economic history by 
demonstrating, via analytical case study, the vital yet 
complex role played by economic theory in the formation of 
political strategy and tactics. The specific example consid­
ered was the mainstream Marxist labor movement in the years 
1860-1930. The necessity of analysis rather than description 
stems from the fact that although the role of economic 
theory is often decisively important, it is equally often 
true that a ready and direct identification of the specific 
effects of theory is difficult to provide, i^ .e^ ., its effects 
are not immediately and palpably revealed in the 'choices' 
that political actors make. This Is not because most politi­
cal practitioners (particularly Marxists) fail to explicitly 
acknowledge the importance of theory, but rather because the 
practical repercussions of conflated levels of theoretical 
abstraction, teleological constructs, ill-defined or absent 
concepts, etc., frequently only make their appearance ob­
liquely, or in a domain once, twice, or even further removed 
from that in which the theoretical construct had originally 
been erected.
One aspect of the exercise has been a writing of the 
theoretical history itself, viz., criticism of the varied
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economic theories of capitalism advanced by socialist poli­
ticians (and/or prevalent in socialist political parties) 
has been linked to the political practice advocated or 
pursued by the politicians and/or parties. The second aspect 
of the study then logically entailed the demonstration that 
these theoretical conceptions of capitalist economy provide 
a good explanation (as good as or better than rival explana­
tions) of the political conclusions reached by their propo­
nents. Note that the approach taken herein has never implied 
the claim that the entirety of an individual's (or party's)
political makeup derives directly from their 'preferred*
1
theory of capitalism. Lenin's politics, for example, proba­
bly owe something to the fact of his brother’s execution at 
the hands of the tsarist regime. But for an analyst (a 
Marxist one at that) to claim to somehow know that Lenin's
considerations on party organization sprang full-blown from
2
the sad episode of Alexander's death is arguably fanciful. 
The theory-dependence of politics is more complex, but no 
less crucial merely because of this complexity, than expla­
nations which dwell on the 'personal' or 'psychological*. 
Indeed, it is precisely the attenuated nature of the link 
between economic theory and politics which makes it both 
possible and necessary to speak of the sense in which the 
logic of an economic theory imposes itself on practice, 
since it most frequently takes place 'behind the backs* of 
the practitioners.
A clear case of economic theory's perceptible effects 
on practice was discussed in Chapter I, which traced the
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development of Marx's theoretical work and his conduct of 
political matters. It was shown that prior to his working 
out of a complete economic theory of capitalism, Marx's 
understanding of capitalist society derived from a concep­
tion of history rooted in philosophy. Economic notions 
(wages, capital, etc.) were present, but they were not yet 
concepts. These non-concepts, once instantiated in Marx's 
philosophy of history, nonetheless became metamorphosed into 
vessels (in the sense of containers), with a shape and a 
palpability which belied the fact that they were--empty. The 
relations between these contentless notions could not, 
therefore, be governed by the structure of the notions 
themselves (as is the case with genuine theoretical con­
cepts), but came to be dictated by the highly general phi­
losophy of history in which they were embedded. The con­
sequence was the outline of capitalism in which the homo­
genizing and levelling tendencies of the accumulation proc­
ess appeared to stand alone, seemingly driving real history 
to the pure final result in which "The working men have no 
country."
Conclusions of this sort were gradually discarded by 
Marx in step with his elaboration of the economic theory of 
capitalism. Commodity, value, money, capital, etc., were 
systematically worked over into concepts as opposed to only 
designating the names of things; serious attention was de­
voted to distinguishing levels of theoretical abstraction
3
and the legitimate applications of these abstractions. The
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implication, as evidenced by Marx's political approach after 
the early 1850s (and especially with the International Work­
ing Men's Association, the First International), was an 
increasingly 'complex’ and non-deterministic politics (Chap­
ter I, subheading C). Once the economic analysis of capital 
allowed the prospects for revolutionary politics to be eval­
uated from the standpoint of a theoretically informed con­
crete analysis (rather than the mere, even if 'artistic', 
hypostatization of generalities), the conception of an ac­
tually or even eventually existing homogeneous proletariat 
vanished. Concerted international working class political 
action, while not ruled out as an impossibility, came to be 
regarded by Marx as a political program to be forged and 
continuously re-forged. The process of accumulation not only 
produced, it also continually reproduced, the economic con­
ditions which simultaneously fostered and equivocated prole­
tarian political unity.
Marx had determined that the 'pure' theory of capital­
ism (as ultimately embodied in Capital) could not be regard­
ed as the "historical tendency" and "logical conclusion" (as 
Luxemburg later maintained) of the real development of capi­
talism, any more than the Newtonians' first approximation of 
a 'frlctlonless' environment could be regarded as the "logi­
cal conclusion" of actual motion in the physical world. The 
relationship between theory and the reality it sought to 
explain was now treated in a much more contingent manner 
than before— Marx had adopted a materialist perspective in 
more than form, and had begun to operate from an epistemo-
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logical perspective resembling modern scientific realism. It 
was this sense of the contingency mediating the theory- 
reality relation which for a time escaped Marx's followers.
Within the Second International, Bernstein's politics 
not surprisingly reflected his criticism of Marxism from 
essentially bourgeois theoretical positions (Chapter II, 
subheading C). From the standpoint of this study, however, 
more interesting and important considerations emerge from an 
analysis of the differences among those who sought to defend 
Marxism from Bernstein's revisionism, and the manner in 
which economic-theoretical discord produced or was reflected 
in varying political judgements. For the 'orthodox* tendency 
in the International, determinism in economic theory 
(Kautsky) plus a pacifist social orientation combined to 
produce a political position which affirmed the 'necessity' 
of a peaceful capitalism (ultra-imperialism). The determin­
istic vein in Plekhanov’s work stemmed not so much from his 
own economic analyses (of which there were few) nor his 
philosophical efforts, which, contrary to much of the con­
temporary wisdom, are not crudely deterministic. Rather, 
Plekhanov's deterministic-teleological constructions derive 
from his over-reliance on the economic themes of Marx's 
Manifesto which, as already argued above, were drawn from 
the philosophical theory of history ultimately abandoned by 
Marx himself.
Luxemburg, despite the militant orientation and inde­
fatigable spirit which render her so appealing, was unable
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to resolve the revisionisn-orthodoxy quandary. This must be 
recognized and affirmed, without casting unwarranted asper­
sions, particularly in view of those increasingly ingenious 
efforts to recover Luxemburg. As argued in Chapter II, 
subsection E, it Is simply impossible to disengage the 
tension between activism and fatalism in Luxemburg’s work—  
indeed, Luxemburg’s theoretical schema necessarily produces 
a continual oscillation between determinism and voluntarism 
in politics.
Although Lenin's approach surmounted in practice the 
impasse erected by the revisionism controversy, it did so in 
a not entirely theoretically satisfactory manner, with 
shortcomings which were not long in returning home to roost. 
Lenin’s "concrete analysis of a concrete situation" was no 
doubt a major methodological step toward recapturing the 
complexity of Marx's mature approach, but the fortuitous 
aspects of the success of the Leninist project were not 
always recognized as such. It was precisely the spectacular 
practical success of Leninism which led to its virtually 
uncritical incorporation into the revolutionary working 
class movement. Not unreasonably, organizational considera­
tions were perceived as the hallmark of the Leninist 
approach, and the optimism of the immediately post­
revolutionary period suggested that surmounting theoretical- 
political problems was possible by simply drawing the appro­
priate organizational lines of demarcation.
But while the effects exercised by economic theory on 
politics may be silent and indirect, they are also inexora­
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ble. Even the seemingly ironclad "21 Conditions” of admis­
sion to the Comintern could not prevent economic theory from 
leaving its specific imprint on the communist politics of 
the 1920s. In this case, Lenin’s theoretical legacy did not 
make a positive contribution. The poorly worked out aspects 
of his economic theory--especially the inconsistency inher­
ent in his treatment of the corapetition-monopoly question 
and the pseudo-concept of "moribund” capitalism— forced 
their way into the theoretical orientation of the Comintern.
While Lenin's notion of "moribund" or "decaying" capi­
talism produced very consequential effects, it was not whol­
ly or partly responsible for the origins of the third period 
in Comintern politics, as some Marxists (Claudin,
Poulantzas) maintain. The turn to the left wing politics of 
the third period originated with the disproportionality 
approach of Bukharin and his analysis of the growing contra­
dictions of capitalist stabilization. Bukharin by and large 
succeeded in presenting an analysis which treated the inten­
sification of contradictions as an integral aspect of the 
resumption of accumulation, by contrast to the underconsump­
tion approach which forced observable phenomena into precon­
ceived images of "decay." Disproportionality explicitly 
avoided the notion of "decay," and was able to explain the 
upturn, the aggravation of contradictions as accumulation 
proceeded, and the eventual downturn; but disproportionality 
was less suited to pinpointing why a particular downturn 
would or might be the final "structural" crisis of capital­
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ism, Varga's underconsumption view, on the other hand, was 
in relative abeyance through the mid-1920s as Varga's ef­
forts to deny any evidence of a resumption of economic 
activity began to sound increasingly ad hoc. The persistence 
of generally high levels of unemployment in Europe was the 
toehold needed by the underconsumption theory to retain a 
semblance of offering a viable explanation of economic con­
ditions in the capitalist world.
After the campaign against the right deviation and 
Bukharin began to make an impression, however, the undercon­
sumption approach began its move to center stage by default, 
and soon displaced disproportionality as the prevailing 
theory of capitalism's contradictions once Bukharin's views 
on socialist development were rejected in the Russian party 
and his political influence collapsed. The triumph of under­
consumption might have been shortlived, due to its under­
lying inability to reasonably explain any recovery in the 
process of accumulation, were it not for the economic col­
lapse in the capitalist world after 1929. Suddenly the 
imagery of "decay” came into its own, and was actually more 
compelling than disproportionality in its description of 
empirical events, as the 'rationalization' and 'stabiliza­
tion' of capitalism in the previous few years were 
forgotten.
The increasingly implacable character of the left turn 
after 1929 was sustainable largely as a result of the suc­
cess enjoyed by underconsumption in 'predicting' the Great 
Depression— it was the theory of underconsumption and its
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descriptive baggage (the collapse of an ’overripe’ capital­
ism) rather than Stalin as such which made the distended 
version of the third period possible.
It is particularly the case for the Comintern's politi­
cal history that economic theory must comprise a significant 
component of any effort at understanding. Without the in­
sights gained by assigning a major explanatory role to 
economic theory, the alternative is an account rooted in 
Stalin's personality and/or his tactics in factional strug­
gle. While these latter factors are certainly not irrele­
vant, their utilization as the principal explanation of 
events is sustainable only by a careless approach to the 
dating of events (Chapter III, subheadings C and D).
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Notes to Chapter IV
1. The ironical quotes reflect my realist view that the 
'preferred’ theory of capitalism does not acquire its status 
as the result of 'choices' made by practitioners. "The 
scientific practice will exist in a particular society as an 
autonomous practice provided it plays an appropriate role or 
function in that society. This will not be a matter of the 
decisions of individuals." Chalmers, What Is This Thing 
Called Science?, 139.
2. P.N. Pospelov et al., Vladimir Ilyich Lenin A Biography 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965),24.
3. The subject matter of Capital was "...not Britain, but 
the capitalist socio-economic formation." Colletti, From 
Rousseau to Lenin, 9.
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